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This dissertation examines the historical practices and literary representations of 
“agrarian commune” from 1949 to the contemporary time in People’s Republic of 
China, focusing on its ambiguous role in the heterogeneous formation of Chinese 
modernity. Current Chinese literary studies have not explored the literary imagination 
of “agrarian commune” and its relation to modernity. Combining the Marxist political-
economic analysis of China’s socio-economic reality with the textual analysis of 
literary works, this study seeks to explore how this “non-capitalist” formation of 
“commune” articulates with the “capitalist sector” in the uneven structure of China’s 
national economy in a complex way: on the one hand, it creates an “internal border” 
within China and serves for the internal primitive accumulation for the state; on the 
other hand, it produces the resisting elements that continually contest and disrupt the 
logic of capitalism, and opens the possibility for alternative practice of the “common 
life” that transcends the logic of capital and state. This study unpacks the complexity 
of “commune” in different periods through the reading of literary works. Chapter One 
focuses on the “collectivization movement” in socialist period and explores Zhao 
Shuli and Liu Qing’s divergent conceptions about the “agricultural cooperative” in 
relation to the state. Chapter Two focuses on the “underclass literature” that captures 
 the living conditions of rural migrants under the “household contract responsibility 
system” in the era of market economy and global capitalism. Chapter Three examines 
the recent effort of reviving the “commune” and “common life” in the “New Co-
operative Movement” promoted by New Left intellectuals after the year 2000, 
focusing on Wang Anyi and Liu Jiming’s novels. By looking into the different ways 
that the collective land ownership interacts with capital and the state throughout 
different stages of modern China, this study shows how the rural “outside” plays both 
a “productive” and a “subversive” role in the global uneven structure of capitalism, 
thereby enriching the discussion of “uneven development” in Marxist scholarship, and 
filling a blank spot in current Chinese literary studies regarding the rural modernity.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
WHAT IS COMMUNE 
 
Marx and the Ambiguous “Commune”  
 “Commune” is a controversial term in Marxist discourse, denoting multiple 
meanings and indicating a complex turn of Marx’s thought. A systematic articulation 
seems to be necessary to capture the difficulty and hesitation of Marx in contemplating 
the highly theoretically charged and extremely ambiguous “commune” in Marx’s 
thoughts.  Generally speaking, we can hastily say that in some places, as in “The 
British Rule in India” (1853), “commune” denotes an archaic form of social formation 
as pre-capitalist mode of production, which is regarded as prior to the rise of 
capitalism and could be developed into the capitalist mode of production. However, in 
other places, such as Grundrisse, although “commune” is still regarded as an archaic 
one, it is designated as a mode of production outside the “history”, that it is intimately 
linked with the stigmatized term of “oriental despotism” as well as the “Asiatic Mode 
of Production” which generated controversial debates in later socialist states. But, 
thirdly, there is a positive way of understanding “commune,” when Marx in his later 
years discussed Russian Commune or “Paris Commune,” it is imagined to as the base 
of “communism” that could overcome the capitalism, and is consciously linked to the 
struggle of Paris Commune and therefore linked to the imagination of an alternative 
future or another temporality.  
This demands us to pay more attention to particular junction of these three paths. 
That is the point in Grundrisse, where Marx denotes various kinds of precapitalist 
  2 
social formations that are characterized by the incomplete development of private 
property and individual in modern sense. The three major types of “commune” – clan 
(to which Asiatic mode of production belongs), Greco-Roman, Germanic – all share 
the characteristics that the laboring individual’s “relation to the objective conditions of 
labor is mediated through his presence as member of the commune.”1 Of the three type 
of commune, the clan is the earliest, initial type, and has the least degree of 
individuation, in which individuals are “mere accidents,” as “purely natural 
component parts,”2 and to this the least individuated “clan” type belongs the Asiatic 
commune, with its own distinct character. On the other hand, the Roman 
state/commune had a more alienated relation of individual to the commune (state), in 
which individuals can be private proprietors of land as a member of the 
commune/state; and the Germanic commune had a even more loose form, existing 
“only in the periodic gathering-together of the commune members,” appearing “as a 
coming-together, not as a being-together; as a unification made up of independent 
subjects, landed proprietors, and not as a unity.”3  
Apparently, here Marx only elaborates on the ancient mode of production which 
is located at the first or second stage of the linearly history of historical materialism, as 
Marx clearly claimed in his Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economics (1859) 4 . However, a closer look at this draft of thoughts shows the 
                                                
1 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 486. 
2 Ibid., 474 
3 Ibid., 483. 
4 Marx said, “In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of the production 
can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society.” Here Marx incorporates 
Asiatic Mode of Production a one stage of the unilinear scheme of “progress.” See Marx, “Preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, 
vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 504. 
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uncertainty and hesitation of Marx in pondering the “oriental commune.”  Indeed, of 
all the communes, the oriental commune (the Asiatic type) stands out as a unique type, 
distinguished from all other communes for its highest degree of communalism and the 
least degree of individuation. First, it is the least individuated. “In the specifically 
oriental form (wherever property exists only as communal property, … the individual 
member is as such as only possessor of a particular part, hereditary or not, since any 
fraction of the property belongs to no member for himself, but to him only as 
immediate member of the commune, i.e. as in direct unity with it, not in distinction to 
it. This individual is thus only a possessor. What exists is only communal property, 
and only private possession.”5 
Here Marx implies, communal property is a kind of private possession and the 
individual is also a possessor in an indirect method of possession. This is the first level 
of the structure of the Asiatic type. The second level is there is a “despot.” Indeed, 
Asiatic form is distinguished by the “unity” of all communes embodied in a despot:   
It is not in the least a contradiction to it that, as in most of the Asiatic land 
forms, the comprehensive unity standing above all these little communities 
appears as the higher proprietor or as the sole proprietor; the real 
communities hence only as hereditary possessors. Because the unity is the 
real proprietor and the real presupposition of communal property, it 
follows that this unity can appear as a particular entity above the many real 
particular communities, where the individual is then in fact propertyless, 
or, property – i.e. the relation of the individual to the natural conditions of 
labor and of reproduction as belonging to him, as the objective, nature-
given inorganic body of his subjectivity - appears mediated for him 
through a cession by the total unity – a unity realized in the form of the 
despot, the father of the many communities – to the individual, through the 
mediation of a particular commune. The surplus product – which is, 
incidentally, determined by law in consequence of the real appropriation 
through labor – thereby automatically belongs to this highest unity. 
Amidst oriental despotism and the propertyless which seems legally to 
                                                
5 Marx, Grundrisse, 477 
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exist there, this clan or communal property exists in fact as the foundation, 
created mostly by a combination of manufactures and agriculture within 
the small commune, which thus becomes altogether self-sustaining, and 
contains all the conditions of reproduction and surplus reproduction within 
itself.6 
 
Here we can see two characteristics of Asiatic commune, or “oriental 
despotism.” First, its structure is characterized by the unity embodied by a despot that 
sits above numerous mutually isolated village communes, to which communes submit 
their surplus product or common labor. The unity of communes embodied in a 
despotic regime above them is the presupposition of the existence of the communes – 
“the communal conditions of real appropriation through labor, aqueducts, very 
important among the Asiatic peoples; means of communication, etc. then appear as the 
work of the higher unity – of the despotic regime hovering above the little 
communes.”7 The second feature is the self-sustaining mode of existence based on the 
union of agriculture and manufacture. The “union between agricultural and 
manufacturing industry” constitutes the “economic basis” of their “self-supporting” 
mode of existence. According to Marx, the combination of these two characteristics 
has endowed the Asiatic type with the long-lasting vitality, making the AMP an 
irreducible other of History.  Marx points out, “The Asiatic form necessarily hangs on 
most tenaciously and for the longest time. This is due to its presupposition that the 
individual does not become independent vis-à-vis the commune; that there is a self-
sustaining circle of production, unity of agriculture and manufactures, etc.”8 Kevin B. 
Anderson, in his groundbreaking book Marx at Margins, analyzes, “Of all of the 
                                                
6 Ibid., 472-473 
7 Ibid., 473-474 
8 Ibid., 486 
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precapitalist forms, the Asian one was structurally at the furthest remove from modern 
capitalism, to which it put up a strong resistance. … Whereas the evolution the Greco-
Roman and Germanic forms saw the breakdown of communal society, as well as a 
certain degree of individuation in both consciousness and social existence, including 
property forms, Asian societies preserved more of the older clan-based communal 
forms.”9 
For Anderson, such tenacity of Asiatic commune met with two different 
attitudes from Marx as he went through the intellectual turn from a unilinear view of 
history to a more multilinear view. He shows, up until 1853, Marx was still trapped in 
a unilinear view of history, focused primarily on working class struggle within 
Western Europe and North America, and barely paid attention to non-Western society. 
At that time, when he just began to approach this unique form of oriental society, he 
conceived it as a historically backward social formation that needed to be broken and 
overcome by more advanced civilization for the sake of historical progress. As is 
shown in his comments on the Indian “village community” in 1853: 
We must not forget that these idyllic village-communities, inoffensive 
though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental 
despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest 
possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving 
it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical 
energies. We must not forget the barbarian egotism which, concentrating 
on some miserable patch of land, had quietly witnessed the ruin of empires, 
the perpetration of unspeakable cruelties, the massacre of the population of 
large towns, with no other consideration bestowed upon them than on 
natural events, itself the helpless prey of any aggressor who deigned to 
notice it at all. We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and 
vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence evoked on the other part, 
in contradistinction, wild, aimless, unbounded forces of destruction and 
                                                
9 Kevin B. Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 159. 
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rendered murder itself a religious rite in Hindostan. We must not forget 
that these little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste 
and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead 
of elevating man the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a 
self-developing social state into never changing natural destiny, and thus 
brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in 
the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in 
adoration of Kanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow.10 
 
Anderson points out, Marx’s notion of oriental society in this period was 
strongly informed by Hegelian notion of teleological progression and Eurocentrism; 
and this has been criticized by many people, including Edward Said. Another historian, 
Perry Anderson, also criticizes that Marx have unreflectively received the 
Enlightenment discourse’s biased description of “oriental society” as “despotism.” 
This discursive tradition of “despotism,” extrojected onto the “Orient” since the 
antiquity, consisted of a series of Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu, Adam 
Smith, Hegel, the travel writings of Francois Bernier and Richard Jones, and informed 
the German classical philosophy and British political economy which Marx heavily 
drew on as his intellectual resources. In Perry Anderson’s view, Marx has basically 
reproduced the Eurocentric prejudice of “oriental despotism” in Enlightenment 
thoughts without much alteration. For example, Marx’s view on India as of 1853 
“were very close to the main themes of traditional European commentary on Asian 
history and society, in both direction and tone,” especially in his “repeated assertion of 
the stagnation and immutability of the Oriental world.”11  
                                                
10 Karl Marx, “The British Rule in India,” in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 12 
(New York: International Publishers, 1975), 132. 
11 Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: N.L.B, 1974), 470. 
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But perhaps Perry Anderson should limit this critique of Marx to the 1853 notes 
of Marx, which was indeed infused with the Eurocentric bias. The materials that Marx 
cited for his description of India came from the official report of the British House of 
Commons in Indian affairs, which employed words like “unchanged” and “from time 
immemorial” - “the village … care not to what power it is transferred, or to what 
sovereign it devolves; its internal economy remains unchanged.”12 As we can see, 
“stagnation” is considered to be the defining feature of “oriental society.” And it is 
obvious that Marx held a negative view towards the “stationary” character of oriental 
society, describing it as “undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life” and “passive sort 
of existence” which needs to be broken for the sake of progress. Hence, though British 
colonists’ invasion of India has brought tremendous misery to the people there, Marx 
believed it was the inevitable price that needed to be paid for the overall progress of 
human beings - “The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental 
revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of 
England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.”13 
Therefore, as many scholars have noted, Marx held an unilinear view of history when 
he was writing this article in 1853, thinking that it is the law of history that capitalism 
should conquer all the backward pre-capitalist societies and replicate its mirror image 
on the rest of the earth.  
However, the Eurocentric bias of “oriental despotism” should not be taken as the 
entirety of Marx’s view on “commune.” Kevin Anderson argues, starting from 1853, 
Marx gradually turned toward a more multi-linear view of historical development and 
                                                
12 Marx, “The British Rule in India,” 131 
13 Ibid., 132 
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started to show more interest in non-Western society. In his detailed and solid study of 
Marx’s late writings on non-Western and precapitalist societies, Anderson notices 
several important changes in Marx’s attitude toward non-Western societies. First, 
different from his earlier modernist attitude that praised capitalist modernization and 
historical progression, Marx showed more aversion to capitalism and colonialism’s 
repressive and violent character, and denounced them as “barbarism.” And instead of 
affirming the “historical inevitability” of their conquest of India like he used to do, 
Marx emphasized the contingent character of the Muslim and British conquest.14 At 
the same time, Marx showed a more favorable attitude towards the lengthy resistance 
of Indian people, stressing their perseverance rather than their eventual defeat. On the 
other hand, Marx stopped treating non-Western society as “unchanging” and 
“stagnate,” but started to recognize the internal historical development within the 
oriental society, and considered that oriental society to be able to develop on its own 
even without the intervention of external forces of colonialism. These non-Western 
societies served as lens for Marx through which the capitalism of Western Europe was 
“particularized” or “provincialized”, instead of being a universal stage that all 
societies must go through.  
The great contribution of Anderson’s Marx at Margins is to liberate these 
traditionally invisible, fragmentary observations by Marx and to rescue Marx from the 
economic determinism, Hegelian linear history and Eurocentrism. And it also liberates 
AMP for a more open understanding.  In this context of Marx’s changing attitude, the 
persisting existence of “Asiatic Mode of Production” over a long period of time started 
                                                
14 Anderson, Marx at the Margins, 214. 
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to acquire more positive meaning. While the “oriental despotism” used to be viewed 
negatively as the “stagnation” that deters it from “progress,” now the difficulty of 
Asiatic society’s subsumption by the capitalist development was viewed in a favorable 
light by Marx for its “tenacity” of resisting capitalism.  
 
Commune as Alterity 
According to Kevin Anderson, as Marx tried to “particularize” and 
“provincialize” Western European capitalism in his late period, he also began to 
accord the Asiatic Mode of Production with more “universal” significance, trying to 
expand this peculiar social formation of “commune” out of Asia to include non-Asian 
societies such as Slavonic, Rumanian, Mexico, Peru, Celts.15 Perry Anderson was 
astonished by the “enormous inflation of the scope of Asiatic Mode of Production” in 
Marx’s late-stage thought that extended “chronologically backwards to the earliest 
dawn of civilization, and geographically outwards to the farther edge of tribal 
organization,” and which encompassed “such immensely disparate historical forms 
and epochs.” He thus comments that the “Asiatic Mode of Production” has become 
“less rigorous as a term”, and that “the inflation of ideas, like coins, merely leads to 
their devaluation.”16 But Perry Anderson’s criticism is limited by his capacity as a 
historian – he tries to fix the “Asiatic Mode of Production” strictly to the specific 
geographical area of Asia and to accord it with a rigorous definition backed by the 
solid support of empirical evidence that actually existed in historical reality, but he 
fails to take into account the possibility that Marx might be consciously using the 
                                                
15 Marx, Grundrisse, 473. 
16 Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 486-487 
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concept of “commune” or “Asiatic Mode of Production” (considered to be porous and 
unfounded by Perry Anderson) to discursively construct an “alterity” and “antithesis” 
to the European capitalism. 
Especially after the violent repression of Paris Commune in 1871, seeing that 
there was little hope of revolution of industrial workers inside Western Europe and 
North America, Marx turned his gaze toward non-Western societies which had not yet 
been completely taken hold by capitalism, and placed on them the hope of overcoming 
capitalism and developing an alternative path. He even started to imagine how the 
archaic form of “Asiatic commune” could skip over the stage of capitalism and 
develop directly into the higher stage of “communism.”  
For example, as shown by Haruki Wada, as early as 1872 to 1873, Marx had 
read and was impressed by Chernyshevskii’s Essays on Communal Ownership of 
Land, in which Chernyshevskii raised the idea that a “higher form” of society could be 
sought from “primitive forms” and that Russia could develop socialism directly out of 
the communal land ownership in Russia. 17  From then on, Marx was profoundly 
attracted to the Russian village commune and started to learn Russian.  Later, in his 
reply to Vera Zasulich’s letter (1881), in which Zasulich asked Marx whether “it is 
historically necessary for every country in the world to pass through all the phases of 
capitalist production,” Marx explicitly stated that the so-called “historical 
inevitability” of the course of primitive accumulation is “expressly restricted to the 
countries of Western Europe.”18 That Marx tried to limit the historical experience of 
                                                
17 Haruki Wada, “Marx and Revolutionary Russia”, in Late Marx and the Russian Road: Late Marx and 
the Russian Road, ed. Teodor Shanin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 48. 
18 Karl Marx, “Drafts of a reply,” in Late Marx and the Russian Road, 124. 
  11 
primitive accumulation to the particular case of Western Europe was also expressly 
shown in his letter to the editorial board of Otechestvennye Zapiski, in which he 
radically rejects the way of treating his Capital as “a historico-philosophical theory of 
the general course fatally imposed on all peoples.” 19 
Before sending out his final reply to Zasulich, Marx wrote four drafts, in which 
he elaborated in detail his idea of how to develop communism on the basis of Russian 
communes. He listed several reasons for why Russia should preserve and develop its 
“village commune” instead of following the Western Europe’s path of primitive 
accumulation through expropriation of land. First, the historical situation of Russian 
society was essentially different from Western Europe in that it had a long tradition of 
cooperation and collective farming. Second, when Marx looked at Russian rural 
commune at this age, the existing Russian rural commune was a contemporary form 
that distinguished from the “archaic” formation – it was neither a pre-capitalist mode 
of production as elaborated in Grundrisse, nor an Asiatic mode which was “outside” 
capitalist history in the Indian notes; rather, having “survived all the vicissitudes of the 
Middle Ages and have maintained themselves up to the present day,” “the agricultural 
commune proved more capable of adapting and expanding, and of undergoing contact 
with strangers,” and hence compatible with socialized production. 20  Besides, the 
capitalism in Western Europe and the United States was undergoing a crisis, and the 
working masses are “seeking to break its chains by replacing capitalist with co-
                                                
19 Karl Marx, “A Letter to the Editorial Board of Otechestvennye Zapiski”, in Late Marx and the 
Russian Road, 135. 
20 Karl Marx, “Drafts of a reply,” 108 
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operative production.”21 All these, in Marx’s view, provided favorable condition for 
the modern transformation of Russian communes. For this purpose, Marx suggests, 
first, it is necessary to utilize the advanced technology of capitalist production; 
secondly it is necessary to overcome the “lack of connection between the lives of 
different communes” which resulted in their subjection to the despotic state.22 Hence, 
Marx proposed, “there must be a Russian Revolution” to break the fetters of 
government and replace it with “a peasant assembly chosen by the communes 
themselves.” 23 
To some extent, we might say, Marx had projected onto Russian commune what 
he had hoped for Paris Commune, when he said in the letter that the working masses 
in Europe are “seeking to break its chains by replacing capitalist with co-operative 
production, and capitalist property with a higher form of the archaic type of property, 
that is, communist property.” 24  Anderson also shows, in Marx’s notes on 
Kovalevsky’s study of Algerian communal property in 1879, Marx compared the 
French colonizers who destroyed indigenous communities in Algeria to the French 
National Assembly who suppressed the Paris Commune, by calling the former “Rural” 
(a derisive term that French leftists addressed the French National Assembly). Hence, 
an implicit discursive link between Paris Commune and the archaic “commune” 
seemed to be established.25 Besides, when writing about Paris Commune in 1871, 
                                                
21 Ibid., 102 
22 Ibid., 121 
23 Ibid., 111, 116. 
24 Ibid., 102. 
25 Anderson, Marx at the Margins, 220. 
  13 
Marx also consciously aligned it with the “mediaeval Communes,” remarking on their 
likeness in form.26 
Marx’s political design for a modern commune is demonstrated in his view on 
Paris Commune in his article “The Civil War in France” (1871); he saw in Paris 
Commune a brand new form of social organization that could overcome capitalism 
and develop into communism. Commune is imagined by Marx as the alternative to the 
modern bourgeois state. The bourgeois state, in Marx’s view, carried from the 
mediaeval era the hierarchical structure as well as “huge national debts and crushing 
taxes”; under the circumstance of the class antagonism of capital and labor, the state 
has turned into “public force organized for social enslavement of an engine of class 
despotism” and “the national war-engine of capital against labor.”27 Different from the 
State, the Commune has no bureaucracy, not standing army, no police; it is a 
democratic and egalitarian body free of all hierarchical structures. It is the “self-
government of the producers.”28 The standing army is replaced by a national militia, 
with an extremely short term of service. All public servants, including government 
officials, judges, magistrates, and police, are responsible agents elected through 
universal suffrage and revocable at short terms; while their salaries are the same as 
workers’ wages. As “a working-class government,” the Paris Commune has turned 
means of production, land and capital, from “means of enslaving and exploitation” 
                                                
26 “It is generally the fate of completely new historical creations to be mistaken for the counterpart of 
older and even defunct forms of social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness. Thus, this new 
Commune, which breaks the modern State power, has been mistaken for a reproduction of the 
mediaeval Communes, which first preceded, and afterwards became the substratum of, that very State 
power.” Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels On the Paris 
Commune (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1991), 73.  
27 Ibid., 69. 
28 Ibid., 72. 
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into “instruments of free and associated labor,” and abolished the economic 
foundation of existence of class and class-rule. 29  Accordingly, education and 
knowledge is also free and open to the public – “The whole of the educational 
institutions were opened to the people gratuitously, and at the same time cleared of all 
interference of Church and State,” and “science itself freed from the fetters which 
class prejudice and governmental force had imposed upon it.”30 In the commune, 
“with labor emancipated, every man becomes a working man, and productive labor 
ceases to be a class attribute.”31  
To sum up, in Marx’s thought, “commune” denotes a pre-capitalist social 
formation characterized by the communal labor and communal property, in which 
individual is not a distinct form of existence from the commune. Among various types 
of communes, the “Asiatic Mode of Production” or “commune” characterized as or 
stood out as a peculiar type for its remarkable high degree of “unity” embodied in in 
the “despot” or “despotic regime,” the least degree of individuation, and the tenacious 
existence over the longest period. While in his early years Marx viewed such tenacity 
negatively as “oriental despotism” and “stagnation,” and held the modernist view that 
it was the historical necessity that all pre-capitalist mode of production should be 
destroyed and replaced by capitalist mode of production, in his late years, witnessing 
the failure of working class movement (especially Paris Commune) in Western Europe, 
Marx began to adopt a multi-linear view of development, and turned to non-Western 
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societies for alternative. In this changing context, Asiatic Mode of Production was 
appreciated for its alterity and its stubborn resistance to capitalism.  
 
Discursive Positions about Chinese Commune for Later Marxists   
Since Marx showed an ambiguous towards “oriental despotism” in his early and 
major theoretical works, and since his scripts in his late years which paid attention to 
non-Western societies had not been discovered, translated, and published until 
recently, the multi-linear aspect of Marx’s thoughts have long been ignored. Besides, 
as his thoughts were put to practice in backward areas as a guidance for revolution and 
socialist state building, Marx’s theory had been read in wide variety of ways, 
generating controversies and debates. Accordingly, the conception of the “Asiatic 
Mode of Production” have been utilized by various discourses for different purposes. 
In this section, I will examine four major discourses constructed around AMP. My 
intention is not to discuss whether their knowledge or descriptions of AMP are 
accurate or not, but to show how these discourses try to make their own political 
statements by fixing “AMP” in a certain position within a certain power configuration. 
If we use Naoki Sakai’s concepts of “position” and “positionality,”32 then we may say 
these discourses all try to fix or to ossify the AMP in certain power configurations – 
the totalitarian state, modernization, state capitalism, or cultural nationalism –  in 
which AMP occupies an assigned “position” that functionally serves the logic of state 
or capital.  
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(1) The Erasure of the concept of AMP in the debates of 1920s-30s  
Above we have already elaborated Marx’s two different attitudes towards 
AMP’s differential character. One is to treat such difference as “stagnation” that must 
be erased by the unilinear scheme of progress, as shown in Marx’s early writings such 
as “Manifesto of the Communist Party” in 1848 and “The British Rule in India” in 
1853; the other is to appreciate the difference of the oriental society as an alternative 
to capitalism, as shown in his notes on non-Western society and his writings on 
Russian communes in late years. And Marx transitioned from the former to the latter. 
Although Marx intended to construct a multi-linear path of development in his late 
years, and to show a differential path of development towards “communism” for 
backward agrarian countries (with undeveloped capitalism), by imagining a brand new 
form of social organization based on “commune” and entirely rejecting the “State”, for 
the Marxists and intellectuals in backward agrarian countries who longed for 
“modernization” and founding a modern state, such exclusion from the unilinear 
scheme of development amounted to precluding them from a “normal” path of 
advancement into a modern state and leaving their countries forever trapped in a 
“stagnation.” Hence, once they took Marx’s theory as a guideline for “modernization”, 
Marx’s effort of “particularizing” or “provincializing” Western Europe’s path of 
capitalism was easily neglected or dismissed, while his disparaging description of 
“stagnation” in his early years kept haunting nationalists in backward countries. For 
this reason, the concept of “Asiatic Mode of Production” has met with denial and 
erasure in the discourse of oriental socialist states.  
  17 
Studies of the debates of Asiatic Mode of Production in socialist states showed 
that, between 1925 and 1931 there were widespread discussions in the Soviet Union 
on the topic of the Asiatic Mode of Production. The distinctiveness of Asiatic Mode of 
Production as a separate category was brought up in 1925 by “Aziatchiki” (Russian 
sinologists who studied and sympathized with China), such as Evgenii S. Varga and 
Liudvig I. Mad’iar, Kokin and Papaian, who argued that Chinese society was not 
feudal but existed a distinctive “Asiatic Mode of Production” up until twentieth 
century. However, they were met with fierce attack on the Leningrad Conference of 
February, 1931, at which opponents of Asiatic Mode of Production accused them of 
failing to explain the transition from the Asiatic mode of production to the next stage 
of history within the categories of class struggle. Instead of treating AMP as a separate 
type of society distinct from other modes of production, they proposed to treat it as an 
Asiatic variant of slavery or feudalism. 33  About the reason of such fierce attack, 
Joshua Fogel explains, the discursive construction - how to determine the nature and 
stage of development of the society – was intimately linked with the revolutionary 
strategy to be taken, hence it was heavily invested with political meanings and 
intertwined with political struggles. At that time Soviet and Communist International 
was cooperating with Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) who represented the 
interest of the nationalist bourgeoisie, “if Chinese society could be characterized as 
feudal or semi-feudal, then a ‘bourgeois-democratic revolution’ was the order of the 
day, and an alliance with the ‘bourgeois’ Kuomintang, as demanded by the Comintern, 
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was appropriate. If, however, China could be described as ‘Asiatic,’ that meant China 
had a weak, underdeveloped bourgeoisie on which the revolutionary leadership could 
not safely rely; the peasants and the proletariat had to lead the revolution, and it could 
be socialist in aim.”34 After the Leningrad Conference, the expression “Asiatic mode 
of production” began to disappear from the Soviet press.  
However, Karl Wittfogel argues, the shunning and banning of the concept of 
AMP in Soviet Union has a stake far greater than Chinese revolution; the bureaucratic 
ruling class in Soviet Union was actually trying to conceal the fact that Soviet Union 
had inherited from Tsarist the structure of a despotic state, to “hide the primary 
problem of bureaucratic class rule and general state slavery” in Soviet Union.35 At the 
time of discussion, Soviet Union was embarking on the nationalization of land and 
building a “managerial-bureaucratic Asiatic state,”36 hence, it tried to suppress the 
concept of AMP, so as not to invoke any impression that Soviet Union was in fact a 
restoration of Asiatic state. Although Wittfogel’s comment, deeply informed by Max 
Weber, is oriented by his strong bias against Communism and a favorable attitude 
towards Western democracy, he nevertheless illuminates on the important fact that 
AMP, as a differential type of social formation distinct from capitalist state, obstructs 
the Soviet Union’s effort of building a strong socialist state. Wittfogel’s view 
constitutes a popular narrative during Cold War that Soviet and China’s socialism was 
a repetition/restoration of oriental despotism, proving the stagnate character of 
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Oriental society which was unable to “progress” into the modern (capitalist) society. 
His narrative actually served the “modernization” discourse prevailing in the area 
studies.  
But what is more interesting, Chinese revolutionaries in 1930s did not favor the 
concept of Asiatic Mode of Production very much either. According to Arif Dirlik, the 
views of Mad’iar, Varga, and Wittfogel that advocated for the distinctiveness of 
Asiatic Mode of Production were not very popular in China and the reactions to it 
were mostly negative. Modernization paradigm has deeply influenced the Chinese 
Marxists in the period; therefore, they tended to treat it “as a variant of one or the 
other forms of production, as in a special feudal society.”37 For them, to be named as 
Asiatic Mode of Production is to be excluded from the path of historical progression 
and precluded development. Most of them were committed to the scheme of European 
development in which capitalism inevitably followed the dissolution of the feudal 
system. Thus, when they discussed why China had such a long imperial period from 
Zhou up to twentieth century and did not develop indigenous capitalism, they were 
reluctant to use the name of “Asiatic” and preferred to use the term “feudalism” to 
describe the extremely long imperial period. At any rate, the intention to erase the 
distinctive character of AMP or to insert it into the scheme of historical progression to 
highlight its transition was obvious.  
  
(2) Modernization Narrative in North America and post-80s China 
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Compared to the evasion of the concept in the East, AMP was intentionally 
applied to East Asian studies in North America for particular ideological reasons. 
Indeed, during the Cold War, the Hegelian color inherent in the “oriental despotism” 
was highlighted and transformed into a modernization narrative, which prevailed in 
the discipline of area studies in North America. As Rebecca Karl terms it, China 
studies in North America has turned into a “Weberianized version of Hegel … a 
version that was simplified through the Parsonian appropriation of Weber as a theorist 
of capitalist modernization,” in which China’s “long-lived imperial political, economic, 
and cultural formations were accordingly seen as enduringly stable as well as 
impervious to a transition to the modern.”38 The differential character of AMP, which 
had been viewed by Marx with hope as a socialist/communist alternative to overcome 
the repressive capitalist modernity, now is rendered into a historical anomaly that 
needs to be erased by the unilinear history of capitalist modernity.  
In his famous work Oriental Despotism, Wittfogel associated “Asiatic Mode of 
Production” with the “totalitarianism” of Socialist state and its bureaucratic ruling 
class. What makes the USSR strikingly similar to the Asiatic “agrodespotic society,” 
Wittfogel argues, is that they are both “total managerial and dictatorial states” 39 
characterized by “the monopolistic position of its ruling bureaucracy.”40 The “total 
statism” of oriental despotism in fact has another name, “state capitalism.” 41 
Especially, Lenin’s nationalization of land and collectivization of agriculture are 
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viewed as restoration of the “semi-Asiatic order.”42 Wittfogel says: “Even prior to the 
collectivization of agriculture, the Soviet apparatchiki disposed over a mechanized 
system of communication and industry that made their semimanagerial position 
different from and potentially superior to the semimanagerial position of an 
agrohydraulic bureaucracy. The nationalized industrial apparatus of the new 
semimanagerial order provided them with new weapons of organization, propaganda, 
and coercion, which enabled them to liquidate the small peasant producers as an 
economic category. The completed collectivization transformed the peasants into 
agricultural workers who toil for a single master: the new apparatus state.”43 Since 
Wittfogel, it has become a common practice to link “totalitarianism” and “despotism” 
to socialist state, and to describe socialist state as the regressive restoration of an 
archaic society. Wittfogel’s view have dominated both 1980s China and the area 
studies in North America, both of which were full of the urge to “modernize” the 
Chinese state and to eradicate the “alterity” of socialism.  
In order to understand the revival of AMP discourse in Chinese context, we need 
to revisit the discourse of modernization in the Chinese context of the 1980s. He 
Guimei points out, the “New Enlightenment” intellectuals in 1980s China, ardently 
embracing the idea of “modernization”, cut off Mao’s socialist period (1950s to 1970s) 
as an aberrant period, while treated 1980s as a period of “New Enlightenment” and 
connected it directly to the May Fourth Movement (regarded as China’s 
“Enlightenment”) to form a smooth “history” of “modernization” and “enlightenment”. 
Representative examples included the famous TV documentary River Elegy [Heshang] 
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(1988), and the book The Cycle of Growth and Decline: On the Ultra-Stable Structure 
of Chinese Society by Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng. 44 And even today, it is common 
for Chinese intellectuals to treat Mao Zedong’s socialist practices as regressive 
restoration of premodern “despotism” or “feudalism,” and to see socialist modernity as 
an unfinished modernization project, at a time when China was charged with 
modernization impulse to re-integrate itself into the “international world” which was 
then the global capitalist system. A representative figure is Qin Hui, a historian of 
Chinese ancient history. Qin compares the socialist agricultural cooperative in Mao’s 
China to the premodern patriarchal kinship community, which were characterized by 
the lack of individual freedom and private property, as well as subservience to the rule 
of an “autocratic state”, or the “grand clan.” 45  Imperial China, Qin says, was 
characterized by the existence of a “despotic” state. “The upper class exploited the 
peasantry, not through its position as proprietors of land or capital, but via the state, 
which operated like an omni-community ruling the whole population through its tax-
registration system.”46 In the “Asiatic state,” “the state organizes the processes of 
production and distribution with extra-economic means of force, mobilizing labor and 
products on massive scale.”47 Qin is particularly critical of the egalitarianism between 
rich and poor regions, to Qin, such “egalitarianism” is a result of the notorious practice 
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of “levelling” (ping diao, £ź) by the centralized despotic state, which tended to 
impose heavier tax on richer regions to help the less developed regions.48 
Especially, Qin extracts from Marx’s Grundrisse a teleological view of history 
to serve the narrative of “modernization.” He holds that it is Marx’s “basic view” that 
there was an “evolution of members of the community into independent individuals”49:  
In the Grundrisse, he [Marx] famously declares that ‘the more deeply we 
go back into history, the more does the individual appear as dependent, as 
belonging to a greater whole.’ In his view the evolution of the ‘wholes’ 
passed through successive forms, from the single family to the tribe and 
then, through ‘conflict and fusion’, into the total unity, squatting above all 
smaller communities, that was the ‘Asian state’. In all these formations, 
personal character is suppressed; individuals are merely parts attached to 
the whole, as property of the community; and from individual dependence 
on the community, there derives the attachment of all its members to the 
patriarchal figure at their head.50  
 
Under the “modernization” framework, Qin Hui takes “individual’s dependence 
on the community,” rather than property relations, to be the defining feature of 
premodern community. And accordingly, he views individual’s breaking away from 
community to be the defining feature of modern society. Individual’s self-
consciousness comes from private property, and “freedom” of individuals is based on 
the exchange relations and contractual relations between free individuals; hence, 
commodity economy constitutes the conditions of “freedom.” “On one hand, human’s 
socialized character cannot develop without the exchange and association of goods 
(commodities); on the other hand, human’s individuality cannot be formed without 
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shedding its affiliation with patriarchal community.”51 Hence, he suggests, we should 
“replace patriarchal natural economy with commodity economy, replace patriarchal 
community with free private ownership.” 52  Accordingly, he views the Chinese 
economic reform in 1980s – the disintegration of People’s Commune, the rise of 
commodity economy, and the emergence of individualism – as a progressive transition 
from “premodern” to “modern.” By dissolving the socialist cooperative and 
partitioning land among peasants as their private property, peasants can turn 
themselves into individuals. Such “historical development,” he asserts, is “a process 
from non-freedom to freedom – in Marx’s words, from the ‘dependence’ to the 
‘independence of Man.’”53  
But, my discussions above have shown that such characterization of AMP by 
Marx may largely be discursive and metaphorical rather than empirical and factual. 
Also, Marx in Grundrisse has paid due attention to the private aspect of “communal 
property,” that is, the individual member is a “possessor of a particular part”, and that 
“any fraction of the property belongs to him only as immediate member of the 
commune,” and thus “what exists is only communal property, and only private 
possession.” 54  Clearly, Marx’s nuanced description of the “private possession” of 
communal property has not been taken into account by Qin’s argument, and 
accordingly the more historical problem of “individual” within the socialist commune, 
as we will see in Zhao Shuli’s novel, is also absent in Qin’s narrative. Hence, Qin’s 
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study is less a serious historical study than a discursive statement expressed from a 
certain positionality.   
The area studies in North America is also dominated by such a modernization 
narrative, characterized by the binary of “despotic state” versus “individual freedom,” 
“premodern” versus “modern,” as part and parcel of Cold War discourse. For example, 
Haiyan Lee’s recent book, The Strangers and the Chinese Moral Imagination, 
building on numerous scholarship from the field of sociology and area studies which 
were fundamentally shaped by the “modernization theory,” also repeats such a banal 
binary of “modern capitalism” versus “premodern socialism.” In her view, Chinese 
socialist state was still trapped in the form of traditional society characterized by the 
“centrality of kinship and territorial ties as structuring principles of social, political, 
and moral life.”55 Since China did not go through the “breakup of primordial forms of 
social organization and the greater differentiation of social roles attendant upon the 
greater division of labor,”56 there does not exist the essence of sociality within Chinese 
society. In a language reminiscent of “oriental despotism,” she characterizes that the 
socialist has “expropriated individual moral capacity and subjugated morality to 
power-administered laws and totalitarian self-sameness” by “bind(ing) the populace 
vertically to the state while vitiating horizontal ties and the civil society they bind 
together.”57 As such, Lee successfully establishes a “modernizing” narrative of a linear, 
progressive developmental frame, in which China should shed its regressive and 
“provincial” character of “exclusivity and conformity” and progress into a modern and 
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open civil society of stranger sociality, which can only be brought about by the 
transformative force of “globalization” and “cosmopolitanism” through instituting the 
relation of exchange and contract. 58 Clearly, in treating socialist period as a repetition 
of the primordial kinship society, Lee is repeating Wittfogel’s narrative. By treating 
socialist China as a static, archaic formation that has not yet been through a Weberian 
path of “modernization”, such narrative amounts to a complete denial of China’s 
socialist history.  
 
 (3) Multiculturalism and Cultural Nationalism of AMP 
Both Qin and Lee’s ideological positionality as “modernization proponents” are 
clearly articulated and can easily be detected. By simply attributing “premodern” and 
“regressive” character to socialist China, both Qin and Lee’s arguments serve the 
typical “modernization” theory with the metaphor of Asiatic commune, which takes 
the Western bourgeois society as the paradigmatic example. The multi-linearism of 
socialism is erased to give way to the unilinear historical path of capitalism. But even 
some kind of recognition of Asiatic mode of Production as an alternative beyond the 
unilinear historical path of capitalism, for example, as shown in the resurgence of 
discourse of Asiatic Mode of Production in China since 1980s, also contains the 
possibility of flattening and reducing AMP’s implication of the alternative political 
economic relations (which may challenge and overcome capitalism) into a logic of 
multiculturalism and cultural nationalism, which inversely reinforce the universality 
and invincibility of global capitalism. 
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Here, it is necessary to bring in Karl’s observation in her recent discussion of the 
reemergence of AMP. She notes that “the waning of revolutionary historical 
paradigms; the rise of more nationalistic modernizationist ones after Mao Zedong’s 
death (1976); and the re-orientation of Chinese socio-economics in the nineteen 
eighties curiously facilitated the return of the AMP to historiographical attention.”59 
She notes, since its return in 1980s, AMP has come to be combined with the present 
“anti-revolution” atmosphere and the global trend of transnational capitalism, and has 
turned into a kind of multiculturalism which reinforces and endorses the invincibility 
of global capitalism.  
For Karl, such undermining of AMP’s alterity is done from both sides, from left 
and from the right. On one hand, leftist critical theorists (such as Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt), in their theorizing about the contemporary condition of capitalism, 
ends up treating capitalism as an “eternal present” that cannot be overcome, and has 
given up seeking real historical alternatives from the uneven development of historical 
capitalism. Such theorization, Karl criticizes, “cannot account for the historical 
unevenness produced in and by capitalism as a global formation” and “precisely erase 
the historicity of the coextensive relationship between formal and real subsumption 
that forms the core of the historical movement of capital globally.” 60 Though “these 
theories of an eternal present of capital/empire present themselves as an opening to 
politics,” yet they are “really only a politics of systemic regeneration.”61 I will discuss 
the weaknesses and limits of the Marxist discourse of “uneven development” in part 
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four of this section, but here it is necessary to pay attention to Karl’s critique of certain 
sort of post-structuralist and post-colonialist thinking. “Formal subsumption” and the 
emphasis of “historical movement of global capitalism” actually leaves room for 
rethinking the coexistence of different modes of production, that is, different 
temporalities, in the same structural totality. Could the “commune” be a real “outside”? 
As what I will discuss later, Negri and Hardt’s discussion about “commune” has too 
easily dismissed the real historical experience of the construction of commune in the 
East, as in the historical context of both Russian Chinese. For them, any political 
change, any difference, would simply turn into “systemic regeneration” of capital 
itself, without posing real challenge to the relations of production.  
Karl finds, while capitalism is increasingly recognized as a universal existence 
that cannot be transcended, AMP is increasingly bound with the “nation-time 
(diachronic chronology) and nation-spaces (geographic unity)” and reduced to cultural 
nationalism. “The AMP came to be incipiently articulated as both a nationalized 
theory of historical difference – multilinearity – and a comparative theory of 
(nationally-inflected) imperial formations.”62 There was thus the peculiar convergence 
of AMP (Asiatic Mode of Production) and CMP (Capitalist Mode of Production), of 
values (cultural values) and value (capital), in which the differential Asiatic Mode of 
Production simply constituted one of the various moments of the “local instantiations” 
of global capitalism. Here Karl mainly refers to the debates on “Neo-Confucianism” in 
the 1990s, but we could also think of other kinds of “configuration of West and Rest” 
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pointed out by Naoki Sakai;63 therefore, “the peculiar contemporary appeal of multi-
linearity appears as a reified meta-historical truism and even compensatory gesture in 
this era of global capital.”64  
Worse still, such cultural nationalist logic was embraced and reinforced by 
Chinese intellectuals and even Chinese officials, who now proudly praise China’s 
uniqueness for its long-lasting imperial formations. Karl criticizes, many Chinese 
intellectuals “attempt to articulate ‘uniqueness’ as exceptionalism in Weberianized 
Marxist terms by drawing on a culturalist-statist conceit of origins,” by which 
“China’s exceptionalist past becomes a basis for a reconceptualization of Chinese 
history as the origin of all world history. … Meanwhile, these theories also proclaim 
the cultural difference of China as adequate explanation not only for China’s past but 
also for the necessity of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’”65 With the success 
of Chinese economic development in the last forty years and the natural revival of 
national confidence in terms of national culture, nowadays, the AMP can be seen as a 
positive descriptor of cultural strength, instead of a shameful deviation from normality. 
Under such circumstance, the return of what is called transhistorical theories of empire 
and Confucian modernization, though under the guise of both critical and celebratory 
‘globalization’ theory, for Karl only endorsed the explanatory power of global 
capitalism with Chinese (cultural) character. 
What’s more, even if the alterity of AMP is appreciated by critical thinkers for 
challenging the totalizing logic of capital, Karl criticizes, such difference of AMP is 
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not explored in terms of “materialist historical” significance but appreciated for 
cultural significance. Here we can easily recall what Gayatri Spivak has casted upon 
AMP. Let me briefly introduce Spivak’s conception of AMP here. In A Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason, Spivak appreciates AMP for its significance of denoting 
“alterity,” as an attempt by Marx to account for difference, in answer to the question 
“why did the normative logic of Capital not determine itself in the same way 
everywhere? …why is there difference? ... why is ‘Europe’ not the only self-identical 
‘same’?” 66 However, she thinks Marx’s effort to account for this difference only 
serves his purpose to sublate it dialectically, to remove its difference. In Spivak’s view, 
Marx’s thoughts have never really got rid of the Hegelian dialectic of “position – 
negation – sublation,” which sought to absorb and negate difference. Even “primitive 
communism,” in which Marx tried to seek for the otherness for capitalism, is 
considered by Spivak as “a version of the selfsame, man in nature as species-being, 
one foot into history.”67 In Spivak’s view, Marx simply stands for another variation of 
the European “self-same,” trying to impose his speculative philosophy onto the 
heterogeneous history (by naming and accounting for the historical difference) and 
reduce its complexity and heterogeneity, and to use this speculative philosophy as a 
blueprint for social justice and a guide for human practice, in order to create the 
“universal world,” in which the real minorities like subaltern women have no place. 
“Marx will be in search of a system that will remove difference after taking it into 
account. Thus the exigency of accounting for difference lies at the heart of Marx’s 
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system.”68 As for Marx’s followers in the socialist states, Spivak thinks they all tried 
to pursue a “universal world” that erase differences like Marx, and their social 
engineering and state planning all entailed the “persistent sublation or différance of 
capitalism.” For Lenin, this universal world is the Soviet State; for Stalin, this 
universal world is the Slavonic nation; and for Mao Zedong, this universal world is the 
proletariat culture.69 At any rate, Spivak considers Marx to be a modernizationist and 
obsessed with a unilinear scheme of development – “Marx too thought that capitalist 
colonialism would shock the Asiatic Mode of Production into normative historical 
evolution so that unilinear resistance could begin.”70  
Therefore, appreciating AMP’s “otherness,” Spivak proposes to use AMP as “a 
kind of deconstructive lever to open up Marx’s text in a de-constructive way.”71 For 
example, she points out that Marx, in talking about colonial trade, has reduced value to 
the “money form” of value, while neglecting “the total or expanded form of value.” 
The “total and expanded form”, including the “cognitive, cultural, political, or 
affective value production”, would disrupt the logic of capital and constitute part of 
the “global resistance to ‘Development’ from below.” 72  To this extent, AMP should 
be taken as an alternative system of values and an unassimilable text or desire which 
become the perfect agent for ‘decoding’ capitalism. “The heterogeneous and uneven 
social texture of what was given the convenient nomenclature of ‘the Asiatic Mode of 
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Production’ can then be seen … as differentiated sites of similar conflicts between the 
general and the total or expanded forms of value.”73  
As we can see, when Spivak calls for us to overcome the reductive logic of 
exchange and pay attention to the “cognitive, cultural, political, or affective value 
production,” there is already a turn from “economic” to “culture.” Therefore, Karl 
criticizes, for Spivak, “the utility of AMP as a concept thus becomes a textual utility: a 
way to restore a textually understood cultural/national difference to supposed AMP 
countries, primarily India.”74 To Karl, Spivak’s appreciation for AMP’s alterity is not 
much different from cultural nationalism, to which perhaps we can also add	 Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s attempt of recuing “History 2” from “History 1.”75 Karl has a point in 
arguing that the significance of AMP should not be limited to the textual or 
representational world, but instead should be sought from the “material historical 
process” of uneven development, of how the pre- or non-capitalist formation was 
restructured by and unevenly subsumed into capitalism through imperialism and 
formal subsumption, for which she raised historical studies of Claude Meillassoux and 
Samir Amin as exemplary works. To Karl, the “material historical process” as well as 
its problematic representation in the real history of East has been reduced to a 
meaningless repetition (state capitalism or others) in the “eternal present” of 
capital/empire (as in the theory of Negri and Hardt), or has been obscured by the 
textural representation of the uncoded culture under the rhetoric of cultural capitalism 
or even the analysis of post-colonialism.  
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(4) Agrarian Commune as Means of Primitive Accumulation 
As a Marxist historian, Karl pays special attention to the material historical 
aspect of AMP as an alternative mode of relations to capitalism, and is on guard 
against any attempt that reduces the alterity of AMP to mere cultural difference that 
reinforces rather than undermines global capitalism. However, as a historian, due to 
her biased attitude towards literary text, in dismissing it as “fictitious” and irrelevant 
to reality, she underestimates the intricate relationship between the “world of things” 
and the “world of words.” The essential issue here returns to the “idealism” or 
“determinism” of the Marxist theory of “uneven development.” Marxist scholars 
always consider agrarian commune as means of primitive accumulation, but is it not 
another representation of reality, or in other words, an institutionalized testimony, a 
kind of statement about historical positions in the real and therefore unrepresentable 
history? Literary texts indeed have a more nuanced relationship to reality, and as 
Derrida would show us, fiction in nature can be very close in nature to moment of 
testimony, and thus the moment of contradiction and openness. Let us first look into 
the theoretical observation by the discourse of “uneven development.” 
Allow me to start from an intersection, a benign recognition of capitalism in 
socialism. Actually since 2000s, as China became increasingly integrated into the 
global capitalist system, and as the polemical Cold-War ideology dissipated in the 
post-Cold-War period (or, in Rebecca Karl’s word, in the atmosphere of “Goodbye to 
revolution”), there has been a tendency in scholarship that tends to tone down the 
political nature of Mao Zedong’s socialist project and tend to re-examine and re-
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evaluate Mao’s socialism in terms of its economic achievement of “modernization,” 
and to rethink its functional role of capitalist accumulation in socialist China. Such 
scholarship, mainly in the field of history and economics, tends to put aside the 
“political values” of socialism and discuss it from the utilitarian perspective of 
economic function. In this light, socialism is not so much different from socialist state, 
and since any state would undergo a process of primitive accumulation, hence 
socialism is not so much different from state capitalism. Viewed in this light, the 
collectivization and agricultural commune then served as indispensable means of 
primitive accumulation for a socialist state which lacks capital.  
Under such a spectrum, Wen Tiejun’s empirical study is representative. He and 
his research team in their recent researches argue that that rural area has played an 
important role for China’s “internal primitive accumulation.” They argue that, for any 
sovereign state, state industrialization is the condition for the independence of state 
sovereignty, and any industrialization would need capitalist accumulation; most 
underdeveloped states would have to rely on the economic aid of foreign countries to 
accomplish such accumulation, which often result in their political dependence on 
foreign capital. However, in order to protect its hard-won state sovereignty, China 
chose the path of “internal primitive accumulation,” by extracting surplus value from 
the vast rural area to support the state’s industrialization. The collectivization 
movement was in essence the most efficient measure for extracting surplus value from 
peasantry; it was necessary to organize peasants into economic unit of “agrarian 
commune,” because the “transaction cost” with the numerous small peasants scattered 
over a vast area would simply be too high for the state, and also because the collective 
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labor in the unit of commune was able to generate extra surplus product for the 
consumption of urban population.76 Besides accumulation, Wen also argues, rural area 
has consistently provided solutions for the capitalist crises in the city – eight economic 
crises throughout China’s course of modernization. For example, in 1958, when Soviet 
Union drastically reduced its economic aid to China and caused the shortage of capital, 
China managed to sustain the capitalist accumulation by maximizing the input of labor 
power into the production. This economic purpose was realized through the hyper-
political movement of “Great Leap Forward,” in which the political ideology of “class 
struggle” and “continuous revolution” was utilized to mobilize the masses in economic 
production.77 And in the economic depression of 1961-1962, when the recession of 
urban economy resulted in drastic decrease of employment rates, to relieve the 
pressure of urban economy China sent a part of urban population to the countryside to 
participate agricultural production. The same situation happened again in 1968-1970, 
this time in the name of “re-education of intellectual youths.”78 To sum up Wen’s view, 
the existence of a vast rural area, which undertakes for urban capitalism the cost of 
capitalist accumulation under the dual structure of rural-urban system, is the 
“comparative advantage” of China for its primitive accumulation and fast 
industrialization. It is too hasty to conclude that Wen and his group endorse the 
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“primitive accumulation in socialist state”; for them, the primitive accumulation is 
rather a kind of necessary evil which needs to be counteracted by the socialist good. 
However, their scientific study and indifferent tone distinguish them from the Marxist 
critics, who have a similar observation about the historical process of “primitive 
accumulation” in the history of socialist China but have a more critical attitude. 
Here, it is interesting to mention Lin Chun’s slightly different and yet also 
ambiguous standpoint about primitive accumulation. Lin Chun’s study of socialist 
China also confirms that China’s primitive accumulation was built on the mass 
sacrifice of peasantry. She said, China finished its primitive accumulation (of state 
capitalism) “through sacrificing rural development and exploiting the peasantry.”79 
Specifically, Lin argues, it was done through the unequal “scissor price” in the 
exchange between the industry and agriculture, by trading the cheapened agricultural 
products with more expensive industrial goods.80 With the statist monopoly over the 
purchase of agricultural products, a quasi-segregation system between urban and rural 
residents was established. Besides, the wages and consumption in the rural areas had 
to be suppressed and the countryside subordinated to urban demands, for the purpose 
of sustaining an internally generated high accumulation rate. Hence, comparing with 
Wen’s scientific study, we can detect an intensified tone of criticism. For Lin, the so-
called socialist primitive accumulation did not radically differ from classical 
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capitalism in terms of the intensity of “extraction” of the countryside, leaving only 
enough food for peasants’ subsistence.81 Lin’s main argument is by no means the 
disavowal of socialist China, but once she uses “primitive accumulation” as a weapon 
of critique, the Marxist critique could be easily and dangerously reduced into the 
established position as state slavery of “oriental despotism,” or, a type of state 
capitalism in which peasants were reduced as “agricultural workers for the state” “who 
owns no property and produces food to be distributed on a national scale,” as 
illustrated in Negri and Hardt’s criticism of socialist modernization.82  
To some extent, both Wen and Lin’s explanations are well-grounded by the 
theory of uneven development. According to the theory of uneven development, it is 
the law of capitalism that capital needs an “outside,” a non-capitalist sphere for 
accumulation. Rosa Luxemburg points out, Marx leaves out the important question of 
“expanded production” in his construction of the theoretical model of capitalism, in 
which he presumes “the universal and exclusive domination of capitalist production”83 
and considers primitive accumulation to be a one-time event, which will cease to exist 
once the capitalist mode of production is established. Luxemburg discovers, Marx’s 
diagram of the two departments of capitalist society fails to answer “how does capital 
realize the surplus value,” or, “how does capital accumulate.” Luxemburg argues, the 
surplus value cannot be realized by workers or capitalists; to realize surplus value, 
capital needs a “third person”, that is, “consumers other than the immediate agents of 
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capitalist production (i.e. workers and capitalists).” 84  This extra demand for the 
consumption of the portion of surplus value essential for expanded production, in 
Luxemburg’s view, can only come from the non-capitalist strata. Luxemburg analyzes, 
the process of accumulation, as an elastic and spasmodic process, “requires inevitably 
free access to ever new areas of raw materials in case of need,” and “only on the pre-
capitalist soil of more primitive social conditions can it develop the ascendancy 
necessary to achieve such miracles.”85 Besides, the accumulation of capital needs the 
supply of living labour which can be mobilized by capital to meet its demands. That is 
to say, when capital expands in leaps and bounds, the raw materials and labor 
population the capital needs must also increase in leaps and bounds too; and this 
cannot possibly come from natural propagation of population, but must come from the 
“social reservoirs outside the dominion of capital,” which “is drawn into the wage 
proletariat only if need arises.”86 Therefore, for Luxemburg and many Marxist such as 
Rebecca Karl, only the existence of non-capitalist outside can provide additional 
labour power and the consumers for the realization of capitalist accumulation. Hence, 
the accumulation of capital becomes impossible at all points without non-capitalist 
surroundings. This need for the “outside” is the inherent drive for the expansion of 
capitalism into imperialism – “Capital needs the means of production and the labour 
power of the whole globe for untrammeled accumulation; it cannot manage without 
the natural resources and the labour power of all territories.”87 Such a classic theory of 
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“primitive accumulation” is still the most influential one among the Marxist scholars 
of political economy.  
That capitalism always needs the “outside” for accumulation implies that 
capitalism is always an “uneven” and “asymmetrical” structure in which capitalist 
mode production must always co-exist and articulate with non-capitalist mode of 
production. As David Harvey points out, “imperial practices, from the perspective of 
capitalist logic, are typically about exploiting the uneven geographical conditions 
under which capital accumulation occurs and also taking advantage of … the 
‘asymmetries’ that inevitably arise out of the spatial exchange relations.”88 Moreover, 
he shows, such “uneven geography” and “asymmetry” is not necessarily given 
naturally but could be actively generated and reinforced: “Uneven geographical 
conditions do not merely arise out of the uneven patterning of natural resource 
endowments and locational advantages, but, ever more importantly, are produced by 
the uneven ways in which wealth and power themselves become highly concentrated 
in certain places by virtue of asymmetrical exchange relations.”89 Or, as Neil Smith 
puts it, capitalism creates its own geography; it is not the geographical differentiation 
that determines the capitalism, rather, it is capitalism that generates the internal 
differentiation of geographical space.90 
Such distinction of “inside” and “outside” of the uneven structure of capitalism 
is manufactured and sustained by “border.” “Border” can thus be understood as a 
crucial device for accumulation and primitive accumulation. As Gavin Walker points 
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out, primitive accumulation is “the process of the formation and capture of difference, 
the making-equivalent of difference in order to set in motion the circuit-process of … 
capitalist development.” 91  Primitive accumulation is in essence “the closure of 
heterogeneity - the simple and pure space of difference as such - in order to produce 
specific difference, equivalences that can then ‘encounter’ each other.”92 To be more 
specific, “border” is a result of the practice of “bordering,” which “order” and “re-
codes” the heterogeneity into commensurable differences of “capital” and “labor,” so 
that they could encounter each other in the circuit of capitalist production. Sandro 
Mezzadra and Brett Neilson conceptualize “border” in a more sophisticated way and 
use it as the crucial analytical tool to observe contemporary capitalism. They point out, 
borders are “finely tuned instruments for managing, calibrating, and governing global 
passages of people, money, and things.”93 Border, does not just blocks, obstructs, or 
excludes, but also selects, filters, and includes; it governs and regulates the flow of 
people, money, and goods and hence “play(s) a key role in producing the times and 
space of global capitalism.” 94  Insofar as capital needs the “outside” and “non-
capitalist” spheres to realize its accumulation, border, which has the capacity to 
“hierarchize” and “stratify” the global space, serves as a mechanism and device to 
create “frontiers of capital” to facilitate capitalist accumulation.95  
If we adopt the perspective of “uneven development” and “border,” then the 
unique formation of “commune” can be understood to be located in a subtle position – 
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commune is both “inside” and “outside” the capitalist order, but in a determinist way. 
It will not be difficult for us to find the internal border in China where commune is 
positioned as the “internal outside” of the capitalist development in China. For a 
country which does not have oversea colony, the rural-urban divide in China can be 
understood as a mechanism of “bordering” which “re-codes” the Chinese nation into a 
hierarchical order of the “non-capitalist” sphere of countryside, which supplies raw 
material and labor power, and the “capitalist” sphere of the city, which supplies capital. 
The uneven structure is most manifest in what Dorothy Solinger calls the “dual 
citizenship” of rural and urban citizens, created by the household registration system, 
or the hukou system (Äb), which “codes” city and countryside as the equivalent of 
“capital” and “non-capital.” According to Solinger’s study, under the hukou system, 
“residence status became an ascribed, inherited one, determining an individual’s entire 
livelihood and welfare simply on the basis of where the registration was located.”96 
Solinger finds, during the socialist period, whether one resided in the country or in the 
city determined difference in “the quality of goods supplied, the transportation 
conditions, the range of cultural entertainment, the nature of education offered, and the 
type of health care one received.”97 While urban citizens enjoy “a range of benefits 
and entitlements” which Solinger called the “urban public goods regime,”98 peasants 
were organized into agricultural communes and were responsible for their own 
medical care, pension, and education. As such, the household registration system 
established a “border” between the city and the country, through which the city is 
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“coded” as “capitalist sphere,” concentrated with industrial capital and social welfare 
facilities, while the countryside is “coded” as “non-capitalist” sphere, with no welfare 
provided by the state. The relation of city and countryside hence resembles that of the 
“center” and the “periphery.” In the first chapter I will discuss how the hukou system 
and the agrarian commune served for the state’s primitive accumulation as the 
capital’s “outside.” In the second chapter I will talk about in the rapid expansion of 
capitalism of 1990s, and how such “unevenness” of capitalism is manifested in the 
specific group of “rural migrants.” In the third chapter I will discuss, in the new phase 
since 2000, how the effort of “re-collectivization” and the imagination of “common” 
continues to generate the “outside” of capital. In this light, the persistence of agrarian 
commune and the incomplete capitalization or modernization of rural area, can be 
explained by their status as the “outside,” a “non-capitalist sphere” that serves a 
utilitarian role in the the overall “uneven” structure of state capitalism, providing the 
urban capital with raw material and labor power.  
If under the paradigm of modernization theory, AMP needs to be wiped out to 
force the Asia to enter the History, and if under certain cultural nationalist discourse 
and post-structuralist discourse the AMP can only exist in the omnipresent and 
“eternal present” of capitalism, then, the theory of primitive accumulation rationalizes 
the existence of commune, as the indispensable “outside” for the formal and real 
subsumption of capitalism. However, is it not another kind of erasure of real alterity of 
“commune”?  
As I enter the specific historical moment and the complex world of the literary 
works, I find that the theory of political economics lacks the ability to explain 
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historical complexity. Generally speaking, the problem of such narrative is its 
“economic determinism,” which subjects everything to the universal law of “capital,” 
and completely eliminates the various alterities under the ambiguous name of 
socialism. In such a reductive analysis, even the socialist values of egalitarianism and 
mass democracy, which aim to challenge the capitalist logic, are viewed as efficient 
means for mass mobilization that increase the intense input of human labor to realize 
capitalist accumulation of an underdeveloped state, serving the economic goal of 
building a stronger state. In this narrative of “modernization,” Mao Zedong’s socialist 
period is sutured with the post-Mao reform period to form a smooth continuous 
process, a linear progression whose ultimate goal is to lead China from an 
undeveloped state to an advanced global power in the 21st century. And with the later 
post-Mao stage, all the resistances, the anxieties and uncertainty, as well as openness 
and possibilities, are also excised by the sweeping power of capital. The Chinese 
experience in the whole 20th century, including Mao’s socialist experiment, thus 
serves only as one of the various ways of capitalist accumulation, one of the 
“multilinear” paths of “modernization,” one of the many “local instantiations” of 
global capitalism. 
However, I have already argued Marx had imagined and could imagine AMP as 
an alternative that stands opposed to state and capital. Then, could we imagine another 
way to think about the “commune”? It seems to me that the four discourses sketched 
above all tend to erase its alterity and incorporate the peculiar existence of “agrarian 
commune” and “Asiatic Mode of Production” in their own discursive construction. 
Firstly, socialist states, obsessed with the goal of building a strong state and rapid 
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modernization – an exigency demanded by the encroaching imperialist powers – 
banned the discussion of AMP in order to suppress Marx’s criticism of a powerful 
state implicated in the discourse of AMP. Area studies in North America and post-80s 
China, under the influence of Weberianized “modernization,” tried to eliminate the 
alterity of socialism in the AMP by constructing a unilinear history of 
“modernization” (capitalist modernization) and describing socialism as regressive 
restoration of despotism. The cultural nationalist appropriation of AMP which treats 
AMP as a distinct national character and boasts of China’s long imperial tradition 
reduces the alterity of AMP into cultural difference, which only reinforces and 
validates the global capitalism. And finally, the recent re-evaluation of agrarian 
commune and Mao’s socialism in terms of their positive role of capital accumulation 
capital, has turned AMP into another narrative of “modernization,” and its counterpart, 
the Marxist political economists, has also subjected it to the “universal law” of 
capitalist economics by their economic determinism. To some extent, all of these 
discourses have more or less reintegrated the AMP into the unilinear historical path of 
capital or state.  
 
The “Outside”, or, the Positionality of Asiatic Mode of Production   
Here I try to reconsider the representation of commune in another way, that is, 
from position to positionality.  If we use Naoki Sakai’s concepts of “position” and 
“positionality,” then we may say these discourses all try to fix or to ossify the AMP in 
certain power configurations – the totalitarian state, modernization, state capitalism, or 
cultural nationalism –  in which it occupies an assigned “position” that functionally 
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serves the logic of state or capital. “Position” is fixed in a given power configuration, 
where “one’s conduct is regulated by the expectations and imperatives” of the given 
situation; thus “position” is “objectively determined, and its rules of conduct cannot be 
changed at whim. The configuration of positons is a social reality that serves as the 
basis for consensus among participants on the stage.” On the stage, “when a 
performative utterance is made, the elements of the situation are given in such a way 
that its consequence are known in advance; its effect is codified.”99 Likewise, under all 
these discursive elaborations of commune or AMP, the energy, anxiety and 
uncertainty around the empirical and representational existence of  commune is 
defused.  
In contrast, “positionality” for Sakai always captures an eventual moment. It 
transcends the given stage of power configuration; it “withdraws from the 
configuration of positions, being indifferent to them all.” Positionality is being “off-
stage” and “cannot be treated as being within the configuration.”100 Sakai points out, a 
statement’s positionality, the speaker’s transcendence of a particular stage, is the 
essential condition for modern production of knowledge, which endows it with a 
certain universality. In this study, I will try to articulate the same positionalities of my 
writers in each particular stage of history. Of course, it does not mean the speakers or 
writers could be truly free of power relations; he or she has always “articulated to 
power configurations”. But he/she can also conceal his/her specific relation to power 
configuration, distancing himself/herself away from the power configuration he/she 
describes, therefore, to expose a positionality, to witness an untranslatable moment. 
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Indeed, to expose a positionality is simultaneously to hide his positionality, the 
“capturing” or “naming” moment, and therefore to make the power configurations 
look natural and universal. Hence, we can see, all these above-mentioned ossified 
discourses assume a certain positionality and try to capture and objectify AMP by 
assigning to it a certain position in the power configuration of their discourse.  
The result is, with the “capturing” of the AMP, the discourses eliminate its 
otherness. As Foucault says, thought, or discourse, always tends to eliminate otherness 
by interiorizing it, by incorporating it into itself in a dialectic way. “Any purely 
reflexive discourse runs the risk of leading the experience of the outside back to the 
dimension of interiority; reflection tends irresistibly to repatriate it to the side of 
consciousness and to develop it into a description of living that depicts the ‘outside’ as 
the experience of the body, space, the limits of the will, and the ineffaceable presence 
of the other.” 101  Therefore, Foucault points out, the entire tradition of Western 
thoughts/philosophy hardly sees any “thought from the outside.” “For the entire time 
the demand was being formulated, most imperiously, to interiorize the world, to erase 
alienation, to move beyond the false moment of the Entausserung, to humanize nature, 
to naturalize man, and to recover earth the treasures that had been spent in heaven.”102  
Now, I hope to retrieve to the moment of “capturing” with a sophisticated 
reading of literary text. While discourse or thought is a systematic order that tries to 
interiorize everything and eliminate their “otherness,” language and literature can 
always create an opening and “undo” the system of meaning, as “a passage to the 
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‘outside.’” 103  This is because language, in its dissemination, undermines the 
sovereignty of subject. “Language endlessly spreads forth, while the subject – the ‘I’ 
who speaks - fragments, disperses, scatters, disappearing in that naked space.”104 “The 
subject that speaks is less the responsible agent of a discourse (what holds it, what 
uses it to assert and judge, what sometimes represents itself in it by means of a 
grammatical form designed to have that effect) than a non-existence in whose 
emptiness the unending outpouring of language uninterruptedly continues.” 105 
Thought/discourse and literature/fiction/language are two entirely different modes of 
existence. “‘I speak’ runs counter to ‘I think.’” “‘I think’ led to the indubitable 
certainty of the ‘I’ and its existence; ‘I speak’, on the other hand, distances, disperses, 
effaces that existence and lets only its empty emplacement appear.” While “thought 
leads us to the deepest interiority”, “speech about speech, by way of literature as well 
as perhaps by other paths, to the outside in which the speaking subject disappears.”106  
“Language escapes the mode of being of discourse – in other words the dynasty of 
representation – and literary speech develops from itself, forming a network in which 
each point is distinct, distant from even its closest neighbors, and has a position in 
relation to every other point in a space that simultaneously holds and separates them 
all.”107 
Therefore, according to Foucault, instead of trying to build up a system of 
meanings like discourse, language hollows out the meaning system, breaking its 
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coherency, and unveiling the void surrounding things and people. The language of 
fiction “must be directed not toward any inner confirmation – not toward a kind of 
central, unshakable certitude – but toward an outer bound where it must continually 
contest itself.”108 Foucault argues, Maurice Blanchot’s novel writing forms a singular 
mode of being of discourse, “appearing with no conclusion and no image, with no 
truth and no theater, with no proof, no mask, no affirmation, free of any center, 
unfettered to any native soil; a discourse that constitutes its own space as the outside 
toward which, and outside of which, it speaks.” Such novel “returns thought to the 
outside.”109  
For our purpose, Foucault’s conceptualization of language and literature helps us 
reflect about Rebecca Karl’s dismissing of literary texts as irrelevant fantasy and 
prioritizing of empirical historical studies as the sole source of authenticity. Although 
my study has been inspired a lot by her and other Marxist political economists’ theory 
of “outside,” I also want to challenge its economic determinism and reconfigure the 
“outside” as a Foucaultian outside.  Foucault shows us that literature in fact contains 
the potential of breaking away from the coherent discourses that try to capture, fix, 
and interiorize AMP in their meaning system, erasing its alterity. The ruptures, 
interstices, and void hidden inside the text would always exceed the systematic control 
of the discourse. In other words, literature may become a source of historicity, through 
which we may glimpse the true alterity of AMP.    
I want to capture the moment of “truth telling”; it does not mean a universal 
truth, but a truth only in its historicity. Indeed, that literature may contain a certain 
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truthfulness, an act of “truth telling” like “testimony,” is also pointed out by Derrida. 
While it is common to think that there is a strict line between testimony and literature, 
in that testimony is based on truth and fact, and literature is fictional and distanced 
from reality, however, in his reading of Blanchot’s autobiographical fiction The 
Instant of My Death, Derrida demonstrates that the line between the two is indeed very 
tenuous, because both testimony and literature involves the undecidability of whether 
what it tells is truth or not. 
For one thing, testimony contains literature, as it is always inherently structured 
by the possibility of perjury, lie, and fiction in it, without which it will lose its value of 
truthfulness: 
 
There is no testimony that does not structurally imply in itself the possibility 
of fiction, simulacra, dissimulation, lie, and perjury – that is to say, the 
possibility of literature, of the innocent or perverse literature that innocently 
plays at perverting all of these distinctions. If this possibility that it seems to 
prohibit were effectively excluded, if testimony thereby became proof, 
information, certainty, or archive, it would lose its function as testimony. In 
order to remain testimony, it must therefore allow itself to be haunted. It 
must allow itself to be parasitized by precisely what it excludes from its 
inner depths, the possibility, at least, of literature.110     
 
On the other hand, literature is like testimony. Despite that literary institution 
defines that literature is meant to be “fictional” and distanced from “reality,” it is 
always possible that literature contains certain truthfulness of experience “in the 
abidance life.” Life here means a free will which tries to get rid of the established 
institution. The moment of truth-telling or the moment of positionality among positons. 
“The literary institution … has imposed the rigor of its right to calculate, master, 
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neutralize this undecidability, to make as if … literature, in its possibility, had not 
begun before literature, in the very abidance of life. But it nonetheless remains.” The 
literary institution cannot exclude from fiction “the exigency of truthfulness, sincerity, 
or objectivity.”111  
This is what I want to cope with the “commune” in a few literary texts. It means 
I want to capture the undecidability. To the extent that the author writes about 
“experience of the unexperienced,” to the extent that he records his singular and 
irreplaceable experience, literature is like testimony. Derrida says, the narrative 
“testifies to what happened only once, dated, occurred, arrived, even if it did not arrive, 
at a date and in a place that are irreplaceable, to someone who is, in short, the only one 
able to testify to it, even if he inscribes his attestation in a network of facts largely if 
not totally probable, public, accessible to proof.”112  Here for Derrida, Blanchot’s 
autobiographical fiction presents an exemplary case in which the distinction between 
testimony and fiction is contested. In his writing, testimony and literature fall in the 
singular place of “neuter”, “the neither-nor that is beyond all dialectic,” 113  and 
“beyond the distinction between the real and the phantasmatic.”114 We cannot know 
for sure whether what the writer writes about is true or not, just like we cannot know 
for sure whether the testimony is telling truth or not. It is precisely in this 
“undecidability,” in literature as well as in testimony, that it is most likely to contain 
the truth. “One must be able to say this just as firmly, that this undecidability, like the 
abyssal co-implications it engenders, does not in the least invalidate the exigency of 
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truthfulness, sincerity, or objectivity, any more than it authorizes a confusion between 
good faith and false testimony.”115 
Such is the truth I try to capture in the following discussions. Literature is the 
truth, even when the writer writes about its singular and irreplaceable experience, his 
text is easily extracted from its original context of enunciation and crafted onto other 
contexts, just like the AMP is crafted onto various discourses and serves for different 
arguments. Therefore, the truthfulness lies only in the instant of their enunciation. “It 
is thus the very instance of the instant that seems to become exemplary: exemplary in 
the very place where it seems unique and irreplaceable, under the seal of unicity.”116 
Hence, the “truth” of literature must be sought from the instant of its writing, from the 
historicity of the text, which requires us to historicize the text. In doing so, the 
historicity of AMP, which has been erased by the various discourse for their own 
purposes, might be recovered through investigating into historicity of relevant texts on 
agrarian commune at various moments of its inscription in Chinese history.  
 
Agrarian Communes in People’s Republic of China: An Outline  
I try to list three of these truth-telling moments corresponding to three different 
periods of People’s Republic of China, when agrarian commune had taken different 
forms through different periods in accordance with the varying needs of the national 
economy.  
Chapter One will focus on the specific form of “socialist agrarian commune” 
and its literary representations, especially Zhao Shuli’s Sanliwan Village (sanliwan, 
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ƞč ) (1955) and Liu Qing’s The Builders (chuangyeshi, Je ) (1958).While 
cooperation in agricultural work had long existed before the founding of People’s 
Republic China, in the form of mutual-aid group, agricultural collectivization was 
officially promoted as a national movement in 1953 together with the launching of 
industrialization project known as the the first “Five Year Plan” (1953-1958), giving 
rise to the initial form of commune – elementary cooperative (Kńį, chujishe) – 
nationwide. Later, it expended its scale and developed into “advanced cooperative” 
(Ƽńį, gaojishe), and culminated in the form of “People’s Commune” in 1958 and 
lasted through Cultural Revolution. This socialist agrarian commune, resembling the 
“clan” (the first type) that Marx had praised, was highly organized with collective 
labor and collective property with the least degree of individuation. Perhaps we can 
say, during this period, agrarian commune indeed functioned to provide surplus to the 
state for accumulation. However, I will try to present, the form of “agrarian 
commune,” as independent and self-sustaining economic unit capable of producing its 
own surplus, infused by the socialist ethics of democracy and egalitarianism, also has 
the potential of escaping the logic of the state and capital, spontaneously developing 
into alternative form of social organization. Such discrepancy between the state-
assigned function of accumulation and its actual character can be glimpsed through 
Zhao Shuli’s and Liu Qing’s novels on collectivization. Zhao pictured agrarian 
commune not from the view of “modernization,” but from the perspective of local 
peasantry. Cooperative and commune, in this light, appeared more as an indigenous 
tradition that suited to the needs of peasantry and not necessarily subject to the logic of 
accumulation. Zhao’s novel shows a differential understanding of “individual,” 
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“family,” “romantic love,” “marriage” rooted in a rural society, which differs from the 
bourgeois definition, and hence opens for us an alternative temporality. Liu Qing is 
more easily to be recognized as a “modern” novelist, who viewed collectivization 
from the perspective of “modernization” and “industrialization”; however, his novel 
The Builders also unconsciously revealed somewhat ambiguous attitude in his 
depiction of the relationship of local community and state. And this makes the 
“builders” in his novel not exactly the builder of a capitalist(socialist) cooperation but 
indicates something more.  
Chapter Two targets the post-socialist moment of the “great transformation.” 
After Cultural Revolution, as China carried out the economic reform and turned 
toward market economy, People’s Commune was abolished, and the agrarian 
commune changed into the form of “household contract responsibility system.” Under 
this new organization, there was no more collective labor, but collective land 
nevertheless remained. Each household was allotted an equal share of land, and 
agricultural work was contracted and individualized to each household, while the 
collective property, such as animals and machines, were also divided. Nevertheless, 
land, as the primary means of production, remained a collective property at the 
disposal of the village community, and the possession of land is mediated by peasant’s 
affiliation with the commune. To this extent, it is still a type of “commune,” only more 
loosely organized, like the “Germanic type,” or what Rosa Luxemburg referred to as 
“primitive communism.” It actually gave rise to a vast strata of small peasants (each 
possessing a plot of land), which, under the conditions of market economy, have 
turned into migrant laborers, constituting a huge army of flexible and disposable labor 
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force that suited to the need of global capitalism. Meanwhile, the peasant family was 
structurally and internally fractured, divided between the “non-capitalist” countryside 
and the “capitalist” city, to the point that family is now facing the crisis of 
disintegration and may lose its designated function of reproducing labor, for which I 
will explore the works of so-called “Underclass Literature” (©Ì, diceng wenxue) 
rising at the end of 20th century and the beginning of 21st century. I select out Fang 
Fang’s (ÐÐ) Tu Ziqiang’s Personal Sorrow (ćŘ±Ĥ!¾+), Chen Yingsong’s 
(Ʃ¨å ) Mother (ù ) and Wild Cat Lake (ƠĘČ ) to illustrate the social 
contradiction and its literary representation about the “great transformation” towards 
capitalism. We will see how these bodily embodiments of “commune” did not 
completely conform to the logic of capital. On one side, the possession of land in the 
countryside ensured means of self-sustenance for migrant laborers, which enabled 
them to dissociate themselves from capital without starving to death. On the other side, 
the migrants show the wild power and ressentiment of the downtrodden subaltern class.  
In this sense, the “great transformation” is far from completion. Indeed, in recent 
years, we can even find a reverse tendency. Because of the preservation of commune 
in the remote countryside, the migrants have a place to return. What kind of 
countryside is waiting for them? And can they really reside permanently in the 
countryside? Can we resuscitate agriculture and reconstruct the countryside with the 
attempts of re-collectivization? These are questions which I attempt to approach in 
Chapter Three. Since the land remains collective property of the village community, 
there have been various attempts that try to reactivate the socialist legacy of collective 
labor in a productive way, in social practice, economic policy, as well as in literary 
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imagination. In this chapter I will discuss two literary texts. The first one is Wang 
Anyi’s (Ě·) novel Anonymous (Niming, Th) (2016), which presents us the 
utopian imagination of how the remote countryside and small towns that are 
“delinked” from the capitalist city become the enclaves where the humanity thrives 
and flourishes, and how an egalitarian community gets to be formed between the 
disabled, the “unproductive,” and “useless” humans that are not qualified as “labor 
force.” The second is Liu Jiming’s (IŋÓ) Human World (Renjing, !) (2016). In 
a way that echoes Liu Qing’s The Builders, this novel shows how youngsters that 
suffer setbacks in the city finds a new way of life in their cooperative effort of 
founding and running professional agricultural cooperative.        
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CHAPTER 1  
THE COMMON IN SOCIALIST LITERATURE ON COLLECTIVIZATION 
 
Upon the completion of land reform in 1940s, each peasant was entitled to a 
share of land sufficient to support himself by laboring on the land. However, such 
mode of production of small peasant economy was incompatible with the condition of 
modern state, which requires socialized mechanized production. In The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx has offered an elaborate analysis as to how the 
originally “liberation” of peasantry from feudal villenage into small holders turned out 
to be the “enslavement” and “pauperization” of peasantry under the condition of 
capitalism.  
 
The small holding of the peasant is now only the pretext that allows the 
capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to 
the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages. …The 
mortgage debt burdening the soil of France imposes on the French peasantry 
payment of an amount of interest equal to the annual interest on the entire 
British national debt. Small-holding property, in this enslavement by capital 
to which its development inevitably pushes forward, has transformed the 
mass of the French nation into troglodytes. Sixteen million peasants 
(including women and children) dwell in hovels, a large number of which 
have but one opening, others only two and the most favoured three.117  
 
As capitalist relations developed, land was turned into the source of the interests, 
rents, and profits of capitalism, the low productivity of small holdings forced upon 
small holders the heavy burden of both the state and capitalism - they not only could 
not afford capital’s demand of extracting surplus value, but also could not afford the 
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taxes for supporting the bureaucracy of the modern state. As a result, agriculture 
inevitably deteriorated under capitalism and small holders were dragged into the state 
of misery and destitution, subject to the to the exploitation of capital.  
Under the modern condition, socialized production is necessary for any modern 
state, be it socialist state or capitalist state; “the transformation of the individualized 
and scattered means of production into socially concentrated means of production” is 
necessary. To enhance production and develop economy, small-holder ownership must 
be eliminated, and small lots of lands must be amassed to conduct large-scale 
mechanical farming. In socialist states, the socialized production took the form of 
“collectivization.” Soviet Union nationalized all land and established state farms and 
collective farms to conduct large-scale mechanized collective farming. China, too, 
launched the campaign of “socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and 
capitalist industry and commerce” in 1953 along with its “Five-Year Plan” of 
industrialization. However, contrary to Marx’s proposal that socialist state should stop 
extracting surplus product from peasants like capitalist states and help peasants 
develop, in most socialist states, collectivization ended up a means of extracting 
surplus value from the countryside for the state’s accumulation.   
Many scholars have noted the “exploitative” nature of of agricultural 
cooperative in the state-dominated “modernization.” Philip Kuhn poignantly points 
out that collectivization functioned as a “powerful extraction device” for the modern 
Chinese state to “access to the farmers’ surplus production, unimpeded by predatory or 
protective middlemen.”118  The “unified purchase” in 1953, he says, dealt a blow 
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against middlemen and abolished the private market in agricultural products, and 
enabled the state to squeeze its revenue from the farmers through the mandated low 
purchase price. Kuhn says, “The administrative effect of land reform and 
collectivization was, in simplest terms, a deeper state penetration into village society 
and a more rigorous system of extraction from it.”119 To this extent, Mao’s socialism 
is more radical than Nationalist regime and the late Qing regime in carrying out the 
agenda of building a modern state.  
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri also criticize that “modernization” in socialist 
states such as Soviet, China, and Cuba were “perversely repeating the figures and 
structures of power in the capitalist states they oppose.”120 To the extent that socialist 
and capitalist states both sought to deprive agricultural producers of their land rights as 
property, and to the extent that land in these countries was consolidated into large 
holdings controlled either by national government or foreign corporations, “the great 
moment of modernization in both its socialist and capitalist forms has been one of 
great convergence.”121  The common result wrought by the socialist and capitalist 
modernizations is the disappearance of peasantry as an economic class.122  
Their accusation of socialist modernization was not unfounded. Many official 
documents at that time have confirmed the utilitarian purpose of using agrarian 
commune for accumulating funds for the state. Mao Zedong explicitly stated that 
“large funds are needed to accomplish both national industrialization and the technical 
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transformation of agriculture,” and “a considerable part of these funds has to be 
accumulated through agriculture.” “Apart from the direct agricultural tax, this is done 
by developing light industry to produce the great quantities of consumer goods needed 
by the peasants and exchanging them for the peasants’ commodity grain and the raw 
materials for light industry, so that the material requirements of both the peasants and 
the state are met and funds are accumulated for the state.”123 For this reason, Mao 
Zedong regarded agriculture as no less important than industry: “We must on no 
account regard industry and agriculture, socialist industrialization and the socialist 
transformation of agriculture as disconnected or isolated things, and on no account 
must we emphasize the one and play down the other.”124 Such was Mao’s theory of 
“walking on two legs” and “simultaneous development of industry and agriculture.”125 
“Agriculture has vital bearing on the nation’s economy and the people’s livelihood,” 
therefore, “in a sense agriculture is itself industry.”126 
Particularly, a distinct feature of Mao’s collectivization was that it relied 
primarily on peasants’ own labor power rather than the state’s financial support or 
industry’s capital investment to achieve collectivization and modernization of the rural 
area. In 1956, “the Program of National Agricultural Development from 1956 to 
1967” (also known as the “Forty Rural Doctrines”) came out. Its maind idea was “to 
mobilize the human power, material power, and financial power of five hundred 
million peasants” to achieve the objectives of modernization of the rural area, 
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including raising production, planting forests, developing husbandry, developing 
hygiene and medical conditions of rural area, improving living conditions of rural 
population and absorbing unemployed urban population, etc. It was impossible, the 
Program said, to rely on state’s investment on everything, which would exceed the 
state’s financial power and would result in the postponing and even cancellation of 
these projects. Rather, we should rely on the huge amount of human labor of the 
peasants to accomplish this. 127  
According to Wen Tiejun, such a strategy of using intensive input of human 
labor power in place of capital input to generate surplus, actually corresponds to the 
economic formula of L (labor) turning into K (capital). And such heavy exploitation of 
human labor power was aggravated in 1958-1960 when China faced a extreme lack of 
capital due to the considerable decrease of Soviet’s financial aid.128  In this light, 
agricultural colllectivization, indeed served as an efficient means of primitive 
accumulation for the state; by organizing peasants’ individual labor into collective 
labor, it effectively raised the productivity and increased the output of grains. To this 
extent, it can be seen a economic exploitation of peasantry, a kind of “state slavery” 
under the mode of Asiatic Mode of Production. 
However, we should not reduce “collectivization” and “agrarian commune” to 
mere instrumental means for the state’s primitive accumulation. For one thing, 
“collectivization” is a modern political practice, which relies on the political agency of 
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modern subject. Because of the indeterminacy that is constitutive of modern 
subjectivity, any political movement cannot be simply regarded as an order imposed 
from above, but must always involves the consensus of the subjects, not without 
resistance. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out, the disciplinary regimes of 
capitalism and state, in their attempt to produce subjects and provide labor power to 
capital, always encounter “the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of 
freedom.”129 Because “the power relation of modernity can be exercised only over free 
subjects who express that freedom through resistance to hierarchy and domination”130, 
therefore, there is always resistance of modernity within the modernity, that is, there is 
always the element “anti-modernity” within the modernity.  
Noting the complexity and heterogeneity of Chinese socialist history, Wang Hui 
describes Mao’s project of socialist modernization as “anti-modern theory of 
modernization.” He points out that while the socialist state contained within itself 
oppressive elements – the hierarchical bureaucracy, unequal exchanges between the 
country and the city, exploitative mechanism of extracting surplus value in support of 
the modern military defense system and modern industry – which were the inevitable 
products of modernization that can be found in any modern state, there were, however, 
at the same time critical forces within the socialist state which resisted the oppressive 
force of modernity. “In China’s historical context, the struggle of modernization and 
the rejection of rationalization have proceeded together, something that has produced 
profound historical contradictions.” Hence, Chinese socialism was full of internal 
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tensions and contradictions. For example, while Mao established the modern state 
through centralization, he destroyed the centralized bureaucratic system with the 
“Cultural Revolution”; while he used the communization and collectivization to foster 
economic development, he used the socialist distributive system to reduce the 
economic and social inequality; while he mobilized the whole society into the project 
of modernization of the state, and even deprived individuals of political rights and 
autonomy, on the other hand he detested oppression of popular sovereignty by the 
state machine. 131  
For this reason, we should cease to treat “collectivization” as a mere state-
dominating modernization project imposed from above, but should see it as a process 
full of negotiations and resistances of modern subjectivity, and pay attention to the 
inner complexity of the “collectivization.” What were the “modern” and “premodern” 
elements of the agricultural commune? How should the premodern ethical and cultural 
world of peasants participate in the modern organization of agricultural commune? 
Socialist literature on collectivization offers a productive place to capture such 
complexity and resistances within socialist history.  
Revolutionary struggles and production activities of workers and peasants have 
always been the central themes of communist literature. Ever since Chinese 
Communist Party tried to use literature as a medium to educate and transform the 
illiterate masses, there have been many communist literary works that depicted the 
changes and social movements happening in rural areas throughout 1940s and 1970s, 
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some of them popular and influential, such as Ding Ling’s The Sun Shines Over the 
Sanggan River (Taiyang zhaozai Sangganhe shang, ƨĒyð¢ý) (1948), Zhou 
Libo’s The Hurricane (Baofeng zhouyu, ÚƸƻƭ) (1948), Great Changes in a 
Mountain Village (Shanxiang jubian, ¡`) (1958), Liu Qing’s The Builders 
(Chuangyeshi, Je) (1960), Zhao Shuli’s Sanliwan Village (Sanliwan, ƞč) 
(1955), Hao Ran’s Sunny Days (Yanyangtian, Śƨ ) (1962-1965) and Golden 
Avenue (Jinguang dadao, ơ4Ƙ) (1975-1977), etc.  
In this chapter, I will select two pieces of works for my discussion of the 
agrarian commune, Zhao Shuli’s Sanliwan Village (Sanliwan, ƞč) (1955), and 
Liu Qing’s The Builders (Chuangyeshi, Je) (1960), the two most popular and 
highly-esteemed novels on collectivization and agrarian commune in socialist period 
with high artistic quality. Although agricultural collectivization was a state-promoted 
modernization project, and communist literature often served the propaganda of 
collectivization campaign, however, literature is far more complex than pure political 
propaganda; like Derrida says, it will reveal certain “truth” like a testimony, to the 
extent that the author records his singular and irreplaceable experience. The fiction 
“testifies to what happened only once, dated, occurred, arrived, even if it did not arrive, 
at a date and in a place that are irreplaceable, to someone who is, in short, the only one 
able to testify to it, even if he inscribes his attestation in a network of facts largely if 
not totally probable, public, accessible to proof.”132 Thus, Zhao Shuli and Liu Qing’s 
fictional works could be treated as two testimonies of how they felt about the 
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agricultural collectivization at a certain historical moment as two singular individuals 
at different positions, and thus presented different perspectives. While Zhao Shuli, a 
peasant-born writer deeply immersed in and identified with peasant culture, viewed 
the agrarian commune from the indigenous perspective of peasantry, treating it as 
something that naturally grew out of the rural society, Liu Qing, an intellectual writer 
with a passion for modernization, treated “agrarian commune” as an utterly “modern” 
product and placed it within the context of China’s modernization and industrialization. 
Both of their works have unveiled the intricate relationship of commune and socialist 
state that cannot be flattened by the logic of capital.   
 
Zhao Shuli’s Sanliwan Village: “Indigenous” Commune in Rural Society 
Zhao Shuli is a communist writer of high reputation while at the same time 
aroused controversies. Because of his close relation with the “peasant culture” and 
“peasant perspective,” he experienced different treatments in different periods. In 
1940s, when the Communist Party just began to ally with the peasant masses and 
sought to establish its legitimacy among peasantry, Zhao’s familiarity with peasant 
culture was highly promoted by Communist Party; his works were promoted by 
Communist Party as “models” that embodied the spirit of Mao Zedong’s Talk at the 
Yen’an Forum on Literature and Arts (1942),133 which had done a very good job in 
serving the illiterate masses by using accessible language, plain style, and writing on 
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themes that are familiar to people’s life. But when socialist state was founded and 
modernization was carried out, his “peasant” perspectives sometimes resulted in his 
conflicts with the demands of the Party and the state. This was because, the mode of 
existence of “peasant” itself was in conflict with the modern socialized production. As 
He Guimei points out, the controversial position of Zhao Shuli precisely illustrates the 
“excess” of peasant culture which cannot be easily subsumed by the given framework 
of “modern literature” defined by bourgeois culture, or the “modernization” project of 
the socialist state. Hence, Zhao’s literature may actually provide an alternative 
imaginary of the modern.134 
Zhao Shuli grew up in a declining peasant family. His grandfather, a small 
business man, emptied his savings to buy a few acres of land in the countryside and 
became a small landlord, but with the deterioration of economy in the countryside, the 
family had been going down the hill since the late 19th century.135 When Zhao was a 
child, the expenses on grandfather’s illness and funeral, as well as Zhao Shuli’s 
expenses on school, dragged the family into usury and tons of debts. For this reason, 
Zhao had a very good understanding of peasants’ misery in the countryside. Spending 
his childhood working in the fields with his father, Zhao was brought up like a peasant 
and was well-versed in farm work. Nevertheless, Zhao’s family managed to support 
him through school. He went to Changzhi No.4 Normal School, where he received 
modern education and came into contact with May Fourth literature like most Chinese 
intellectuals, and wrote a few pieces with the modern language of May Fourth 
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literature. However, he found that modern Chinese literature could barely get to 
peasants. The modern Chinese language used by May Fourth literature was a re-
invented Europeanized language in terms of grammatical structure and semantic, and 
such Europeanized written language was alienated from the peasants. When he tried to 
read a piece of May Fourth fiction to his father, he was surprised to find that his father 
showed no interest in it at all. Instead he found that peasants showed far greater 
interest in the old-style folklores, ballads, and theatre, which were regrettably 
informed by the old “feudalist” ideology of the landlord class. He realized, as long as 
peasants were still immersed in literature and art with “feudal” consciousness, there 
was no way they could accept new and revolutionary ideas. For this reason, Zhao 
consciously departed from the May Fourth literary tradition. He decided, in order to 
educate peasants and transform their thoughts, he would have to use a style that is 
accessible to them and popular with them. He called May Fourth literature “literature 
on the podium” (wentán wenxue, Ì{Ì), meaning such literature is placed high 
above the masses and circulated within only a small circle of intellectual elites, while 
he aimed for his literature to be “vendor’s literature” (wentān wenxue, ÌÊÌ), 
meaning that he intended his literature to be stories sold on vendor’s stall, which 
peasants liked to read and could afford.136  
Zhao Shuli made it clear that his literature was intended for the peasants; the 
guiding principle in his choosing of language was to make peasants understand, and he 
hoped to write fictions in such a way that those who had read his story could retell the 
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story to peasants who couldn’t read. In other words, he intended his literature to be a 
kind of “story-telling”. Such conceptualization of his literature, intended for the less 
educated peasants, has determined his unique language and style. He avoided using 
long and Europeanized sentence characteristic of May Fourth literature, but instead 
used the plain language that people would use in their daily conversation. Deeply 
nourished by and immersed in peasant culture and folk culture, he consciously drew 
on the cultural resources for his literary creation. Knowing that peasants would lose 
interest in listening if they could not figure out what happens in the first few lines, he 
always made sure that information that “person, place, time” is demonstrated at the 
beginning of the story. For this reason, he prioritizes “plot” over “character,” 
prioritizes “narration” over “description,” avoiding any lengthy and winding 
description of characters or scene that are not directly related to the plot itself. He said: 
“peasant readers are not used to reading separate descriptions; if you spend a few 
pages writing about natural scenes, they would think you are writing a book of 
geography.”137 The lack of “in-depth” psychological depiction of character makes 
Zhao Shuli’s works creates such an impression as if there was no “modern 
subjectivity” in the peasant’s world that Zhao Shuli depicts.  
This character distinguished Zhao Shuli’s works from modern Western novels 
and most May Fourth literature founded on the interiority of modern subject, and 
made them more close to a kind of medieval “story telling.” This has confused readers 
who have been accustomed to modern novels, such as American journalist Jack 
Belden, who expressed his disappointment as such: 
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The plots were merely outlines, the characters often bare types labeled with 
a name, but possessing no personality, and none of them were fully 
developed. Worst of all, his stories dealt with outlined events and not with 
actually felt emotions. Those deep passions which I found out from personal 
experience were stirring the whole Chinese countryside found no record in 
his pages. 138 
 
Belden’s confusion by the lack of “emotions,” “personality,” and “deep 
passions” in Zhao Shuli’s works, revealed the fundamental conflict of Zhao’s works 
with modern Western novels: the absence of “interiority.”  
Sunouchi Tōru (Ă<´), too, is confused by the absence of “inner struggle” 
of Zhao’s characters. He said, psychologism, though having various shortcomings that 
undermine modern novels, is indispensable and even inevitable for the establishing of 
the modern self; however, this basic method of modern novels is absent in Zhao’s 
novels. He is also confused by the fact that in Zhao Shuli’s fictional world there is no 
conflict between individual and the society, which is supposed to be the central 
concern of modern individuals. He said, Zhao Shuli’s characters do not even engage in 
battles against the social authority; the new government and new law descend like a 
savior overnight and the road simply opens up before their eyes. They are blessed 
simply because they are on the right side of history, on the side of progressive force, 
for their correct standing.139 For Sunouchi, the “inner struggle,” the “conflict between 
individual and society,” is what defines a modern subject. For this reason, there seems 
no modern subject in Zhao’s novels; peasants seem to present a “premodern” outlook, 
as if they haven’t got rid of the traditional rural world.   
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However, Takeuchi Yoshimi gives a different explanation for Zhao’s fiction’s 
“premodern” outlook. The seemingly traditional outlook of Zhao’s works in fact 
conceals a utterly new conception – transcending the bourgeois “modernist” literature 
by returning to the “medieval literature,” in which the relationship of the writer and 
readers is not yet differentiated. He notes that in Zhao’s fictions, rather than the 
opposition between individual and the background, character has a tendency of 
becoming the ground – once a character is fully developed and the “type” is complete, 
this character then merges into the background, giving way to another individual 
character’s development. In creating the “type”, Zhao “returns” it to the will of the 
entirety; the particular/individual is neither against the entirety/totality, nor is it a part 
of it, but rather, individual exists in such a state that “individual is the entirety.” 
Individual, staying the way as it is, merges into the entirety. However, the individual is 
not “unchanged.” After going through the time and struggles in life, it “returns,” but to 
a higher departing point than the original, and in doing so, the entirety develops with 
the individual together; as such, the world develops together in entirety. As such, the 
world itself is constantly drifting, without an anchoring point or a set framework as 
most modern literature do. Such a “drifting” world is a world that has unlimited space 
for individual’s free development without restraint or limit, and displays the scenario 
of a true “freedom” of individual.140  
Takeuchi’s insightful reading of the “individual” and the “entirety” in Zhao 
Shuli’s fictional world is highly suggestive of the relationship of “individual” and the 
“collective.” As we will later discuss, in the novel Sanliwan Village, there is not an 
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“unchanging inner core” of individual; rather, whether the individual, family, the 
cooperative, or the village, are all mutually mediated and constantly changing together.   
Despite its seemingly and confusing “traditional” outlook, the content of Zhao’s 
fictions is utterly new with modern ideas. His fictions touched upon romantic love 
between two free individuals, encourage women to be independent through her own 
labor rather than rely on husband, to break out of the large patriarchal household, to 
fight against local landlords and villains, etc. For example, Xiao Erhei Got Married 
(Xiao Erhei jiehun) tells a story about how superstitions prevented free love; Marriage 
Registration (Dengji) was a story written to correspond to the newly promulgated 
Marriage Law;  Clapper Talk of Li Youcai was written to serve the rent-reduction 
struggles during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Transformations of Village Li was 
written for the mobilization for a battle at Shangdang County; Grain Collector was 
inspired by his experience of dealing with lower officials of the old regime; Heirloom 
dealt with the relationship of modern rural woman and traditional mother-in-law. 
Basically, his fictions served as a medium for the Communist Party’s project of 
“modernizing” the rural society.  
Nevertheless, in introducing these new policies or new ideas, Zhao always 
viewed it from the perspective of local peasants, putting himself in the position of 
peasants, considering their possible emotions and reactions, and bring in peasants’ 
perspectives. Zhao avoids treating the new ideas and new practices as something 
“alien” and “external” to peasant’s life, brought by the Communist from outside and 
imposed upon the otherwise “intact” peasant world. To Zhao Shuli, the new values 
and new practices, corresponding to peasants’ need to solve problems in their reality 
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which could not be solved otherwise, appear to be something that naturally grow out 
from the rural society, rather than something imposed from outside by the state regime. 
For example, the resistance against landlord’s expropriation and oppression is the 
spontaneous and innate need of peasants; in this sense, the land reform and communist 
revolution led by Communist Party happen to aid peasants in fulfilling their needs of 
taking back their fruit of labor, and therefore, like Sunouchi describes, “revolution” 
appears to be a blessed opportunity which opens their road automatically. However, 
this precisely demonstrates that the “revolution” fuses naturally with the original state 
of peasant’s society. We might say, Zhao tries to creates an “indigenous” modernity 
that grew organically out of body of the rural society.  
It is in this sense that Zhao’s Sanliwan Village (1954) deserves our attention.  As 
his first novel on collectivization, this text can be seen as his systematic attempt to 
conceptualize this brand new form of “socialist agrarian commune,” and provides a 
lens to see how Zhao conceives of “collectivization” from the local perspective of 
peasantry and rural society, and especially, how does such “local” and “indigenous” 
view of cooperation respond to the state’s need for accumulation.  
It must be noted that when Zhao was writing this novel, “agricultural 
cooperative” was still a relatively new thing under experiment, practiced locally in 
Shanxi Province, Zhao’s home town, and had not yet become a state policy and 
national campaign. Shanxi Province was an “old liberated area” (liberated by 
Communists at the beginning phase of Second Sino-Japanese War) and had a long 
tradition of mutual aid during the Second Sino-Japanese War. In 1942, due to the 
extreme lack of means of production (as most animals and grains were taken by 
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Japanese army), peasants in Shanxi had already developed the form of “mutual aid 
group”, that is, several households formed a mutual-aid group, sharing animals and 
tools together to overcome the material difficulty. After land reform was completed 
and peasants got their own land, new class differentiation began to form within 
peasantry due to the declining interest in mutual-aid and the room for enhancing 
productivity capacity through the form of mutual-aid seemed to be very limited. 
Therefore, Shanxi Province began to experiment with turning the “mutual-aid group” 
into the “agricultural cooperative” by pooling together and sharing means of 
production – land, animals, and implements.141  
At that time, whether such form of “cooperative” should be promoted and 
whether it counts as “modernization” was still a question under debate. Liu Shaoqi, the 
party leader in charge of industrialization, taking Soviet as the model of 
“modernization”, prioritized the development of modern industry in the city over 
agricultural collectivization, insisting that industrialization should precede agricultural 
coopreation, and that the essence of “agricultural collectivization” lies in the advanced 
productive force brought by modern machines, rather than in the simple social 
cooperation among peasants in the countryside under the backward mode of 
production: 
 
Agricultural socialism have to rely on industry. Otherwise, no matter how 
peasants try, it is impossible to make China’s agriculture progress into 
socialism. … Only when there is leadership and help from working class, 
and only when there is state’s industrialization, can we provide peasants 
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with lots of machines, and nationalize the land, and then makes possible 
the collectivization of agriculture.142  
 
For this reason, Liu opposed to Shanxi’s attempt to raise the productivity through 
combining land and tools together: “Neither the mutual-aid team nor the co-operative 
can develop into the collective farm. Collective farm is entirely different, an entirely 
different form of organization, which can grow neither out of the mutual-aid team nor 
out of the co-operative.”143  
Mao Zedong, however, disagreed with Liu. After Liu Shaoqi made the comment 
in July 1951, he drew up “Draft Resolution on Mutual-aid and Cooperation in 
Agricultural Production” in September 1951 to rebuff Liu Shaoqi,144 and circulated it 
within the party in December 1951, attaching his own comments, titled “Take Mutual 
Aid and Co-operation in Agriculture as a Major Task,” calling attention to the 
importance of mutual-aid and cooperation.145 On another occasion, when comparing 
the experience of Soviet Union and China, he again mentioned Liu Shaoqi and 
implicitly criticized him: 
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Some comrades disapprove of our Central Committee’s policy of keeping 
the development of agricultural co-operation in step with our socialist 
industrialization, although the validity of such a policy has been borne out in 
the Soviet Union. While conceding that the speed of industrialization as set 
at present is all right, they maintain that agricultural co-operation should 
proceed at an extremely slow pace and need not keep in step. This is to 
disregard the experience of the Soviet Union. These comrades fail to 
understand that socialist industrialization cannot be carried out in isolation 
from the co-operative transformation of agriculture.146  
 
Mao Zedong’s central concern was, China’s industry, facing the extreme low 
productivity and extreme shortage of capital, would have to take a long time to 
produce machines for mechanized farming. Therefore, agricultural cooperation must 
not wait for the industrialization in the city, but should be carried out simultaneously 
with industrialization in the city, and supported Shanxi’s experiment on agricultural 
cooperative. In general, Mao supported the experiment of Shanxi Province.  
As a writer born of Shanxi origin, Zhao Shuli happened to witness Shanxi’s 
experiment on the new form of organization called “cooperative.” In 1951, Zhao had a 
chance to sit in a conference of the party committee of Changzhi region in Shanxi 
Province, which decided to tentatively set up ten cooperatives in Changzhi region. 
Thus, Zhao went to two of the ten villages to learn about this experiment, where he 
participated in the cooperative’s production, distribution, merging, and expansion. 
After this, he wrote Sanliwan Village according to his experience at the Chuandi 
village (©ã) in Pingshun County (£ƴ]).147  
Since the experiment in Shanxi was successful, it was soon approved by the 
Central Government as a viable form of social organization and promoted nationwide 
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in 1954. Zhao’s novel Sanliwan was published in 1955. It was the first novel that 
wrote about collectivization and published almost at the same time as the nationwide 
campaign of collectivization. However, we must not take Zhao’s novel as a statist 
propaganda, rather, as we can see, it was written in the experimental phase of the 
agricultural cooperative, and like all his past writings, it was intended to “solve a 
problem.” To this extent, the novel can be seen as a “testimony” to Zhao’s singular 
experience of attending the experiment of agricultural cooperative and exploring its 
possibility, recording his way of thinking at a formative moment of agricultural 
cooperation. While Shanxi was experimenting with the organization of “agricultural 
cooperative”, Zhao was also experimenting in his novel the idea of developing 
“modernity” in the rural society, which fuse naturally with the traditional village 
community.  
Zhao tends to conceive cooperation as an indigenous tradition that grew from 
within the rural society rather than a state-led project of “modernization” imposed 
from outside. In Sanliwan Village, the modern economic organization of “agricultural 
cooperative” seems like something that naturally grows within the rural society itself, 
and compatible with the innate logic of rural society itself. The state barely had any 
presence in the novel. The only figure that represents the state is Section Chief Ho, a 
state cadre that happens to be visiting the cooperative; he is a mere visitor and outsider 
that has no substantial influence on the decision-making and business of the 
cooperative. The village community seems to be a self-sufficient life-world relatively 
independent of the state, running on its own logic, free of the intervention of the state, 
and all the problems are solved by peasants themselves.   
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In Sanliwan Village, Zhao presents us a type of new village community 
reinvented through the medium of the agricultural cooperative. The co-operative was 
not only a modern economic organization for the utilitarian purpose of agricultural 
production, but also fuses intimately with the existing culture, ethics and justice of the 
rural life-world. Such cultural and moral logic of rural society was not the old 
dominant ideology of “Confucianism,” which had been eradicated with the 
overthrowing of landlords as the ruling class during the land-reform in 1940s. Rather, 
the indigenous cultural and ethical resources of rural society that Zhao tried to 
mobilize here were the egalitarianism and mutual-aid spirit that had long existed 
among the poor peasants and hired hands in the countryside. As such, the natural 
ethics of the underprivileged and the poor inherently involves a class dimension that 
fits the modern politics of Communist Party.   
Embedded in this community is a whole new conception of “individual,” 
“romantic love,” “marriage” and “family.” If we recall Marx’s description of clan 
commune in Grundrisse, then, what characterizes premodern commune is the 
indistinctness of individual and his community; to become modern, means to make the 
individual detached and separated from his immediate environment which is the 
commune. However, the “individual” in his novels does not have an unchanging inner 
core that is immune to the external changes or is “self-sufficient.” Rather, in his novel, 
individual, romantic love, family, or marriage, is always mediated by the community, 
and always in a changing relation, constantly intervened and changed by others. In his 
novels, the community constantly functions a liberating power that aids individual’s 
emancipation from the “backward” status of small peasant family. 
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In Sanliwan Village, the emancipating power of the community is shown in the 
story of Ma Youyi, a young man with a weak personality, who is overpowered by his 
dominating and manipulative mother. His mother, nicknamed “Always Right” (as she 
always likes to override the opinions of others), tries desperately to get Youyi to 
concern more about the family and to stop him from associating with his friends in the 
cooperative. She often sarcastically calls Youyi’s friends in the cooperative “little 
mothers,” as if she is fighting over the control over her son with the cooperative. 
Disliking Youyi’s girlfriend Lingzhi, who they think is too independent to control, the 
family try to arrange Youyi’s marriage with another girl Xiaojun. Taking Youyi’s 
fierece resistance as “madness” or “illness,” they use the traditional method – locking 
him up in the house and forbiding outsiders from visiting him. Anyone who is familiar 
with May Fourth literature would easily understand the meaning of the metaphors of 
“locked house,” “illness,” and “mad man” - they are typical imageries used by Lu Xun 
to refer to the oppression of modern individual by “feudalism.” Hence, Youyi’s 
breaking away from family and fighting for his romantic love is conscious echoing of 
the May Fourth theme of individual emancipation. To this extent, Zhao shows his 
influence from May Fourth literature. 
However, Zhao is not simply repeating May Fourth theme of individual 
emancipation from “feudalism” (which, in Marxist context, often comes from the 
premodern community), rather, the source of oppression and suffociation of idnividual 
comes from the backward mode of small peasant economy. The room where Youyi is 
locked is not just the “feudal family” in May Fourth literature, but a symbol of “small 
peasant family.” Zhao depicts his room as such: 
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It was too dark inside to see him at first, but by degrees she made out that he 
was lying on a bed by the south wall. This room had only one door and one 
small window on the north side, both facing the wall of the east wing. There 
had been two windows behind Yu-yi’s bed giving on the open country, but 
Muddlehead had nailed boards over them and piled up bricks inside as a 
precaution against thieves. It was hard in the gloom to see what was in here. 
At the head of Yu-yi’s bed loomed a large grain bin, in front of the bin were 
vats, on top of the vats were cases, on top of the cases were crates, and on 
top of the crates were some small, shadowy objects.148  
 
Here, the depiction of Youyi’s bedroom accurately conveys the Ma Family as a 
typical small holder’s family – windows nailed with boards to prevent thieves, the 
room stuffed with bins, vats, cases, crates for hoarding goods. The “darkness” and 
“suffocating” atmosphere of the room where Yu-yi sleeps reminds us of Lu Xun’s 
depiction of “iron house” where the masses sleep, but such darkness and suffocation 
derives not from “feudalist thoughts” but from the isolated state of small peasants, 
who reject social association with others. Such isolation and lack of communication, 
as Marx points out in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, is precisely what 
prevents peasants from forming into meaning political association and acquiring 
political agency.149 Hence, Youyi’s act of self-emancipation – breaking out of the Ma 
House – is endowed with the meaning of breaking out of the “backward” mode of 
small peasant economy.  
Interestingly, Youyi’s individual emancipation and his escape from the small 
peasant family is facilitated by the community. When Youyi ran out of the house, with 
his parents chasing behind, the crowd played a protecting role, deterring Youyi’s 
family from chasing him and dragging him back. When Youyi runs out of the house 
                                                
148 Zhao Shuli, Sanliwan Village, trans. Gladys Yang (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), 186 
149 Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels 
Selected Works, vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, 481. 
  79 
“with his father and mother at his heels,” “folks were flocking home, and all the 
passers-by stood still to watch, while the women and children left at home ran out 
when they heard the noise.”  
And when Muddlehead suddenly grabbed the crate with both hands, Yu-yi 
let go of it, leaving his father to hold it, and pushed his way into the crowd. 
“Stop him!” screamed Always Right. “He’s off his head!” 
Some men laid hold of Yu-yi. 
“Don’t worry about me!” he said. “I’m no madder than you are! They 
locked me up because I wouldn’t agree to this marriage they’ve arranged. I’d 
like you all to know I’m not going to be forced into it. I’ll trouble you to tell 
Hsiao-Chun, if you see her, she look for a husband elsewhere! 
Since he was talking sense, they let him go, and he squeezed his way past. 
“Don’t let him get away!” screamed his mother, in hot pursuit. 
“Go on home, granny!” the neighbors advised her. “You can’t lock up a 
strapping young fellow like that!”150  
 
Here, the crowd provide a shelter for Youyi’s escape, as he “pushed his way into 
the crowd.” More importantly, public space becomes a space where lies – Youyi’s 
“madness” and “illness” (which was used as the excuse to lock him up) – gets to be 
exposed under the sun. At first, people who thought that he was ill tried to help his 
parents catch him, but after Youyi explained and exposed his mother’s scheme, those 
people turned to stop his parents, and let Youyi “squeeze his way past.”  
The crowd also facilitates woman’s liberation. When Chu-ying was bullied by 
her mother-in-law and sister-in-law (nicknamed “Spitfire”), she ran to the Flagstaff 
Compound to seek help from the army dependents’ committee. As her father-in-law 
Muddlehead chased her to the Flagstaff Compound trying to stop her, he was blocked 
by the crowd who had gathered in the courtyard. As he tried to find her out, the 
onlookers deliberately covered for her. 
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Realizing that Chu-ying must have been here, Muddlehead asked one of the 
onlookers where she was. He was told she had left for a meal. 
“She’s not been home,” said Muddlehead. 
“What’s to stop her from having a meal with someone else?” 
… 
This was common knowledge to everyone there – they all knew where 
Chu-ying was – but because they resented the way Always Right and 
Spitfire bullied her, no one would tell Muddlehead. Since he knew it was no 
use asking, and futile to search blindly for her, he decided to wait in the 
crowd.151 
 
Here, what protected the daughter-in-law Chu-ying from the bully of her 
husband’s family was not the state’s authority, army dependents’ committee, but the 
crowd of onlookers; and their intervention and protection of Chu-ying was not 
according to the state’s law (that army’s dependents must be protected), but out of 
their plain sense of justice that a woman should not be bullied by her mother-in-law 
out of no reason; and such plain sense of justice was rooted in the egalitarian tradition 
among poor people in rural society instead of deriving from the state’s law. Therefore, 
the rural community seems to be a “self-ruling” community which runs on its internal 
cultural and ethical logic and does not rely on external law or rule of the state. 
Interestingly, in Zhao’s fictions, “the crowd” often serves as the positive 
function of “truth-telling,” facilitating women’s emancipation, serving social justice, 
and providing protection for the weak and the underprivileged. For example, in Liu 
Er’he and Wang Jisheng (Ip
Ěŋx) (1947), the hired worker Jubao accused 
the landlord out loud while hiding himself in the crowd, which protect him from being 
captured by the landlord and his servants. In Sanliwan Village, when Man-hsi revealed 
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the tricks of the animal broker, he took cover of the crowd, whose supporting words 
exerted a powerful intervention to the illegal behavior of the swindler.  
Zhao’s image of “crowd” is obviously different from the description of “crowd,” 
“mob,” and “masses” in modern political theory. According to Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, the mob and the masses are passive existence that “cannot act of their 
own accord,” and “their collection of differences remains inert and can easily appear 
as one indifferent aggregate,” making them “susceptible to external manipulation.”152 
What causes their political inertia is lack of communication and association, which are 
characteristic of premodern small peasants.  
According to Marx, what prevents small peasants from becoming modern 
subjects is their lack of communication and mutual isolation in the premodern form of 
small peasant economy - “a small holding, a peasant and his family, alongside them 
another small holding, another peasant and another family,” like “a sack of 
potatoes.”153 In the small peasant economy, “each individual peasant family is almost 
self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus 
acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse of 
society.” “In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-
holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national 
bond, and no political organisation among them, they do not form a class. They are 
consequenlty incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether 
through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they 
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must be represented.”154 Hence, in his letter to Vera Zasulich, Marx proposes that the 
key to reinvent Russian village commune into a modern social organization is to 
overcome the “lack of connection between the lives of different communes” and to 
found “a peasant assembly chosen by the communes themselves.” 155  
Based on Marx’s conception of “commune” in his letter to Vera Zasulich, Hardt 
and Negri develop the concpet of “the common.” Although Marx did not explicitly use 
the term “common,” Hardt and Negri point out, what Marx intuited to be the 
revolutionary forms of anti-modernity were in fact “planted firmly on the common.”156 
For them, a key characteristic that distinguished the “common” from other forms of 
plural collectives such as the crowd, the masses and the mob, is that the common 
“designates an active social subject,” while the latter “are fundamentally passive in the 
sense that they cannot act by themselves but rather must be led.”157 In a word, the 
“common” denotes a public space acting in which social subjects with full political 
agency are free to communicate and associate. 
In Sanliwan Village, the Flagstaff Compound serves precisely as such a space 
for communication and association of peasants. It is not only a political center (the 
office of the village administration, and headquarter of agricultural collective), but 
also the center of the ethical and cultural world of peasants, a “natural civil court” 
where issues about family and marriage are argued, reconciled, and solved, such as 
Yu-sheng’s divorce and Chu-ying’s separation from her husband’s home. Hence, 
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people often stop by to watch how family affairs get to be solved; “some of them were 
young people with baskets, sacks or tools, who had dropped in on their way to the 
threshing-floor to see what decision was taken – any question connected with marriage 
aroused their interest.”158 And since it was an open space where people were free to 
stop by, “there was much coming and going, much squeezing in and out.”159   
Because of the communication, debates, and mobility, Flagstaff Compound 
becomes a public and transparent space where truth gets to be told and lies get 
exposed. After hearing Chu-ying’s complaints about how her husband’s family bullied 
her, the head of the army dependents’ committee Hsiao-feng sent for Chu-ying’s 
mother-in-law “Always Right” and sister-in-law “Spitfire” and let the three give 
account of the story in front of the crowd. When the three told different stories, Man-
hsi and Youyi, as eyewitnesses, were sent for to attest to the validity of their stories. 
Man-hsi told the crowd how Chu-ying has been unjustly treated by the family; on the 
other hand, Yu-yi at first did not dare to testify against his mother, but he felt ashamed 
to lie in front of people, and chose to tell the truth. As a result, “Always Right” and 
“Spitfire” had no way but return home, while Chu-ying stayed in the compound as 
other army dependents comforted her and gave her advice how to separate from the 
family. In the end, with the mediation of the village cadres, Chu-ying got to divided 
property with Ma Family, and carried her and her husband’s own share of land to join 
the co-operative. The community actually help Chu-ying become an economically 
independent individual by helping her break away from the Ma family. 
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Besides individual freedom, romantic love and marriage is also mediated by the 
community. Zhao Shuli’s depiction of peasant’s “romantic love” is very different from 
modern fictions. Romantic love usually happens between two modern individuals who 
fight against the entire society, but as we discussed above, Zhao’s character is not a 
typical bourgeois “modern individual” with an unshaking inner core, hence the 
“romantic love,” accordingly, does not have a firm ground but is “drifting” and 
changes along with the situation, which makes it “situational.”  
In the story, Lingzhi and Youyi are the only two middle school graduates in the 
village (hence the only two “cultured” youths), and hence are fond of each other. But 
as Youyi’s family tried to break them up and set Youyi up with another girl Xiaojun, 
seeing that Youyi was too weak to stand up against his family, Lingzhi, in 
disappointment, turned to another young man Yusheng, who she became fond of while 
working with him in the co-operative. Interestingly, the collective activities of the 
cooperative were what facilitated Ling-chih and Yu-sheng’s romantic love. “Since 
borrowing Ling-chih’s geometry set, Yu-sheng had often consulted her on his 
calculations, and she had discovered what a good student he was – very quick in the 
uptake. So she was glad to help, and during the last few days had taught him a good 
deal of simple arithmetic.”160 “Though she had lent him a hand several times since the 
night of the first when she helped him with the roller, they had never been together for 
more than half an hour. Yet each occasion stood out vividly in her mind. Not one 
detail had she forgotten.”161  
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In describing the thought process of Lingzhi when she decided to give up Youyi 
and turned to Yusheng as a candidate for relationship, the novel shows a very different 
understanding of romantic love: 
If she gave up Yu-yi, there was no one else worth considering in Sanliwan. 
She thought fleetingly of Yu-sheng, but turned him down at once. 
“He’s straight, dependable, unselfish, intelligent, competent, and 
handsome! But he’s had no education!” 
She searched her memory for other boys, but kept coming back to Yu-
sheng. Though she had lent him a hand several times since the night of the 
first when she helped him with the roller, they had never been together for 
more than half an hour. Yet each occasion stood out vividly in her mind. Not 
one detail had she forgotten. 
“Does this mean I’m in love with Yu-sheng?” she wondered. 
Her heart did not deny it. 
“So quickly? All the time I’ve been with Yu-yi didn’t count for so much 
as these few hours!” 
She started comparing the two of them, and Yu-sheng beat Yu-yi in every 
respect. Yu-sheng gave all his thought to building socialism, Yu-yi to 
obeying his feudal minded mother.  
“I must start considering Yu-sheng!” she decided. 
 
This seems to go against the usual understanding of “romantic love.” Lingzhi 
made the decision by comparing the personality and families of the two candidates, as 
if “love” was not based on one’s inner core of “heart” that supports one to fight 
against the society, but depends on “external” conditions. But it precisely illustrates 
that there is not a modern dualism of “inner heart” and “external environment” in 
Zhao Shuli’s world; in his world, the “heart” and the “mind” is always mediated by 
one’s interaction with the world, by one’s relationship with one’s family, with the 
community.  
Similarly, Yu-mei’s romantic relationship with You-yi changes with the 
situation and is “conditional.” After being turned down by Ling-zhi, Youyi turned to 
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Yu-mei to propose marriage, a girl he had got along well but had not seriously 
considered marriage before. Yu-mei, “knowing that Yu-yi cared more for Ling-chih 
than of her, had never seriously thought of him as a husband” either; but now that 
situation had changed and Ling-chih was out of the way, she could consider him. 
Nevertheless, Yu-mei doubted his sincerity, thinking, “It’s not as if you thought all 
that of me before! If Ling-chih hadn’t found someone else, you’d not have been in this 
hurry!” Therefore, she laid down certain conditions – Yu-yi must stand up against his 
dominating mother and break from his selfish family and join the cooperative with her. 
Her romantic love, hence, was conditioned on his actual practice - “My answer 
depends on how things go from now on!”162 Seeing that Yu-mei didn’t want to get 
along with his family and wanted to stay in the cooperative, You-yi finally separated 
from the Ma family and registered his own household together with Yu-mei.  
At any rate, it seems to be a belief or philosophy of Zhao Shuli that people can 
change with situation and through practice, hence, there is always possibility to 
transform a person and lead him toward good direction by changing the environment. 
There is not an unshakable inner core of “individual”; rather, everyone changes his 
practice along with the changing environment and situation. Hence, we see, those who 
were not willing to join the cooperative at the beginning, seeing their children break 
away from the family and join the cooperative, or seeing that working alone yields less 
than working with others in the cooperative, ultimately change their minds and decide 
to join the cooperative. One’s marriage, family affairs, or romantic love, all change 
with situation and are mediated and re-defined by one’s surrounding community. The 
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modern notions such as “family”, “marriage”, “individual”, and “romantic love”, 
which have been grounded in a “solitary” individual, are redefined as mediated by and 
rooted in community.  
 
Liu Qing’s “The Builders”: a Modern Subject that Transforms the Community 
Compared to Zhao Shuli, which viewed collectivization from the native 
perspetive of peasants and local rural community, Liu Qing had a stronger passion for 
“modernization”. Liu Qing was born in rural region too, but, like most modern 
Chinese intellecutal, he was deeply influenced by May Fourth literature and modern 
novels, and his novel was a typical modern novel that features a modern subject with 
psychological description. And like many Chinese intellectuals in a under-developed 
socialist state, Liu Qing had a passion for modernization. He was excited about the 
tremendous change that the industrializaiton and modern state brings into peasant’s 
world. Besides, he read a lot of theoretical works of Marxism, newspapers, and party’s 
policy documents about colletivization, and was well-informed of the significance of 
collectivization as a part of the “modernization” of the state. Accordingly, Liu Qing’s 
novel, The Builders (Chuangyeshi, Je) (1962)  is infused with his theoretical 
thinking of the “collectivization” movement. Setting the time of the story at 1953, the 
year when the state launched the “First Five Year Plan”, he consciously links the 
agrarian commune to the larger picture of the socialist state’s modenization, using a 
passionate language to describe the modernization in China:  
Spring in 1953 was exactly the same as the one thousand nine hundred and 
fifty-two springs that had gone before.  
… 
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But in the spring of 1953, people’s feelings were very different from what 
they had been during the previous one thousand nine hundred and fifty-two 
springs.  
What had they done, these historic personages sleeping in the tombs of 
Tang and Han? They studied and created many laws and rules and 
regulations. Dressed in helmets and armour, spears in hand, they fought 
many battles. They wrote dignified essays and beautiful poems. Some 
performed great deeds, some committed terrible mistakes. Some, although 
they did a definite amount of good, also did a certain amount of harm.  
But not one of them ever had any connection with a Five-Year Plan.  
Spring of 1953 was the first spring of China’s First Five-Year Plan for 
socialist economic construction. After the frozen earth thawed, many were 
the big construction projects that began, the new railway lines that were 
started, the teams of surveyors who set forth. China, which had been in the 
merciless grasp of foreign capitalists and the Kuomintang government for 
years and years, was commencing planned construction at last.  
In the spring of 1953, new buildings sites, surrounded by fences of wire 
and bamboo, appeared in the outskirts of Si’an. Red merit banners floated 
above the competing work teams. The decrepit ancient capital began to 
regain its youth. Sewers were dug, streets were widened and paved. In the 
city and in the suburbs, vehicles laden with steel girders, cement, timber, 
sand and gravel jammed roads laid when Si’an was the famed Chang An of 
antiquity.  
… 
In spring of 1953 all China’s vast land was a huge panorama, a symphony, 
collective dance, of the First Five-Year Plan. 
Spring of 1953 – another turning point in history.163  
 
In Liu Qing’s passionate and lyrical language, 1953 is marked as a “turning 
point in history”, in which for the first time, the countryside was involved into 
“History” because of the state’s industrialization and “First Five-Year Plan.”  
In order to enter History, a peasant must become a modern subject. The Builders 
is a typical bildungsroman, featuring the growth of a young peasant Liang Sheng-pao 
in the collectivization movement. As a party intellectual, Liu Qing is familiar with 
Marx’s theory about small peasants, especially the famous text The Eighteenth 
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Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. If traditional peasant is a non-political figure that only 
passively reacts to the stimulation of environment, conforming to domination, satisfied 
with the given status quo, and lacking the courage to make change, then Liu Qing’s 
bildungsroman intended to shows how peasants bid farewell to their way of life of 
thousands of years old and became active political subjects to create “History,” the 
history of the modernization of the socialist state. The “bildung” of modern 
subjectivity is a process of ovecoming the immediate “materiality” with transcendent 
“spirit”, to get rid of the obsession with immediacy of materiality and identify with the 
noble and transcendent ideal of communism and socialism. 
In the novel, the biggest characteristic that Liu Qing accords to the protagonist 
Liang Sheng-pao is his interiority, which alienates him from the surrounding 
environment. If traditional peasant is characterized as “fundamentally conservative, 
isolated, and capable only of reaction, not of autonomous political action of its 
own,” 164  then Liang Sheng-pao is marked as being different from the “passive 
masses,” and “not like a peasant” at all.  When Sheng-pao makes his first appearance 
in the novel, he is on a trip to another county to buy rice seeds for his mutual-aid team: 
 
Because the river was so rapid at this time of the year, there was no evening 
ferry service. Passengers arriving on the late train had to spend the night in 
town. Attendants from the local hotels were explaining the situation to the 
newcomers and leading them to their various establishments. In a few 
moments the little street was empty. Only Sheng-pao remained. Pieces of 
gunny sacking over his head and shoulders and wrapped around his bed roll, 
the young peasant stood alone in the inky darkness beneath and old mat 
awning extending from the wall of the station building.  
Why didn’t he go to a hotel? Surely they weren’t all filled? 
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No, but Sheng-pao did have a small problem. He had come several 
hundred li to buy rice seed. The better hotels here charged forty or fifty cents 
a night. Even if you shared a large heated kang with several other guests, the 
cost was twenty cents. Sheng-pao hated to spend the money. When he left 
his home on the Tang Stream, this item had not been included in his 
budget.165  
 
The novel depicts for us a person in aloofness. In the raining night when “spring 
rain came hissing down,” while other passengers seek shelter and hide into the hotels 
in a rainy night, Sheng-pao “stood alone in the inky darkness.” If hiding into a warm 
shelter is a natural and spontaneous reaction of most ordinary people to the cold rainy 
night, like animals reacts naturally to the environment, then Sheng-pao distanced 
himself from the environment and displays his “indifference” to the disrupting element 
of the surrounding, immersed in his own thoughts and thinking about how to spend the 
night - “As he stood in the little street beside the station, his mind went back to the 
paddy fields of Frog Flat.” He recalled “how hard it had been, collecting money for the 
trip. … He even had to advance money for two families of his own team. If he hadn’t, 
hey! – there wouldn’t have been the breath of chance that every member of the team 
would switch to a better strain of seed as their plan provided.”166 After going through a 
calculation of “how much money he had brought, how much seed he was going to buy, 
its cost of transport, and the price of his own round trip fare,” Sheng-pao made up his 
mind to save the money: “Even if I have to sleep out under the eaves, I’m going to 
save that twenty cents.”167 What we see here is a modern subject who is determined to 
“endure” the unfavourable material conditions and determined to “overcome” the 
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difficulty to carry out his will. Shengbao’s determination to endure the coldness to 
sleep out under the eaves is a conscious, well-planned choice that transcends the 
immediate environment and overcomes the difficulty. This capacity to distance himself 
from the given surroundings and transcend it marks him out as a modern subject.  
According to Naoki Sakai, this “alienation” and “interiority,” or, one’s negative 
relation with the species as the substratum, is a defning feature of modern subjectivity. 
“In immediacy, the individual would never constitute itself as a subject, it becomes a 
subject by returning to itself after reflecting upon and distancing itself from its 
immediate inheritance, through self-negation.” 168  While negating the immediate 
surroundings, the subject identifies with a higher, transcendental plane. For a modern 
subject, this “transcendental” plane is usually the “state,” hence, the modern subject is 
always a national subject. For Liu Qing, such “transcendental” plane is the 
“Communist Party’s policy” and its ideal of “socialism” and “communism.” Liu Qing 
was passionate about promoting the Party’s lines. He once said, “As I understand, ‘the 
need of politics, class, and masses’ means the correct line, policy, and guidelines of 
the Party.”169 In fact, because Liu stood too close to the “Party”, that he mistakenly 
followed the wrong line during Cultural Revolution, for which he had to apologize, “I 
didn’t make distinction between correct line and wrong line. Because I didn’t have 
enough consciousness about the ‘lines’, I talked about Party’s newspaper and party’s 
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editorial in a general way and didn’t distinguish good lines and bad lines.”170  Liu 
Qing consciously portrays Sheng-pao to be a young man that loyally follows the 
Communist Party’s leadership: “He should listen to the Party, adopt the principle of 
life that the Party promotes and become a model, to enhance the consciousness of the 
masses, and to fight the opposite force with the superiority of mutual aid and 
cooperation.”171  
In their expedition into the mountain to cut bamboo, while other peasants “were 
discussing the differences between the weather in the mountains and the weather on 
the plain,” Shengbao “neither joined in their conversation nor listened to it,” but “was 
involved in his own thoughts, which to him were highly entertaining.”172 He was 
thinking of a badly informed peasant who mistakenly thought that Sheng-pao was 
leading the group at the behest of Sheng-lu, his well-to-do peasant cousin, instead of 
Party’s leadership. Think “that was certainly comical, Sheng-pao couldn’t represss a 
chuckle.” Here, in analyzing the peasant’s words, Sheng-pao consciously distances 
himself from the peasants, “objectifying” them in his analysis 
 
Sheng-pao continued meditating. It didn’t matter that the stranger obviously 
had little regard for him. Young Sheng-pao was determined to learn from the 
broad-mindedness of Communists with long-range spiritual goals. He was’t 
thin-skinned. It didn’t matter a bit whether people considered him important. 
But the thing intrigued him. Why? Secretary Wang had put his finger on it 
exactly during the Party rectification. The secretary said that in the great sea 
of the small peasant economy, the well-to-do middle peasant was the most 
respected. He usually had a fine horse, or a large household, or someone in 
the family earning a good salary as a middle-school teacher. His prestige in 
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the surrounding countryside was high. But, Secretary Wang asserted 
definitely, in the socilaist society of future, the system of private property 
would be eliminated. In the village, this ridiculous situation would naturally 
also change. 
“How right Secretary Wang is,” Sheng-pao thought in astonishment. 
Sheng-pao often noted practical proof of revolutionary theory in his daily 
life. Now, marching through a mountain forest, he had made a new 
discovery regarding revolutionary theory, and it increased the spring in his 
step. How fascinating life was! He loved it ardently.173 
 
What “pulls” Sheng-pao out of the immediacy and materiality of everyday life in 
which the other peasants are embedded in an “organic” way are the “abstract” or 
“metaphysical” ideas of the Marxist “revolutionary theory” about small peasants and 
class struggle, which he learned from the Communist Party. Hence, Sheng-pao is able 
to transcend the limited and narrow scope of the village life and see the whole big 
picture (the “blueprint” of the state) in which peasants gain their meaning of life by 
working for the greater cause of China industrialization (otherwise they would not be 
able to understand why 13% of their products have to be turned into the state as tax, 
and why the extra products must be sold to the State at a mandated low price).  
This priority of the “spirit” over the “material” is intimately linked with a 
teleological modernist worldview in which Liu Qing firmly believed. When visiting 
Soviet Union, Liu Qing was deeply moved by the mental state of Soviet people: “They 
are the people that head toward a spiritual goal and along with time; this spiritual goal 
is communism! They are living by the principle of ‘all behaviors that pursue spiritual 
principles are good behaviors!’”174 “If a man works only for his money and material 
needs, he cannot do great things, just like a person who writes for remunerations 
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cannot produce great works. But if a person doesn’t care about material return and put 
all of his effort into working for the nation, the people, and his honor, then he will 
create miracle.” 175  
In the novel, with the strong passion for the teleological progress towards 
modernization, Liu Qing passionately call for peasants to break away with the bound 
of the trivial materiality of “property” and throw themselves into “History”, 
abandoning the “material” and embracing the “spiritual”: 
 
Peasants, oh, peasants. What importance they attached to their land, 
draught animals, buildings, grain, to every bit of property they owned – 
was it only a carrying pole, a piece of rope, or a little ring on the handle 
of their plough. Any change in history made some people tremble, so 
fearful were they of losing even a bundle of straw.  
 
Such prioritization of “spirit” over “materiality” typifies in Sheng-pao’s 
romantic relationship with Kai-hsia, a girl he is fond of. Faced with the brave 
confession of Kai-hsia, Sheng-pao suppressed his impulse to get intimate with her: 
 
Sheng-pao longed to wrap this girl who loved him in his strong arms and kiss 
her lips. But he didn’t. Kissing a woman for the first time in life is a big event 
for any honest man.  
His reason as a communist took precedence over the human weakness to 
yield to emotions. He thought, once they hold and kiss, their relationship 
would take a radical turn. Sheng-pao, who had never tasted sex in his life, was 
bound to stay with Kai-hsia once he had time. If it was slack season with long 
winter nights, how would sweet sex life matter? Communists are humans, too. 
But the summer harvest and rice shoot transplanting were about to begin. He 
had to control human being’s elementary instinct and elementary feelings with 
noble spirit.  
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Not only Sheng-pao’s personal emotions must give way to the public cause of 
the mutual-aid team or the collectivization, but also the “elementary instinct” and 
“elementary feelings” should be overcome by the “noble spirit” as a Communist.  
Such praising of the “spiritual” over the “material” was stressed to an even 
greater extent in his fiction “Stubborn through Iron” (hen tou tie, ėƔƢ), written in 
1958 during Great Leap Forward. In the story, the fifty-three-year-old man, 
nicknamed “stubborn through iron”, suffers serious back pain and foot pain due to his 
overwork as a leader of production team. Nonetheless, he insisted on accepting the job 
of the team leader again after deposing a corrupted cadre. Despite his wife’s weeping 
and pleading to give up this job so as “to let him live a few more years,” he was 
nevertheless determined to lead the production team to undertake an even bigger 
project – to turn the arid land into water fields. Because the Great Leap Forward, as 
Wen Tiejun points out, was in essence a process of primitive accumulation based on 
the intense input of human labor in place of capital, turning “labor power” (L) directly 
into “capital” (K) under the condition of the extreme lack of capital, therefore, Liu 
Qing’s calling for “overcoming” laborer’s body’s physical limit to strive for a higher 
spiritual goal, in the context of Great Leap Forward, amounted to calling for over 
expending of human’s labor power onto the building of aqueducts, bridges, and roads, 
which were frequently undertaken during Great Leap Forward.176 As is well known, 
such overt expending of labor power onto infrastructure construction to the point of its 
exhaustion, and the extreme material destitution resulted from the over extraction of 
agricultural surplus products, caused the “Great Famine” and mass deaths in early 
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1960s. And Liu Qing unfortunately ended up being a state’s agent that contributed to 
such exploitation of peasantry. 
As a matter of fact, to the extent that “socialism” is “socialism within one state”, 
“socialism” is closely bound with the the need of the “state” for primitive 
accumulation. However, we must refrain from reducing Liu Qing to a “statist,” but 
should recogize a more nuanced relationship between industry and agriculture, 
between the state and the collective in the socialism. When Liu Qing was writing the 
novel, it was still at the early stage of collectivization, and collective interest of local 
commune had not yet conflicted with state’s interest. Modenrization of the commune 
is part of the modernization of the state. The more developed the commune, the more 
grains they will yield, and the more surplus product they can contribute to the state. In 
the blueprint of the “modernization” of the socialist state outlined by Chinese Marxists, 
agriculture, though sacrificed for a short term, would ultimately benefit from the 
development of industry and the modern state. When Liu Qing persuaded peasants to 
turn in the surplus products to the state in 1954, he stressed how modern industry (the 
advanced productive force) could greatly contribute to agriculture’s development and 
modernization:  
 
How many more grains they yielded from using the chemical fertilizers 
produced by the chemical factory? How much more water they got and how 
much more grains they yielded by using the modern water wheel 
manufactured by the modern factory instead of the old-style wooden water 
wheel inherited from Qing Dynasty? How many more grains they yielded by 
organizing and engaging in collective labor? And before they had all these 
conditions, how many grains did they get? And who gave them such 
conditions? When their mutual-aid team was on the brink of disintegration, 
who sent them help? Who prepared for them the chemical fertilizers and 
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new-style water wheel? Who sent people to live in the village and gave 
technical instructions?177  
 
Liu Qing tried to make the peasants aware that “the extra grains were given by 
the Party, the government, and the working class,” therefore they had no reason to 
decline selling the extra grains to the state at a reasonable price. Liu explained, “the 
grains sold to the state will turn into more and better fertilizers and new-style 
implements at cheaper prices, as well as more capable cadres and technicians. Given 
such good cycle, it be long before the tractors drive into villages.”178 In The Builders, 
the state played a crucial role of helping Sheng-pao’s mutual-aid team to develop, 
sending the technicians to their village to teach villagers new technique of planting 
seeds, helping them prevent the insect hazard, and providing them with the loans for 
production. 
On the other hand, the tension between the “spiritual” and the “material” should 
be understood in a more complex way. In fact, the ability of the modern subject to 
“transcend” his immediate and material interest and forsee the “abstract” things, is 
what is demanded for the running of a agriculutral cooperative. Economically 
speaking, the agricultural co-operative, as a modern economic organization, must 
observe the economic law of accumulation, not unlike modern enterprise, which 
requires a modern mindset of investment and long-term planning. An agricultural co-
operative would need to set aside some percentage of income as “productive fund” (9
ĳơ, gong ji jin) and “welfare fund” (9ĥơ, gong yi jin). While “productive fund” 
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is to be re-invested in the subsequent rounds of expanded reproduction for the sake of 
long-term development of the co-operative, “welfare fund” is to be expended on 
taking care of the weak, the old, and the widowed of the co-operative. In enterprise, 
when spending money onto production, the entrepreneur foresees the return of capital 
investment in the long term, even though he has nothing to gain immediately. In the 
same way, the expanded production of co-operative demands a portion of money to be 
used as productive fund instead of for immediate consumption, therefore it is 
necessary that peasants overcome the shortsightedness that only sees immediate and 
visible gains and must prepare for the potential loss and risk, because like enterprise 
the initial investment cannot guarantee immediate and safe return. 
Moreover, in actuality, after setting aside the “productive fund” (for expanded 
production) and “welfare fund” (for taking care of the incapable members), the co-
operative would keep a portion of products for its self-consumption, and turn the rest 
of the products to the state. Hence, what is involved here is the multiple relationship of 
the individual, collective, and the state, which are often in tension. Even if the product 
does go to the state, there is often inherent tension between “the collective interest” 
and “individual interest,” that is, whether to use the money for personal consumption, 
or to put the money back into expanded production of the cooperative. As the report of 
Agriculture Ministry pointed out: “If the accmulation of public funds increases too fast, 
it will affect negatively the income of members of the co-operatives. Peasants who 
join the co-operatives are looking for more grains, more dividends, more revenues, 
and better living conditions. If the public assets increase and the revenues of the 
individual decrease, peasants’ enthusiasm will go down, and the collective cause 
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won’t last long. Therefore, we should restrain the accumulation of public funds, and 
make it slower and more stable.”179  For many peasants who have got used to the self-
sufficient small holdership, it is hard to accept the “abstract” and rational planning for 
the collective.  
In the novel, Jen the Fourth’s attitude to his first sum of income reveals the 
typical mind of a traditional peasant. Afraid that the money invested in buying 
fertilizers for the expereiment of the new strain of rice seeds might go into vain, he 
wants to take back his share of the investment to buy grains to improve the living 
conditions of the family. In other words, he is afraid of the risks that capital 
investment involves and asks for an immediate gain. Jen confesses: “I’ve got a whole 
houseful of kids, all with mouths waiting to be fed. When they’re hungry if you don’t 
give them a little something, they cry. I’m scared, I’ve been poor too long. And that’s 
the truth. When we made the plan, I didn’t have a penny. If you said storm the heavens, 
I’d have mounted a cloud. But now I’ve got a few yuan in my hands. I can’t bear to 
spend them. I say to myself - suppose the close planting doesn’t work? All that money 
will be wasted.”180 After repeated persuasions of others and after going through many 
inner struggles, Jen finally decides to take the risk, saying: “All right. Even if it’s a 
cliff, I’ll leap off it with you together.” Such a “leap” into the unknown risk like 
leaping off the cliff, is precisely a modern mind for capitalist investment and scientific 
experiment. 
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While Jen the Fourth’s obsession with the immediate and the “material” is 
typical of peasantry, we see a different attitude in Shengbao. After the huge harvest, 
the whole village watch what he would do with the money. Thinking that he will use 
the money to purchase more land for himself, “a number of people with land to sell 
had dogged his footsteps.” However, “Sheng-pao didn’t buy any land. He said he was 
going to invest in expanding the mutual-aid team’s production.”181 Putting the money 
back into the expanded production of mutual-aid team is precisely a modern 
capitalistic behaviour; instead of consuming the money immediately, he uses it for re-
investment to generate more money. In this light, the future-oriented modernist 
perspective cannot not be completely subsumed by the logic of the state, but may 
indicate the possibility of a “better commune.” 
In the novel, the mutual-aid team organized themselves together and ventured 
into the Zhongnan Mountain to cut bamboo and make brooms to earn their first sum of 
money as the starting fund. This organized effort is a very modern behavior that is 
rarely seen on peasants. Like Sheng-pao’s father sneered at him: “Who can compare 
with a young fellow like you – leading forth your army, building camp, setting up your 
cooking cauldron, spending a month in the mountains cutting bamboo. Huh! You’d 
think he was out to conquer a territory. Who ever saw a peasant behave like that?”182 
However, the goal of their modern venture is to construct a better community, of 
which their families are a part. Especially, in depicting these peasants, Liu Qing 
highlights their sentimental attachment to the local life-world and their intimate 
feelings for the “things” in their hometown, conveying a sense of “localness” that 
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differentiates from the state. When their fellow villager Gao Zengfu came from afar to 
visit the mutual-aid team in the deep mountains, seeing their fellow villager for the 
first time in months, the team of peasants get excited:  
 
Aiyaya, the whole crowd, in clothes ripped by brambles, immediately rushed 
to Tseng-fu, who was wearing felt foot bindings and straw sandals for 
climbing countain paths, and surrounded him enthusiastically. … 
Good old Tseng-fu. He was a Frog Flat man. He came from where their 
paresnts, wives, kids, thatched cottages, land, draught oxen, pigs and 
chickens were. His appearance in the narrow mountain ravine was like the 
sudden arrivial of an emissary from the world of men. He had come just at 
the right time. Happily smiling, everyone felt like embracing him and 
kissing his thin serious face.183  
 
Quite different from his constant praising of the “transcendental” spirit over 
material, Liu here highlights the concrete materiality of their daily life and community 
- “their paresnts, wives, kids, thatched cottages, land, draught oxen, pigs and 
chickens.” It was these concrete material aspects of of daily life that motivated the 
poor peasants to venture into the wild and dangerous moutains.  
Even the most “solitary” person, Sheng-pao, who possesses a “transcending” 
personality and who have ambition to “do great things,” is not completely dislocated 
from the rural life-world. Although Liu Qing consciously places Sheng-pao’s founding 
of cooperative within the larger picture the state’s industrialization, he nevertheless 
makes Sheng-pao distanced from the “state.” The narrator tells us, Sheng-pao rarely 
thinks of “big things” like “Five Year Plan” and “industrialization”, but remains 
concerned about business of the cooperative in the village: 
 
In his idle moments, Sheng-pao thought of home. During the day, he 
climbed the slopes and scaled the ridges with the others. At night when, after 
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a session of jollity, the fifteen men were snoring peacefully, Sheng-pao lay 
on his bed of boughs and grass listening to the wind moaning though the 
trees on the opposite mountain slope and wondering how Huan-hsi was 
doing with the rice sowing. Had the agronomist come yet? How was Huan-
hsi getting on with Sheng-lu? The sowing was another important matter in 
their life, Sheng-pao felt. As to the war in Korea and the armistic 
negotiations at Panmunjom, as to the country's industrialization, he didn't 
understand much about that. Anyway, we have Chairman Mao who would 
take care of such things.184  
 
We are told that Shengbao rarely thinks about grand blueprints at the state level 
such as Korean War and “industrialization.” Rather, his mind is preoccupied with the 
progress of the rest of mutual-aid team in the village. In contrast, the other party cadre 
Guo Zhenshan, who keeps talking about “Five Year Plan”  and “industrialization” and 
encourages Kai-hsia to apply for positions in factories in the city, turns out to be a 
selfish person who cares only about his household’s yields. Here, Liu Qing seems to 
share with Zhao Shuli the belief that a “virtuous” leader should be concerned more 
about the local community rather than the state’s business. After all, it is for the sake 
of building better community that Sheng-pao and other peasants become self-
conscious modern subjects capable of planning and engaging in social practice to 
transform the reality. The purpose of Sheng-pao’s founding of the mutual-aid team 
and cooperative is not to contribute to the state’s “industrialization,” but to help poor 
villagers survive the spring famine (because the rich peasants refuse to lend them 
grains). To speak of his identity, Sheng-pao, though a party member, is not really a 
state cadre that lives on state wages, but a local leader at the village level. Leaders of 
this level - the village head, chiefs of production team, head of the elementary co-
operative - are not strictly affiliated with the state government, and yet are important 
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intermediary force (or what Philip Khun calls the “middleman”) between the state and 
the peasant masses, and often play an ambiguous role; they could either aid the state’s 
extraction of villagers, or stand on the side of local community to resist the state, as I 
will late specifiy in the next section. As Cai Xiang points out, “rural cadres are not 
strictly categorized as state officials, and yet the state has had to rely on them to 
manage rural communities for those communities to function effectively within the 
structure of a unified nation-state.”185 In fact, Cai points out, the figure of Sheng-pao 
actually contains some traditional virtues of leaders in rural society, such as the 
“willingness to give all he’s got,” and “selflessness and the sacrifice of one’s own 
family for the good of all families.” Such traditional virtue “was not only the Party’s 
expectation for its own members, but with the localization of cadres, it also 
represented the transformation of social functions formerly performed by the clan or 
family. In other words, revolutionary politics made effective use of the traditional 
ideal of a clan leader and transformed it into a new image of someone who leads.”186 If, 
like Cai analyzes, local village leaders like Sheng-pao carry some traditional virtues of 
a patriarch, we cannot help but wonder, as a good local leader who cares so much 
about the his village community, what would Sheng-pao do when his community is 
threatened by the overt extraction of the state during the Great Leap Forward? At 
times when interest of the co-opeartive conflict with the state’s interest, will Shengbao 
stand by the collective or by the state?  
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“Departmentalism”: Collective versus State 
If, at the time of Zhao Shuli’s writing of Sanliwan Village and Liu Qing’s 
writing of The Builders, the “modernization” of “socialist state” was still compatible 
with the well-being of the village community which was trying to modernizing itself, 
then, in late 1950s and early 1960s, the state, facing the shortage of capital and driven 
by the need of accumulation, began to show its exploiting side. The “communization 
movement” (9įS)  and “Great Leap Forward” in 1957 were part of the socialist 
state’s attempt to accelerate the accumulation by extracting resources and production 
means from the local co-operative.  
The campaign of Great Leap Forward was launched in the end of 1957 launched 
“industrialization of the countryside.” Industries were lowered down to the 
countryside, and peasants engaged in industrial production; they were expected to 
utilize local material sources to develop local small industries which would produce 
small consumer goods for peasantry, such as fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural 
implements, sugar, paper, and textiles. 187  Besides industry, peasants were also 
recruited for the construction of infrastructural works such as roads, bridges and water 
conservation works, which required intensive cost of human power. The objective 
reason for the “lowering” of industry, according to Wen Tiejun, was the drastic 
decrease of Soviet Union’s aid of capital investment in 1957, which caused the 
immediate shortage of capital at the state level. The Central Government, now lacking 
funds to develop industry, had to rely on the fiscal power of local governments and the 
                                                
187 “Guanyu renmin gongshe ruogan wenti de jueyi,” ;!û9įŝ¢ƧƷĤAŮ (Resolution of 
several questions about People’s commune), in Jianguo Yilai Nongye Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian, 519. 
  105 
mobilization of local human power to develop industry in the countryside.188 The 
accumulation of capital for developing local industry now was transferred to local 
collectives, and was obtained primarily through expropriating private-owned land and 
implements of peasant individuals and integrating properties of original collectives. 
Statistics shows that while the usual accmulation rate for public funds maintained at a 
stable rate between 7% and 10%,189 the accumulation rate leapt to 15-20% of the total 
income and 25-30% of the net income in 1958.190 Accordingly, the products saved for 
peasantry’s self-consumption was drastically reduced. As a result, widespread 
resistance of the unified sale by peasantry occurred, mostly in the form of keeping to 
themselves the agricultural products which were supposed to be handed to the State 
and secretly dividing the products between themselves, hence causing the serious 
shortage of grains, oil, pork, and vegetables in 1959.191 Despite the harvest of 1958, 
1959 witnessed the shortage of supply of agricultural products nationwide. 
With the intensifying extraction of the resources, there also appeared the 
tendency to merge local co-operative with the state, and the scale of the co-operative 
kept expanding. In the first stage (1951-1954), mutual-aid team was usually composed 
by about seven or eight households and “elementary co-operative” consisted of about 
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twenty households.192 In the sweeping wave of establishing “advanced co-ops” in 
1956, “advanced co-operative” expanded to two hundred to three hundred 
households;193 meanwhile there also appeared some “extra-large co-operatives” whose 
number of households reached a thousand.194 In Anhui Province, the extra-large co-
operatives even possessed up to 3500 households. 195  This “communization 
movement” culminated in 1958 in the highest form of People’s Commune. A 
“People’s Commune” consisted of about 2000 to 3000 households, and reached up to 
6000 to 7000 households in sparsely populated areas. 196  Its boundaries were 
coextensive with township (xiang, ), the level above natural village and below 
county. A commune is a comprehensive organization, combining sectors of industry, 
agriculture, commercial exchange, education and military in one unit.197 A typical 
commune consisted of mess hall, public kindergarten, nursing home, barber, 
bathhouse, and middle school, and took care of its commune members’ livelihood, 
                                                
192 Wu, Pinghan, Song Ziqin, Kong Jinliang. “Changzhi diwei shiban chuji hezuoshe de youlai, 
gouxiang he jieguo.” ƦþzŶPKń@įĤğäæÀpŉç (“Experience of experiment on 
key agricultural co-operatives in North China”), in Jianguo Yilai Nongye Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian, 93. 
193 “Shengwei nongcun gongzuobu guanyu daxingshe jingying guanli zuotanhui de qingkuang baogao” 
Ĩ@ã0Ɲ;|įňŢľĜ«Ż)Ĥ¿BÇn (Report about the management of exatra-
large co-operatives by rural work department of Fujian provincial party committee), in Jianguo Yilai 
Nongye Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian, 360. 
194 Ibid, 360 
195 “Zhongyang nongcun gongzuobu guanyu tuishe he dashe wenti de jianbao” @ã0Ɲ;Ɠ
įpįƧƷĤļÇ (Brief report about big co-operatives and quitting co-operatives by Department 
of Rural Work in central committee), in Jianguo Yilai Nongye Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian, 409 
196 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zai nongcun jianli renmin gongshe wenti de jueyi” :;
y@ã­ķ!û9įƧƷĤAŮ (Central party committee’s resolution on establishing People’s 
Commune in rural region), in Jianguo Yilai Nongye Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian, 70. 
197 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu remin gongshe de gouxiang,” ;!û9įĤæÀ (Conceptions about 
People’s Commune), in Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, vol. 7,­u$äúĀÌĵ (Mao 
Zedong’s Manuscripts after Founding of People’s Rebpulic of China) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian 
Chubanshe, 1992), 317. 
  107 
education, welfare, medication, and security. 198  Despite its similar form to Paris 
Commune, the People’s Commune was in fact a state organ, through which the state 
could directly extract agricultural surplus. The administration of the township 
government (state officials) became the leaders of the People’s Commune, and 
possessing the adminitrative power over the production activities of agricultural 
communes at lower level. Philip Kuhn points out, as “the chief of the collectives 
became the state’s tax agents in the countryside,” People’s Commune forged “an 
unmediated link to the rural producers”199 and was “a reliable instrument of state 
control below the level of the county.”200 To this extent, Great Leap Forward was 
indeed the extension of state power into the countryside to exert a total control over 
the rural population. 
Zhao soon discovered the statist color of People’s Commune and detected its 
potential threat to the village community. From 1959 to 1962, he wrote several articles 
and letters to express his concern over People’s Commune. He said, the problem of 
People’s Commune, as a state’s organ, is that it was too big, and hence too “abstract” 
and “distant” from the actual agricultural production in the village. State cadres who 
were not part of the local community had no idea of the concrete conditions of 
production of a naturally village, and hence were not able to give accurate instructions 
on production or make plans. He said, “Commune cadres are mostly former cadres of 
township government. Cadres of this level used to represent the state and did not often 
participate in actual production. Hence their so-called ‘leading the production’ merely 
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consists of collecting statistics and reporting statistics, while the real practitioners are 
cadres of production teams. Now that these township cadres participate in the 
management of commune production, they tend to use the old method - convene 
meetings, report numbers, issue directives, approve plans, ask for statistics, and make 
handbooks - and they tend to think that the subordinates will aways carry out their 
directives, without realizing that the directives are a far cry from the reality.”201 He 
emphasized, the conditions of agricultural production in each natural village, such as 
its earth, water source, fertilizer source, traffic, location, terrain, etc, were concrete, 
material, and “historically given,” which could not be changed at will by commune 
leaders. Only peasants who are familiar with these historically given natural 
conditions can plan how to arrange labor in a reasonable way. Therefore, he suggets, 
production team at the level of village should be given more freedom and autonomy in 
production, and People’s Commune should not blindly intervene in the production 
activities at the local level. 202   
Zhao also points out another crucial characteristic that distinguishes collective 
economy from state ownership, which is that “collective ownership holds the highest 
responsibility for the production and livelihood of people within the collective.”203 
Since members of the agricultural cooperative live on the acutal yields of the co-
operative, they have a keen concern about how the collecitve could be better 
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managed.204 However, the Commune administration at the township level do not live 
on the collective’s actual produce but on state’s wages, and thus they concern less 
about the interest of the local co-operative than the fulfillment of state’s task.205 In 
order for People’s Commune to better manage produciton, Zhao proposed that 
Commune should absorb able village cadres at local level into the administration 
leadership of the Commune, while sending township government officials down to 
village to participate in direct production.206 
Zhao emphasized, the sense of “control over the products” was crucial for 
peasant’s enthusiasm for production. He said: “Without the material guarantee, moral 
injunction alone won’t work. … If things are there and he can see it, then he is willing 
to endure a little bit starvation. Otherwise he is not willing to labor hard.”207 Therefore, 
Zhao proposes, at least part of the products should be kept witin the community, 
instead of handing them entirely to the state. “In places where cadres resist the wind 
(of overextraction), and where people see the real effects of the co-operative, people 
still care for the collective. For example, a village established a tree farm, set up a 
school, bought a pump, and bought several mules and carts. When people see these 
things, they would care about the collective. Sometimes when the cart was out for five 
days, people would begin to concern and ask about where it has gone.”208 In Zhao’s 
understanding, it is not that peasants were “selfish” and care only about their private 
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business or personal interest; rather, peasants have a tendency to care for the “public 
interest,” when the public interest is related to his interest, for example, the collective 
interest of the local co-operative; but if the “public” is too far away and too abstract, 
such as that of the state, then they would cease to concern. Hence, Zhao suggests, state 
should refrain from extracting too much from the local co-operative and give more 
power to the co-operative. 
At that time, there was a prevalent phenomenon in 1960s, called 
“departmentalism” (benwei zhuyi, Þ,). This term refers to the act of placing 
the interest of a small group before the interest of the whole; it means putting the local 
before the universal, putting the part before the whole. In 1960s, this word was often 
used to criticize cadres who were overtly protective of their local community that it 
conflicted with universal interest of the state. These were often leaders of local 
production team at village level, who did not live on the wage of the state, but lived on 
the yields of local production team. In late 1950s and early 1960s, due to the shortage 
of food, some local cadres in the village started to resist the state’s overextraction of 
grains, by lying about the actual yields and secretly keeping part of the grains within 
the community.209 In doing so, such cadres were often labelled as “departmentalism” 
by the Party; they are criticized as “narrow-minded” and “short-sighted” because they 
ignore the universal interest and focus only on the local interest of the small group of 
the production team or co-operative.  
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Zhao Shuli had a sympathetic attitude towards the “provicial” behavior of local 
village cadres who resisted state orders and kept the grains within the community. He 
said: “It is natural for good cadres to ‘resist the wind.’ If the cadre is working hard and 
sincerely to build socialism, he always resists the wind; whether it is ‘soft resistance’ 
or ‘hard resistance,’ he would resist as much as he can. Whereas, some other cadres 
who want to show off will ‘launch the satellite’ [note: to report to the state a bigger 
number than actual yields].”210 To Zhao Shuli, defying administrative orders from 
above is a natural thing for a good rural leader, “these cadres have not dissociated 
from the people,” because they wanted to protect the community from being over-
extracted by the state.211 On the other hand, cadres who unconditionally conformed to 
the orders of their superiors and who reported exaggerated numbers of crop yields to 
the State in disregard of the actual conditions of agriculture were precisely 
irresponsible cadres who did not truly care for the co-operative and the masses; they 
only concerened about fulfilling the State’s tasks for the sake of promotion by 
superiors. 
Interestingly, Zhao Shuli’s imagination for an autonomous “commune” that was 
“delinked” from the state power, was manifested in his unfinished novel Lingquan 
Cave (Lingquandong, đÿā) (1958), written during the Great Leap Foward. The 
story takes place during the Second Sino-Japanese War, but the extreme material 
destitution caused by the the Japanese army’s looting and Nationalist army’s levies of 
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grains easily remind us of the situation of 1960s, when the state’s over-extraction of 
surplus product deprived the countryside of the food resources.  
In the novel, Lingquan Village suffered from the various expropriation by 
“village administration, county government, army, and the looting Japanese army,” all 
of which were violence of modern state power. To escape the harsh extraction and 
exploitation, some villagers left the village and hid into the Lingquan Cave, and by 
coincidence found an underground tunnel, through which they entered the deep 
mountains. In the mountains, they managed to survive by collecting wild plants, 
hunting pheasants, and catching fish, living on the diverse plants and animals as their 
food resources. The cave was so big and deep that the Nationalist army could not find 
the underground tunnel. Hence, in an almost utopian color, Zhao depicts for us a world 
that is “delinked” and isolated from the warfare and brutal expropriation of state and 
army, a space in which the ravaged village community could be rebuilt. At the end of 
the novel, after figuring out a way of self-sustenance by growing their own potatoes, 
they returned to the village to fetch the rest of people to live with them in the 
mountains. In the final scene, when the villagers carried away the grains hoarded in 
the cellar of the runaway landlord, pooled together guns and grenades they collected 
on the battlefield, and militarized themselves, what we see was a “commune” in the 
forming, with arms, food, and people. As the local leader Golden Tiger spoke to the 
villagers: 
 
“With people and weapon, our grains are sure not to be lost! Liu Chengye said 
I was Communist, unfortunately I am not, but I think we could ‘communize’ 
for a few days. Tonight we can first empty the cellar and move the grains to 
our new caves; tomorrow we will discuss with everyone in the village about 
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setting up a ‘big kitchen’, whoever is willing to join our ‘big kitchen’ is 
welcome to live with us in the cave. We can organize people who are willing 
to come and divide labor: some people take care of the crops we plant, some 
collect firewood, some stand guard, etc. We can build a wall on the side of the 
Old Sheep Pit, so that if any thing happens, the weak and the old can retreat 
and move there; the militia will guard the cave and there would be no problem. 
If mass army ever come, we can retreat into the Yanwangnao Cave altogether, 
which is a safer place!”  
Someone asked: “What if tomorrow the army comes and attacks the new 
cave?” 
“As long as we have guns and grenades, with only two persons guarding 
the inner cave, even a thousand people cannot take the cave!”212 
 
It is interesting that the “big kitchen” that Golden Tiger proposed is a distinct 
feature of “People’s Commune” in late 1950s. On the other hand, to open up the 
frontier in the wilderness, to battle with the wild force of nature and obtain food 
source, to build up a fence and guard the property (the grains) with weapons, are 
typical acts of “enclosure,” the initial steps of setting up a “regime” (with army and 
property). In fact, this was what Communist Party had done through 1920s to 1940s – 
scattering in the wild mountains, setting up military bases, and combatting with the 
organized modern state power of Nationalist army and Japanese army; one of the most 
famous examples was Mao Zedong’s founding of Jinggang Mountain Base in 1927. 
Interestingly, the local leader Golden Tiger, was not a Communist, albeit he proposed 
a “communist” way of life among people – sharing together food and weapons, 
adopting division of labor in an egalitarian way – which are typical of a “commune.” 
Zhao Shuli’s intentional avoidance of the identity marker of “Communist” for Golden 
Tiger shows his intention to keep away from the association with the “state power,” 
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because “Communist Party,” due to its intimate connection with the state regime 
during 1960s, have ended up being a synonym of the “state” for Zhao Shuli.  
After they moved into the cave, the new type of “commune” was formed:  
 
A big kitchen was set up in the new cave, organizing everyone in the village 
together. People elected Jinhu and Zhu Laibao to be the chief and deputy chief 
of the cave, and at the same time the chief and deputy chief of the militia. 
Some villagers moved into the cave, while others ate in the cave but lived in 
their homes in the village. Whether they were living in the cave or living at 
home, they all took up certain jobs. Who take care of crops, who collect 
firewood, who pluck wild vegetables, who grow vegetables, who cook, who 
ground the grains and mills powder … all kinds of labor division, every thing 
was taken care of by someone. Zhang Zhaorui also asked to join; and after 
discussion, the people agreed to accept him, on the condition that he cannot 
live in the cave and can only eat in the cave. Since he didn’t know how to 
work, people let him learn chopping woods and making fire. His wife, 
daughter, and daughter-in-law, also joined the sewing team. 
    
Here, the form of organization that Zhao Shuli describes here is exactly the 
“People’s Commune,” with the distinct features of big kitchen, public sewing group, 
and militia. Only it is not an organ of the state that extracts resources from peasants, 
but an autonomous, self-sufficient economic organization run by peasants and capable 
of producing its own food, guarding its fruits, and defending itself against external 
political forces.  
Zhao’s re-creation of the “people’s commune” as an autonomous, self-sufficient 
economic and political body suggests such a possibility of “delinking” and “exodus” 
of labor power: in case the organized state power becomes too oppressive, there is 
always a way for the people to escape and delink from the state regime and reorganize 
themselves into new political forms to start their life anew. After all, the labor power 
of people is the source of creating value. Once armed and organized into a 
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“commune,” people can always sustain themselves by engaging in productive 
activities, and even have the power to combat the looting army and even the state.   
What was Liu Qing’s reaction to the Great Leap Forward and the over extraction 
of the state, then? In 1958, roughly about the same time as Zhao Shuli’s writing of 
Lingquan Cave, Liu Qing wrote a novella called Stubborn through Iron (Hen tou tie, 
ėƔƢ ), describing how a retired, former chief of production team, nicknamed 
“Stubborn through Iron”, struggled with the corrupted production team leader, Wang 
Yixin, who tried to hide part of grains from the advanced cooperative. The old team 
leader “Stubborn” who exposed Wang’s corruption, was highly loyal to Party, always 
insisting on turning in all grains to the advanced cooperative (the state’s organ), and he 
always stood by the decision of the cooperative even if it contradicted the local 
interest of his village. For this reason, he was isolated and misunderstood by his fellow 
villagers. However, like Sheng-pao, he is portrayed as a modern subject who sticks to 
his faith and is determined to overcome all sorts of difficulties, enduring 
misunderstandings and isolation from his fellow villagers. His struggle with Wang 
was not driven by his love for members of the community (to the contrary, it put him 
in the opposite position to most members of the village), but was driven by his faith to 
the Party. “The old inspector was really faithful to the public and the big cooperative, 
even an old Catholic’s faith to God cannot match his faith.”213 “All his activities were 
directed towards the spiritual goal of enhancing the consciousness of the masses and 
overcoming their backward consciousness.”214 However, as far as his disregard for the 
                                                
213 Liu Qing, “Hen tou tie,” ėƔƢ (Stubborn through Iron), in Liu Qing Wenji, vol. 4, 198. 
214 Ibid. 
  116 
collective is concerned, Stubborn is very close to the kind of “statist” cadres that Zhao 
criticized, who chose to conform to the state’s order and disregard the actual needs of 
the local community.215 
On the other hand, the chief of production team, Wang Yixin, seemed to have 
the characteristics of a “departmentalist” leader who tried to protect local interest of 
the production team, as he often spoke for the village and argued against his superiors 
at the advanced cooperative, and he even tried to hide part of the grains from the 
advanced cooperative by reporting false numbers, as many village leaders would do. 
However, Liu shows, the reason for the team leader Wang Yixin’s false report of 
yields and hiding the grains was “corruption.” He hid the grains not for the collective 
interest of the production team, but for his selfish appropriation of the collective fruit 
as his own. When spotted by other peasants, Wang Yixin lied to them that he was 
doing so for the sake of the village, to keep the good grains within the village, and to 
hand the bad grains to the state. His corrupted behavior thus took on the deceptive 
look of “protecting local interest and defying the state’s order,” and was supported by 
most peasants. Therefore, “Wang Yixin took advantage of the backward 
consciousness of the masses, making use of peasants’ selfish thoughts, 
departmentalism, and their indifference to the overall interest.”216 In the end, not only 
Wang Yixin’s corruption was exposed, but his hidden class identity was revealed – he 
turned out to be a rich peasant who had managed to disguise himself as an upper-
middle peasant during land reform. In other words, he was actually a class enemy 
hidden among the masses. As such, Liu re-wrote the “departmentalism” (protecting 
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the interest of local community) as “corruption,” and even a deliberate act of sabotage 
by class enemy. As the time of the story was set in 1957 when Anti-Rightist 
Movement was underway, Liu seems to be writing about an anti-corruption story. 
As a matter of fact, “eradicating corruption” was indeed a major movement in 
late 1950s and early 1960s, to cope with the difficulty of extracting surplus products 
from the peasants. At that time, mass assemblies such as “Five-Levelled Assembly” 
(wuji dahui, ń)) (involving five levels of cadres: production group, production 
team, commune, county, province) and “Ten Thousand People Assembly” (wanren 
dahui, !)) were often held around 1959 and 1960. One thing that was often 
done at such mass assembly was “account verification” (suan zhang, Ľƀ). This 
“account verification” was done through the crosschecking of accounts between the 
three levels – people’s commune, production teams, and produciton groups - and the 
discordance of numbers will expose the “corruption” of cadres who tried to hide the 
products from the state. The account verification in Macheng County assembly 
revealed that corrupting behaviors were prevalent among cadres at the level of 
production team (village). 217  The “crosschecking of accounts” thus served as a 
powerful tool to eradicate the “corrupted cadres” (“middlemen”) between the state and 
the peasants, and to enhance the state’s ability of extraction. 
We can see, there were two possible explanations for local cadre’s 
“deparmentalist” behavior of hiding products from the state. One was corruption, that 
is, local cadres appropriated these hidden grains as his own; the other was to protect 
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the collective interest of the local community from the exploitation of the state. While 
Zhao Shuli had a more sympathetic attitude towards “departmentalism” and adopted 
the second explanation, Liu Qing launched a harsh criticism of “departmentalism” and 
adopted the first explanation.  
 
Conclusion 
The relationship between collective interest and state interests has been a 
complicated question throughout the period of collectivization. While agricultural 
cooperative was used as a means to extract surplus product for the primitive 
accumulation of the state’s industrialization, the cooperative at the village level was at 
the same time a semi-autonomous economic organization, which, due to its ability of 
production for self-sustenance and expanded production, was relatively independent 
from the state and even formed a resisting power against the state. During the Great 
Leap Forward, when the state’s extraction exceeded the ability of the local co-
operatives, there appeared the “departmentalism” among local leaders at the village 
level, who tried to keep products within the community and resisted the state’s 
extraction.  
Zhao Shuli and Liu Qing capture the complex relationship between the 
collective and the state from different angles. While Zhao Shuli pictures “agricultural 
cooperative” as something naturally grown from within the rural society and relatively 
free of state’s influence, and seamlessly fuses the modern economic organization of 
“agricultural co-operative” with the ethical and cultural world of peasants, Liu Qing, 
in a praising tone of “modernization,” places the co-operative in a linear progression 
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towards “modernization” and situates it within the bigger picture of the state’s 
industrialization. Zhao’s Sanliwan Village, in a style that was essentially different 
from modern novels, shows a whole new understanding of “individual,” “marriage,” 
“romantic love,” “family,” which are fundamentally mediated and defined by the 
village community and change with the situation. Liu Qing’s The Builders, on the 
other hand, is a typical bildungsroman that feature how a peasant grows to be a 
modern subject of the Party. As the state’s extraction of products was intensified, Zhao 
and Liu’s different understanding of the commune became more manifest in their 
different reactions to the question of “departmentalism.” In Lingquan Cave, by writing 
about a how a ravaged village armed itself and hid into the deep mountains during 
Sino-Japanese War, Zhao imaginarily presented the potential scenario that peasants 
can organize into an independent and self-sufficient “commune” and “delink” from the 
state violence in extreme conditions. While Liu, on the other hand, chose to stand by 
the state and criticize the “departmentalism” of local village leaders, re-writing it as 
“corruption.”  
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CHPATER 2  
THE INDISPENSABLE AND IMPOSSIBLE FAMILY IN POST-FORDIST CHINA 
	
Dissolution of the “Common”  
The 1980s witnessed a process of “de-collectivization.” With the disintegration 
of the “People’s Commune”, the “household contract responsibility system” (jiating 
lianchan chengbao zerenzhi, ¬ŗÆRž'N) was established.  
According to the system, the land remains collective property of the entire 
village, but the production activity is “decentralized” and “individualized” to each 
family. Each peasant family is allotted a plot of land and is supposed to turn in the 
predetermined quota of agricultural product to the village administration, and keeps 
the rest of the products for self-consumption. The village community has the power to 
distribute the land according to the number of people within each family, take back the 
land when a person deceases or moves out of the village, and assign new land to new 
member of the village community, so that every member of the village is guaranteed 
equal share of land, with which he could sustain his life. The land, nominally a 
collectively-owned property, is strictly forbidden from sale by individuals on the 
market and can only be used, either by growing food on it, or leasing it out for cash.  
At its appearance this land ownership appears to resemble the “primitive 
communism” that Rosa Luxemburg describes in her historical study of the German 
mark community, and its variants in Peru (Inca Empire), Spain, India, Russia, and 
South Africa. The basic characteristics of primitive communism are: the community 
divides land among members of the community in an egalitarian way; each family 
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obtains a plot of land according to its size and needs; each person not only has to live 
in the mark, but also has to cultivate his farm himself; whoever neglects to cultivate 
his portion of land over a number of years will lose it for good and the mark could 
hand it over to someone else to cultivate; repartitioning of the land is carried out each 
year, hence preventing it from forming into inheritable private property; forests, 
meadows, bodies of water and unused portions remained the collective property of the 
mark; the right to the land is exclusive to members of the community and cannot be 
transferred to outsiders; farm work is done communally and is mandated for the 
community by strict regulation.218  
However, there is critical difference between the two. In “primitive 
communism” as described by Luxemburg,  the collective had the substantial power of 
organizing production, for example, “the work of the members of the mark community, 
including farm work, remained totally communal and was mandated for the 
community by strict regulation.” 219  However, under the household contract 
responsibility system, the “collective” lost the substantial power of organizing 
production and commanding its members, reduced to a shell and the collective 
property became purely formal. With the allotment of land to each household, the farm 
work was divided and “individualized” to each single household, as well as products 
from the land. As a result, the collective found it more and more difficult to extract 
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products directly from the peasants for collective purpose.220 While peasants still had 
to finish the state’s assigned tasks, they now began to refuse turning in a portion of 
their surplus products to the collective to be used for “productive funds” and “welfare 
funds”. Though the land was still nominally collectively owned, the collective already 
lost the real command over the means of production, and accordingly, the power of 
commanding its members. Hence, the “household contract responsibility system” was 
to a large extent a “personal responsibility system”221 , creating the effect which 
amounted to the “individualization” and “de-collectivization”, and hollowing out the 
economic base of the agricultural collective. Even the collective assets, such as 
machines, tractors, animals, implements, houses, were also divided and privatized. In a 
sense we may say, 1980s witnessed the process of “dissolution of the common.”  
With the dissolution of the collective economy, the collective welfare also 
disintegrated. First, the weak, the sick, and the aged were left unattended with the loss 
of the collective’s redistributive function, as	 capable people now refused to spend their 
money on taking care of the weak and the old. 222 Instead, driven by the creed of 
“every man for himself”, people now started to compete over the land, implements, 
animals, and water resources.223 Secondly, the public causes previously supported by 
the collective funds of the cooperative, such as schools, medication, and public 
                                                
220 “Bufen baokan zaiwen dui baochandaohu tichu zhiyi” ƝFÇGƋÌRMÄÉEƁĢ (Some 
newspaper articles raised questions about to land allotment to household), in Jianguo Yilai Nongye 
Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian, 973 
221 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 168. 
222 “Guanyu wending wanshan nongye shengchan zerenzhi de qingkuang,” ;Ĵq@ĝž
'NĤ¿B (About steadying and improving household contract responsibility system), in Jianguo 
Yilai Nongye Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian, 1027. 
223 “Shanxi shengwei dui weinan diwei guanyu jiuzheng gebie defang huafen kouliangtian wenti de 
baogao de pifu” ƪũĨċXz;ł÷LzÐHF“bŀĞ”ƧƷĤÇnĤÅ (Shanxi 
provincial party committee’s reply on Weinan District party committee’s resport on rectifying the 
problems of allotment of in some places), in Jianguo Yilai Nongye Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian, 940. 
  123 
infrastructure, also terminated due to the shortage of collective funds and collective 
labor (especially as the cooperative now lost the power to command individual 
members). For example, in Hunan Province, unable to get their wages from the 
collective funds, cadres and teachers asked for their monthly rations door to door.224 In  
Guangdong Province, while each village used to have their elementary schools, hiring 
teachers on the collective funds, now, with the depletion of the collective, the school 
teachers couldn’t get paid.225 As more and more peasants refused to share the cost of 
the collective cause of education, the cost of public education was undertaken by the 
few peasants who have children go to school, which caused the price to rise greatly, 
resulting in mass drop-out of school. In some places, up to 50% of schools were out of 
service due to the lack of funding or insufficient enrollment.226 On the other hand, 
road, bridges, dam, and irrigation works, which used to be built and maintained by the 
collective, now either lacked maintenance and dilapidated.227  
As a result, the “household contract responsibility system,” written down in law 
and endorsed by the state, lead to the emergence a huge class of small peasants. And 
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such a rural area dominated by small holdership, became the “outside” of the capital 
for the sake of the later’s realization.  
When I say the rural area is “outside” the capitalist sector, for one thing, I mean 
cash/capital is extremely lacking in rural areas. Wen Tiejun, a renown agricultural 
economist who had 11 years of working and living in the countryside, was the first 
one to bring to people’s attention the issues of “peasantry, agriculture, and rural area” 
(@ƧƷ); he and his research team at Renming University have been paying 
attention to the complex relationship between “modernization” and Chinese peasantry. 
In his book Rural China’s Centenary Reflection, he points out that, because the highly 
fragmented nature of small holding economy is incompatible with capital (which is 
suited to socialized production), capital tends to withdraw from the small holdership. 
The small and fragmented cash scattered in the hands of millions of small holders 
cannot form into “capital” under the conditions of subsistence agriculture. And due to 
agriculture’s irregular nature, the capital invested in agriculture requires longer 
turnover, and bears higher risks, posing greater difficulty for the banks to supervise 
each money they loan. For example, he points out, in China, after economic reform in 
1980s, commercial banks prefer to do business with the entrepreneurs with large 
capital and avoid dealing with small holders, because a single transaction with the 
former can generate a great amount of surplus value, while transaction with individual 
small holders is time-consuming, difficult to manage the risk, and hardly generate any 
profits due to the seasonal small loans. 228 Karl Kautsky made a similar observation of 
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the incompatibility of modern financial system with small farmers in 19th Germany, 
“the mortgage institutions which made their living by lending … did not want to get 
involved in all the trouble and expense associated with loans to small farms”, therefore, 
“under the mortgage system, it was the large unit which first seized the advantage of 
the cooperative system”, while  “loans were not extended to holdings below a 
specified net property tax yield … or a certain net value.”229  Hence, cash in the 
countryside is extremely lacking, causing usury started to prevail in many rural areas.  
A second aspect of being “outside” the capitalist sector is the “non-capitalist” 
nature of the partially “self-sustaining” subsistence agriculture, which does not rely 
much on cash for daily subsistence. For example, vegetables grown by the family in 
the courtyard are “free”; part of meat, and eggs, and milk that come from the pigs and 
cows fed by the family are also “free”; grains grown on their own land are also 
“free.”230 It is very common for a Chinese peasant household to combine crops with 
some poultry farming, to “grow some tea on the east slope, grow some corn on the 
west slope, grow some vegetables in front of the door, feed a pig in the courtyard, 
tether a cow in the backyard.”231  Hence, small holders have no problem feeding 
themselves. Some Chinese scholars, like He Xuefeng, terms this life as “low 
consumption, high welfare.”232 
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On the other hand, however, this low-cost “welfare” in the countryside does not 
include medication and education. Local government which lived on the limited taxes 
and fees paid by the peasants simply lacked the financial ability to undertake the 
public welfare construction in the countryside; it became all the more difficult when 
the agricultural taxes and fees were altogether cancelled in 2004. Wen Tiejun also 
points out, with the agricultural sector providing only 17% of the gross domestic 
income, it is impossible for the government to use this 17% of income to take care of 
the social welfare of the 70% of national population (the rural population). 233 
Therefore, their social welfare can only come from the small plot of land they 
possess.234 This was fundamentally determined by the extreme low productivity of 
subsistence agriculture dominated by the mode of small holdership.  
As such, with the retreat of capital from the countryside, the public welfare 
infrastructure is under-maintained in the countryside. High-quality education and 
medical resources have been increasingly informed by the logic of capital with the 
marketization and commercialization in the 1990s, and concentrate more and more in 
the “capitalist sector” and big cities, inaccessible to peasants. Lacking cash and unable 
to afford the expensive medical treatment in hospitals, peasants who have grave 
disease cannot afford to be treated in good hospitals. Good education resources, too, 
also tend to concentrate in the cities along with capital.  
Lacking cash and good education resources, most children could not do very 
well in schoolwork and drop out of school at an early age; they most likely end up 
being a peasant like their fathers when they reach adulthood, and drift into the city 
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looking for employment as migrant worker. Hence, the countryside becomes the 
production site for cheap migrant labor force. Instead of being produced in the 
capitalist sector where the cost is high, the labor power is produced at a very low cost 
in the “non-capitalist” sector of subsistence agriculture, “outside” the capitalist sector. 
Capital in the city thus obtains the labor power basically “for free.” 
If, however, a peasant family wants to change their children’s fate of being a 
peasant or a menial migrant worker, and to support a child to go through college, the 
cash expenses will be huge for them, because the “self-sustaining” mode of agriculture 
determines that rural sector won’t produce money. Hence, a child may be able to go to 
primary school in his/her own village or nearby village, for junior middle school he 
would have to go to the town, for junior high school he would have to go to the city, 
and for university, he would have to go to the capital city of a province or metropolis 
such as Beijing or Shanghai. For each level up the education ladder, he would have to 
spend more money to support his education fees and living expenses, as he approaches 
towards the center of capital.  
Hence, because of the gap between the “capitalist” medical and educational 
resources and the “non-capitalist” small holdership, small holders, driven by the need 
to earn more cash, migrate into the city to look for supplemental employment. As such, 
small peasants turn into migrants. Hence, our discussion of the agrarian commune now 
enters the phase of its “deterritorialization.” Now the tension-ridden relationship 
between “commune” and “capital” shows itself on the laboring body of rural migrants.  
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Small-Holder-Migrant and “Double Labor Market” 
“Small peasant” (with the possession of a small holding) and “migrant” seem to 
be a pair of contradicting concepts. However, they are perfectly combined in the post-
Fordist conditions of China.  
Indeed, according to some Marxist theorists, small peasant has the inherent 
tendency of becoming a migrant. Even in the traditional small holding economy, 
agricultural production is often supplemented with non-agricultural occupations, such 
as crafts and trades. Due to the seasonal character of agriculture, Chayanov shows, 
“the labor intensity curve in agriculture always shows extremely uneven development. 
Sowing, mowing, harvesting, and some work on specialized crops sometimes demand 
the exceptional accumulation of a mass of labor in insignificant time periods, while in 
other, sometimes very lengthy, periods of the farm year agriculture finds no objects on 
which to use its labor.”235 Hence, labor is far from being fully utilized in agriculture. 
For example, in Russia, peasants spend only 25-40 percent of their labor on agriculture, 
and “peasant labor is far from fully used and gives a use rate not exceeding 50 
percent.”236 Hence, small holders often throw part of their labor into nonagricultural 
livelihoods for supplementary income, such as crafts and trades, which “give a 
considerably higher payment per labor unit.”237 With the supplemental income from 
crafts and trades, “one may obtain earnings with less drudgery.” 238 
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When small holders are circumscribed by capitalist conditions, the pressure for 
money would turn small holders from “sellers of foodstuffs” into “sellers of labor-
power, and buyers of foodstuffs.” 239  As Kautsky observed in late 19th century 
Germany, under the conditions of capitalism, small farms ended up the “production 
sites” of labor power for large farms. The most ideal form of wage-laborers in 
Germany, Kautsky points out, was the “independent” small farmers, who had their 
own households “on their own or rented land, devoting only part of their time to wage-
labor, and the rest to working their own land.” “As cottagers their bit of cultivation 
does not take up all their time – and they hire themselves out as day-laborers on large 
farms. Or, either as cottagers or peasants, they provide a surplus of workers via their 
children, for whom there is no room on the family farm, and who can therefore be 
taken on as house-servants or day-laborers by large farms.” Other forms of 
employment included “Deputanten”, who “received a fixed annual wage, together 
with some payment in kind, a plot of land and accommodation on the large farm,” and 
“Instleute,” who “live on the main farm, but in their own accommodation,” receiving 
as remuneration “part of payment in land which they have to cultivate, part in kind, 
and part in wages.”240 
Because large farms always rely on small farms to provide labor hands; 
excessive elimination of the small farms would result in shortage of labor power and 
thus steadily reduce the profitability of the large farms. “Clearing peasants off the land 
may release additional land for the large farm, but at the same time it reduces the 
number of people available to cultivate it. This in itself is sufficient to ensure that, 
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despite its technical superiority, the large farm can never completely prevail within 
any given country. The large landowner may drive out all the free peasants form their 
land, but a portion of them will always celebrate their resurrection as small tenant 
farmers.” Hence, Kautsky observed a peculiar phenomenon in the late nineteenth 
century’s Germany that when large farms increased, small farms increased at an even 
quicker pace. “The penetration of capital can lead not to a decrease, but in fact to a 
marked increase in the overall number of small enterprises.”241 “Far from making a 
rapid exit from the rural scene, small farms continue to exist.”242  
Similar form of wage-worker was also found in Russia, known as the 
“allotment-holding wage-workers.” Lenin found that to guarantee themselves a supply 
of workers, the private landowners would “distribute land to the peasants on the 
otrabotki basis, or for a part of the crop together with otrabotki.”243 The workers 
would work this patch of land for his own subsistence, in exchange of which he is 
obligated to work the land of the private landowners for free, generating some kind of 
“labor rent” for the private land owner. As such the corvée (otrabotki) system and the 
capitalist system “are interwoven in the most varied and fantastic fashion.” These 
Russian corvée agricultural workers, not unlike the German small farmers, are 
characterized by “insignificant scale of farming on a patch of land, with the farm in a 
state of utter ruin, inability to exist without selling labor-power, an extremely low 
standard of living.” Because the allotment of land served as “wages in kind” for the 
worker, it significantly reduced his wage, so that “the prices paid for labor are usually 
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less than half those under capitalist hire.” The allotment of land to the rural worker 
“serve as a means of ‘guaranteeing’ the landowner a supply of cheap labor,” and 
therefore “is very often done in the interests of the rural employer themselves.”244 
Lenin and Kautsky’s study show that small farmers already contain the innate 
tendency of being a “migrant” in their routinely shift between their own farm and the 
nearby capitalist farms, between the role of a producer and a seller of labor power. 
Such a potential tendency to migrate to elsewhere for supplementary employment has 
become “institutionalized” and “normalized” in China through the urban-rural divide 
and the household registration system, locking the peasants in a “permanently 
migrant” status. 
Such rural-urban divide in China resembles what Claude Meillassoux calls the 
“double labor market” and “rotating migration.” Claude Meillassoux’s study of 
colonial capitalism shows, it is in the interest of capitalism to create a “double labor 
market,” which divides the proletariat into “workers who are integrated (or stabilized) 
and who reproduce wholly within the capitalist sector” and “migrants who only partly 
reproduce themselves within it,”245 whereby the cost of production of labor power is 
externalized to the rural area, keeping the cost at minimum level.  
The value of labor power usually consists of three parts, Meillassoux says, the 
first is “sustenance of the workers during periods of employment (i.e. reconstitution of 
labor power),” the second is “maintenance during periods of unemployment (due to 
stoppages, ill-health, etc.),” and the third is “replacement by the breeding of 
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offspring.” The direct hourly wage under the contractual relationship “only pays for 
the labor power expended during the period of work” and “does not take account of 
unemployment and illness.” In other words, this “direct wage” does not cover 
laborer’s maintenance and reproduction. On the other hand, the fees that cover the 
“maintenance” and “replacement” of labor power are “indirect wage”, which keeps the 
laborer alive even when he/she is incapable of working (childhood, sick, retirement). 
The indirect wage “represents the share of the social product necessary to maintain 
and reproduce the labor-power at the level of the nation as a whole” and is 
“redistributed through a socialized institution”, which is often the state’s welfare 
system. “It is … due to the payment of an indirect wage or to fringe benefits, and not 
simply to the purchase of immediate labor-power through wages, that labor-power is 
paid at its cost and reproduced.”246 While citizen workers, who are fully integrated in 
the capitalist sector, are entitled to both “direct wage” and “indirect wage”, migrant 
workers only have “direct wage.”  
Together with this double labor market is the mechanism of “rotating migration”, 
by which migrating peasants in the city are periodically discharged back to the 
domestic sector. Meillassoux analyzes, when the peasant is engaged in both the self-
sustaining agriculture and the paid employment in the capitalist sector, he not only 
generates “surplus value”, but also generates “labor rent”, because he “divides his 
productive time between the self-sustaining activities necessary to support himself and 
his replacements, on the one hand, and the work carried out without return for a third 
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party on the other.”247 For a migrant who is brought up in the non-capitalist sector, it is 
the domestic community and his kin who provide “the subsistence goods and care … 
by breeding him as a producer of labor-power”, and taking care of him when he lost 
the laboring capability (ill or retired).248 As such, when he drifts into the city to work 
for capital, he contributes to capitalist not only the “surplus value” during his working 
time, but also “labor rent” (during the time when he is a child and after his retirement). 
For this reason, imperialism deliberately preserved the subsistence rural 
economy in the colonies rather than destroy it. In colonial Africa, the sector of 
subsistence agriculture existed alongside the capitalist industrial sector, and the 
colonial authority tried to keep the worker from settling down in the capitalist sector. 
British colonial authority stated that “native laborers should be encouraged to return to 
their homes after the completion of the ordinary period of service. The maintenance of 
the system under which the mines are able to obtain unskilled labour at a rate less than 
ordinarily paid in industry depends upon this, for otherwise the subsidiary means of 
subsistence would disappear and the labour would tend to become a permanent 
resident upon the Witwatersrand, with increased requirements.” In Uganda, “it is 
policy whenever practicable to leave the care of the destitute and the disabled in the 
hands of the tribal clan and family organization which have traditionally accepted this 
responsibility.”249  
On the other hand, Meillassoux shows, colonial authority sought actively to 
preserve the pre-modern community in rural areas and “block the growth of private 
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landed property and the formation of capitalist relations of production.” They adopted 
a land system that was to some extent similar to China’s “household contract 
responsibility system,” assigning to “each family … a plot of land to live on - one man 
one plot. These plots are subject to rigorous restrictions; they cannot be sold, which 
prevents their concentration in the hands of a local class of landowners, and it is 
forbidden to employ paid labour on them or to undertake cash cropping.”250 The point 
is “to preserve an area in which labour-power can reproduce itself, but strictly at 
subsistence level.” The “land reserves” hence “are really reserves of labor.”251  
In China, “double labor market” and “rotating migration” is created by the 
mutually excluded urban and rural residence registration system, turning the 
countryside into the “production sites of labor power.” Dorothy Solinger points out, 
under planned economy, the urban citizens were living under the “urban public goods 
regime”, entitled to the exclusive benefits of “administratively allocated, guaranteed 
jobs, underpriced and highly accessible transportation and water, cheap food and 
electricity available at stable cost,” as well as “law and order, full employment, low-
cost utilities, and price stability.”252 Whereas, rural dwellers were excluded from such 
benefits. Because peasant workers do not require urban welfare benefits, urban 
enterprises had always wanted to hire peasant laborers, despite the mandate from the 
state that the enterprise should give priority to local urban citizens. When the 
industrialization begun in 1952, “the heavy pressure the plan placed on enterprise 
managers to meet output quotas while keeping down costs led many of them to 
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circumvent their local labor bureaus by recruiting in the countryside for low-paid, 
temporary peasant workers.” In 1954 there were nearly two and a half million people 
hired in the cities, of whom as many as 70 percent were peasants. Up till 1956, there 
had always been “technically illicit, pejorative titled ‘black’ labor markets, mediated 
by ‘black labor bosses,’ offered the migrants an informal opportunity.”253 Then in 
1957, peasants were legally allowed to work temporarily in the city, on several 
conditions. “To engage temporary laborers from the rural areas, firms in the cities 
needed to acquire a letter of introduction from the rural labor departments, and also 
obtain approval from the county and township governments in that locality. The hiring 
was to be done in the main by contracting for the workers in groups with the rural 
cooperatives that employed them. In addition, urban educational, labor, or public 
securities had to issue a certificate approving the move.” This then was the birth of 
“labor contract system”, under which peasant workers “were paid at a lower rate than 
the regular workers, got fewer, if any benefits, and had to hand over a part of their 
wages to the rural cooperative (and later the commune) to which they belonged.”254 
Hence, migrant peasant workers developed from “contract workers” in earlier period, 
whose  price had been kept at a lower level than urban laborers. Starting from 1980s, 
there emerged in China a huge “floating population”, who had their permanent 
residence registered in the countryside, while working in the city as wage-earners. 
Numerous studies have also illustrated the bad working conditions, low wages, and the 
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precarious employment conditions of peasant workers.255 Their jobs were mostly low-
pay, temporary, unstable, short-term, and insecure, outside the social welfare system, 
concentrating in construction, manufacturing, nurse-maiding, marketing and services, 
cottage-style garment processing, and begging and scrap collecting. 256  Another 
investigation report shows that most jobs that peasant workers did in 1990s were 
vendors, craftsmen (shoemakers, tinsmith, locksmith), butchers, cleaners, janitors, 
maids, waitress, wage-workers at the foreign-invested textile factories, scrap 
collecting.257 Unlike the stable and guaranteed jobs under the socialist welfare state 
system, these jobs were largely “informal” economy, which were “insecure” and 
“flexible.”  
They not only live on wages significantly lower than normal workers, but also, 
by working in the city and living in the countryside, they generate a part of “labor 
rent” by providing for their own subsistence, as analyzed by Meillassoux.  Solinger 
shows, in 1983 when the Chinese state just began to permit peasants to look for 
employment in the city, peasant migrants were expected to carry their own rations of 
food into the city. As of 1989, over 50 percent of the migrants in the Shanghai suburbs 
were still getting grain from their friends and families at home.258  
The reason they are eager to work in the city even when they are given much 
lower wages than urban laborers is because the gap between a “capitalist” sector and 
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“non-capitalist” sector. As Meillassoux illustrates, “because its means of production 
are much more efficient, the capitalist industrial sector is able to offer a wage whose 
purchasing power is superior to the market value of goods produced in the domestic 
sector in the same length of time. To attract the rural laborers it is enough to offer a 
wage which partially reflects the difference in productivity between the two sectors. 
Provided the wage is less than the average price of labor-power in the capitalist market, 
then both labor-rent and surplus value will be realized.”259 Because the peasants come 
from “outside” the capital, from the “non-capitalist” sector of subsistence agriculture 
which is extremely lacking capital and cash, therefore, even if the wage is lower than 
that of urban citizens, it is still still high enough to include both labor rent and surplus 
value. In other words, it is an effect of the “border.” Therefore, peasants’ migration 
into the city have never stopped.  
The population of rural migrants that flow into the city went through a drastic 
increase after 1990s. According to the statistics of national rural population 
investigation, from 1996 to 2006, the outgoing rural migrants increased from 
34,000,000 to 132,120,000, increasing by nearly one hundred over the ten years.260  
The astonishing mass exodus of peasants was described in a letter to the Premier 
of the State Council, written in the year 2000 by a local township cadre, Li Changping, 
of Jianli County, Hubei Province: 
Since spring, all of our peasants have escaped. Day and night for the past 
twenty days, the ‘East Wind’ trucks, loaded with peasants, were heading 
towards cities all over the country. Our town has 40000 people, among them 
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18000 are laborers. Now there are 25000 out for employment, among them 
15000 are laborers. This year, the outflow of population has new 
characteristics compared to the past. The first characteristic is ‘blind flow.’ 
In the past, people flowed out with purpose; this year, most peasants went 
out merely to try their luck, and even have determined to ‘die in the city and 
never come back.’ The second characteristic is the sheer number of 
population and of laborers is huge. In the past, people who went out were 
mostly girls and some surplus labor; this year, men or women, young or old, 
all went out. The third characteristic is many fields have been deserted. In 
the past, people would transfer their land to others before they leave; this 
year, they simply abandoned it. The number of outflow population is still 
rising. The deserted fields and waters in this town is estimated to be 35000 
mou this year, which are up to 65% of the entire fields and waters in this 
town. … The wasteland this year is estimated to be more than 20000 mou.261  
 
And according to Li, the fundamental reason for this, was the striking gap of 
income between agricultural sector and the urban sector, which, was mainly caused by 
the taxes and fees charged to the peasants charged by local township and county 
government, who, after the devolution of power to local government, had to live on 
the fees and taxes it extracted from peasants for its cost of administrative operation. 
Li’s letter to Premier Wen Jiabao, causing a sensation at that time, brought to people’s 
attention the severe problem of heavy burden of peasants; taking his letter seriously, 
the central government cancelled the agricultural tax (at the state level) and the fees (at 
county level and township level) altogether in 2006. However, Li’s observation was 
not entirely correct, for burden was not the fundamental cause of peasants’ outflow; 
after the taxes and fees were cancelled in 2006, the outflow of peasants into the city 
continued to increase. The fundamental reason, in fact, was the uneven distribution of 
capital in the city and the countryside, which formed a border, driving the labor force 
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to flee from the rural sector where capital is extremely lacking and to the industrial 
center where capital abounds.    
Now, the question is: how does the state prevent the migrant peasants from 
settling down permanently in the city and forming “slums” as often seen in some 
developing countries? How does the state make sure the migrating peasants are willing 
to retain the other half of their identity as small producers and willing to return to the 
countryside? This is where the “household contract responsibility system” plays the 
important role. 
 
The Indispensable and Impossible Family  
The institutional design of “household contract responsibility system” functions 
to “fix” peasants to the land. As long as peasant retains his permanent residence 
registration in the countryside, as long as he remains a member of the village 
community, he has the right to possess a small plot of land, from which he obtains 
supplemental income. However, as soon as he changes his permanent residence 
registration into urban citizen and ceases to be a member of the village community, he 
would lose the possession of the small land, which is then taken back by village 
community and re-distributed to others. In other words, the right to a plot of land is 
reserved exclusively to members of the village community, that is, those who retain 
their residency in the countryside. The “household contract responsibility system”, 
thus, is part and parcel of the “bordering” apparatus that makes urban and rural 
citizenship mutually exclusive. On the other hand, the plot of land also fucntions as 
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safety valve that guarantees the stability of the countryside; it enables peasants at least 
to feed themselves even if they don’t have jobs.  
Moreover, this design helps reduce the cost of labor power of the migrant 
worker. The possession of the small plot of land, though does not generate much 
income in terms of cash, can nevertheless substantially contribute to the overall 
income of the family, because most things can be obtained “for free” in the partially 
self-sufficient subsistence agriculture. Hence, if they are not completely integrated and 
stabilized in the city, peasants who migrate into the city would rather retain their 
permanent residence registration in the countryside, and would ask their family or 
relations to work the land. That is, they are willing to keep their identity as “migrant”, 
and remain excluded from the urban welfare benefits, including the medical and 
education resources, for the use of which they would have to pay extra fees.  
In fact, the level of wage income of migrant workers in the city is calibrated and 
kept at such a level so as to make sure that, when combined with the agricultural 
income from the land, it is just sufficient to maintain the reproduction of the entire 
family in the countryside. According to He Xuefeng, only by combining the wages in 
the city and produce from the land can the Chinese peasants maintain the reproduction 
of the family as whole. Under current income structure, the produce from the land will 
sustain the daily expenses for the family in the countryside, while the cash income sent 
back by the male family member working in the city can be saved and used for big 
expenditure such as house-building and education.262  According to He Xuefeng’s 
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calculation, as of 2006, for a normal peasant family that possesses 10 mou of land,263 
the cash input for each mou (for the expenditures on fertilizer, seeds, insecticide, 
watering service, mechanics and cropping) would be no more than 500 yuan, and the 
cash earned from each mou would be 1000 yuan if weather is good, then 10 mou will 
generate 10,000 yuan cash earnings for the family. Besides, the family will usually 
grow some vegetables in the courtyard, breed some pigs, breed fish or shrimps in the 
pond, which could be used for the family’s consumption or to be exchanged for cash. 
As such, with the aged parents doing the agricultural work in the countryside, the 
family will earn an extra 10,000 yuan per year from the migrating members working 
in the city. Such level of income is good enough to support a relatively well-off life for 
a family of 5 or 6 people (including three generations, aged parents, adult couples, and 
their children), enabling them to have some extra savings.264 However, if the family 
move into the city, lacking the “free” resources in the countryside, the living expense 
will soar drastically, because everything would now cost money, and the aged parents 
and children, not qualified as “wage laborer” for proper employment in the city, would 
turn into pure “consumers” instead of producing any value for the family, whereas the 
adult couple become the only wage-earners. Such a family will be unable to reproduce 
themselves in the city.265 Hence, “entirely abandoning the management of the land 
will greatly increase the cash expenses of the peasant family, which cannot be 
compensated by the seemingly ‘affluent’ wages earned in the city.”266 Kautsky has 
illustrated the similar condition for German small farmers: “Consider the situation of a 
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small peasant family earning 400 Marks, paying no rent, and producing the bulk of 
their own food - and living quite adequately. An accident propels them into the 
proletariat, necessitating a move to the town, where a job turns up paying 800 Marks a 
year. The peasant’s income has doubled, but the family’s true situation may have 
worsened. Rent now has to be paid, and possibly a daily rail journey to and from work 
has to be financed. Milk, eggs, vegetables, and pork, which once cost nothing, are now 
expensive items. The children can no longer run around barefoot, and the poorer 
hygienic conditions mean higher outgoings on doctors and medicines.” Kautsky points 
out, as far as income tax is concerned, even though this individual is now twice as well 
off as before, their situation is actually worsened.267 For this reason, keeping the plot 
of land and his family in the countryside is the most rational choice for a Chinese 
migrant who cannot stabilize in the city. 
As the family have to live in the countryside, their children to a large extent 
might be raised by the aged grandparent in the countryside, where, thanks to the 
subsistence agriculture, the cost of raising a child is significantly lower than in the city. 
As pointed out above, children living in the “non-capitalist” sector of countryside only 
have access to low-quality education and medical resources, and would mostly likely 
end up a migrant worker like their fathers. If, however, the migrants choose to bring 
their children with them to drift in the city, the child will still be excluded from the 
urban welfare system (such as good public schools), and have to pay extra fees for 
public schools or hospitals in the city, which is a large sum of money.268 Most often, 
they would go to temporary private schools, whose teaching quality is significantly 
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lower than public schools. And even if the children receive education in the city, by 
law they are required to return to their place of permanent residence (countryside) to 
attend high school entrance examination and college entrance examination. Hence, 
many children would go back to their countryside to attend middle school. Besides, 
since the migrants change their temporary jobs from place to place, their children will 
often frequently transfer between different temporary schools. 269  At any rate, the 
children of migrants are in a situation as precarious and unstable as their parents. For 
reasons above, the reproduction of the migrant’s family is done in the countryside, in 
the “non-capitalist” sector of subsistence agriculture, undertaken by his family 
members.  
Hence, there is an interesting phenomenon of contemporary Chinese small 
holders, which is the tendency toward “familization”. While in the 1980s, the division 
of agricultural and non-agricultural work took place between different time periods 
within one year, that is, peasants spend part or their time working in the fields and 
spend part of their time working in the nearby town, where numerous township 
enterprises were available. Starting from 1990s and up to this day, the division of 
agricultural labor and non-agricultural labor tends to take place more and more within 
one family, between different generations; that is, aged parents stay in the countryside 
to work the land, while young couples work in the city, or the husband working in the 
city while wife staying in the countryside.270 
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Now, the prevailing economic structure of Chinese small holders tends to be 
half-agriculture, half-wage-labor. Very few peasant families get their income solely 
from agricultural production. Most families divide labor within one family, with some 
of its members working in the city as wage-earners, and other members working the 
land in the countryside. Usually, to ensure the maximum income for the entire family, 
the pattern is to leave agricultural work to the physically weak members in the family. 
“The best labour-power in the family takes up wage-labour, …(while) labour on the 
small lot is increasingly delegated to the women, small children and, possibly, elderly 
invalids. The father and more grown-up children have to go out and ‘earn.’”271 It is 
“small peasants” and “migrant workers” combined in the single economic unit of 
family. 
Interestingly, what connects the agricultural “outside” and the capitalist “inside” 
together is family, an institution that is well known for the great amount of “unpaid 
labor” in reproducing labor power. In fact, it is no coincidence that the “household 
contract responsibility system” takes family to be a basic economic unit. Silvia 
Federici points out, “the family emerges in the period of primitive accumulation as the 
most important institution for the appropriation and concealment of women’s 
labor.”272 Federici reveals a crucial dimension of capital’s primitive accumulation that 
Marx failed to explore, that is, the “enclosure” of women’s bodies and their 
reproductive labor. She says, the unpaid domestic labor of women in the house “have 
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enabled capitalism to immensely expand the ‘unpaid part of the working day.’”273 For 
example, the “unpaid labor” within family was very important to male cottage workers 
in the putting-out system, “for a wife could ‘help’ them with the work they would do 
for the merchants, while caring for their physical needs, and providing them with 
children, who from an early age could be employed at the loom or in some subsidiary 
occupation.”274 For this reason, “even in times of population decline, cottage workers 
apparently continued to multiply.”275 
Another crucial aspect of family’s unpaid labor is the parental labor of bringing 
up a child. Meillassoux points out, family is “the institution within which birth, 
nurture and education of children take place thanks to the largely unpaid labor of 
parents, particularly of the mother. It remains the locus of the production and 
reproduction of labor-power.” There are no clauses that binds the parties in respect to 
hours of work, distribution of household tasks or payment for them. “The work which 
the wife puts into producing the child – a future producer – is never paid for in wage 
terms, that is, in terms of the time effectively spent on production.” Despite the 
immense labor put into raising the child, he/she grows up to be the labor commodity 
on the labor market that cannot be sold by their parents, because “the age of consent 
releases the child from all obligations to his parents practically as soon as he reaches 
productive age. Legally, therefore, his labor power can only be exploited by those who 
own the capitalist means of production and are in a position to offer him a job. The 
cost of ‘manufacturing’ a producer is never accounted for in capitalist terms, neither as 
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a private investment, nor as a product which brings the producer of the producer a 
profit in interest or by sale.”276 In this light, family functions as the “outside”, the 
“non-capitalist” sphere within a bourgeois society, providing something “for free.” 
“The capitalist mode of production depends upon an institution which is alien to it”, 
which is the family, “on account of its capacity for utilizing unpaid – particularly 
female – labour, and by exploiting the emotional attachment which still dominates 
parent-child relations.”277 
What Meillassoux and Federici analyze are the “unwaged work” within 
bourgeois family. However, family has even more significant important in the peculiar 
form of production of small holdership. 
 
Family in Small Holdership: Unremunerated Labor 
Russian economist Alexander V. Chayanov points out, an outstanding 
characteristic that distinguishes “family farm” from “capitalist farm” is the lack of the 
category of “wages.” For capitalist farm, the net profit is the amount left after the 
deduction from the gross income of the expenditures on materials and wages paid to 
the labor hands. However, family labor farm, when calculating income, do not take the 
price of their own labor into calculation; to them, the income is the amount of product 
left after the deduction of the expenditure on materials from the gross income.278 In 
other words, “there is no social phenomenon of wages.”279 Karl Kautsky also points 
out: “agricultural labor for the families’ own consumption is not calculated as an 
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expenditure; it does not cost anything. Everything which cultivating the soil 
contributes to the household therefore appears as pure gain. Not only is it virtually 
impossible to calculate the money value of the yield, and divide it into wages, interest 
and ground-rent: such a calculation would never be undertaken since money plays no 
role in this type of farming.”280 This “lack” of wages derives from the fact that small 
holding economy is a self-sufficient mode of production, in which production and 
consumption are combined together as an undivided whole. However, the problem is, 
when such small peasant farm is circumscribed by capitalist economy and is 
articulated with the capitalist mode of production in a certain way, the  labor on family 
farm can very easily turn into “unwaged work” and become the object of exploitation 
for capitalist accumulation.  
Another characteristic of family labor farm is that it cannot “lay off” labor hands 
at will like capitalist farms do, but must keep them fed under whatever circumstances. 
Since the “labor” is a fixed element that could not be changed, all the other elements 
of production (land, means of production) must be deployed around this fixed element 
and must optimize the effective use of “labor hands.” As Chayanov illustrates, “in the 
scheme of the harmoniously developed organic elements of the labor farm undertaking, 
the labor force of the family is something given, and the farm’s production elements 
are fixed in accordance with it in the technical harmony usual among them.”281 Hence, 
while capitalist farm takes as its central concern the pursuit of profit and does not 
concern much about labor hands (which it can lay off at will according to capital’s 
needs), the family labor farm takes as its central concern the maximum employment of 
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family members. Especially, in the circumstance of insufficient land or cash and in the 
circumstance of lacking other employment opportunities, that is, when the family’s 
labor force is in an under-employed state, the family will nevertheless seek to expand 
the volume of its economic activity even within the limited resources of agricultural 
production that it “violate(s) the optimal combination of production elements for its 
activity.” In other words, it displays the tendency for “intensification of labor” (or 
“self-exploitation”) for the purpose of maximizing the gross income for the entire 
family, even if this is done at the cost of declined return per labor unit. “Inevitably 
losing on unit labor payment, it nevertheless considerably expands the gross income of 
its agricultural undertaking.” 282 “This forcing up of labor intensity, buying increased 
annual agricultural income at a price of reducing labor unit payment, is achieved either 
by an intensification of work methods or by using more labor-intensive crops and 
jobs.” 283 For example, Philip Huang’s study of Chinese family labor farms in the 
Yangzi Delta through 1350 to 1988 reveals that, due to the greater pressure on the land 
posed by growing population, peasant families in the Yangzi Delta in Ming and Qing 
Dynasty increasingly switched to growing labor-intensive commercial crops such as 
cotton and mulberries (for silk). By putting greater use of labor onto the land, they 
achieved higher total values of output per unit land, but they got lower average returns 
per labor day. As such, we can see, the intensification of labor is in essence the 
“devaluation” of labor, and leads ultimately to increasingly amount of “unremunerated 
labor” in agricultural practices, which frequently happens in densely-populated area, 
such as China. 
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A third characteristic of family farm is, “family” is good at utilizing the “spared” 
and “auxiliary” labor of women, children, and the old people, who are not qualified as 
“wage-laborers” on the capitalist labor market. For this reason, family as a work unit 
is particularly adapted to the elastic and irregular nature of agricultural activities. It is 
very common for a Chinese peasant household to “grow some tea on the east slope, 
grow some corn on the west slope, grow some vegetables in front of the door, feed a 
pig in the courtyard, tether a cow in the backyard.”284 He Xuefeng points out, “in the 
countryside, old people do not have the concept of ‘retirement’, even if they are over 
sixty, as long as they could move, they will manage to do some work around the house. 
The children can also do some minor jobs such as feeding the chickens or feeding 
pigs.”285  These trivial activities of feeding cows, feeding pigs, working the land, 
growing vegetables in the yards, won’t take up much physical energy, yet they 
constitute substantial part of agricultural activities and contribute substantially to the 
family’s income by providing “free” milk, eggs, fish, and meat, constituting part of the 
actual wages of the migrant workers and hence significantly reduces the price of 
Chinese migrant workers in the city. Just like Russia’s allotment of land to agricultural 
workers served as “wages in kind” and brought the workers’ prices down to less than 
half wage workers under capitalist hire, the supplementary income from the small plot 
of land significantly reduces the price of Chinese migrant workers in the city.286 
Of course, these agricultural products are not truly “free” in the real sense; they 
are in essence the result of the “unremunerated labor” of women, children, and aged 
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parents within the family. However, their cost of labor is hard to calculate in terms of 
wages. As Wen Tiejun asks: when the old mother, after washing the wok, uses the 
waste water to cook some grain husks to feed the pigs, does this count as “production” 
or “consumption”? When a child after school picks some grass on his way home and 
uses it to feed the pigs, does that count as production?287 Under such circumstances 
when production and consumption are combined together, the cost of labor is hard to 
calculate. Besides, these “half-laborers” can endure much lower wages than standard 
wage laborers, because they cannot be “laid off.” For this reason, family farm “easily 
outcompeted the wage labor-based managerial organization,” 288  because while 
“managerial enterprises had to rely mainly on adult and male labor paid at prevailing 
market wages,”289 the family farms are able to draw on the much cheaper auxiliary 
labor of women and the old and young, which made family farms “a lower-cost form 
of labor organization.”290  
These characteristics summarized above – the lack of “wage” category in 
calculating income, intensification of labor at the cost of the declining income per 
labor unit, the use of the “spare-time” and “auxiliary” labor of the half-laborers within 
the family – all come down to the central character of family, the “unwaged labor.”  
I would like to propose a fourth dimension, that this “unwaged labor” operates 
along the logic of “love”, which, as a “non-capitalist” sphere, can also turns into a 
device for capitalist accumulation. Gavin Walker points out, “Capital, in order to 
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undertake its own supposed ‘rational’ and directly economic production cycle, ... 
requires something given, a social gift at its core,” that is, it needs to have the two 
elements land (raw material) and population (labor power) readily available, and it is 
through the “nationalist sentiment” that the two elements could be obtained for free, as 
a “gift”, without paying price. Likewise, in the case of family, the unconditional love 
to support one’s family acts as a device to extract the unpaid labor which accrues to 
the gains of capital. Out of love, aged parents would continue to work into their very 
old age in the countryside to create supplementary income out of the land, or raising 
their grandchild for their migrant children. In fact, the economic exploitation of aged 
parents in some areas were exceedingly heavy in some parts of China. While parents 
put their life-time savings into their children’s marriage and building house for them, 
when they lose labor capacity, what they get from children are only minimum means 
of subsistence, such as about 300 catties of grains each year, some heating materials, 
and a few notes each month for consumption; they were able to subsist, but barely 
have any access to cash. 291  More importantly, “love” also drives the people to 
maintain the integral structure of “family” across the huge gap between capitalist and 
non-capitalist sector, over the long distance between the coastal province and inland 
province, therefore keeping the peasant migrant in a “permanent migrant” status. 
Historically, due to its capacity to bear the almost infinite “intensification of 
labor”, small family farms have better capacity to endure higher rents or higher land 
price than large capitalist farms, because for them “land is not a means of producing a 
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profit or ground-rent, but for providing … the means for the peasant’s existence.”292 
As Philip Huang demonstrates, in Ming and Qing period, there was a tendency of 
“familization of rural production” when the growing population was putting more 
pressure on the land in the Yangzi Delta. Family farm “easily outcompeted the wage 
labor-based managerial organization,”293 because the family farms were able to draw 
on the much cheaper auxiliary labor of women and the old and young, while 
“managerial enterprises had to rely mainly on adult and male labor paid at prevailing 
market wages.” 294  Therefore, family farm became “a lower-cost form of labor 
organization.”295 They did so mainly through their self-exploitation. Kautsky shows us 
a miserable picture of how overwork and under-consumption drove German small 
cultivators “down to the level of beasts of burden, into a life occupied by nothing other 
than work – apart from time set aside for sleeping and eating.”296 Whereas, in France, 
“the small-holding property … has transformed the mass of the French nation into 
troglodytes. Sixteen million peasants (including women and children) dwell in hovels, 
a large number of which have put one opening, others only two and the most favored 
only three.”297 Besides, small farmers “not only flog themselves into this drudgery” 
but also exploit their family members. “The need to exploit family members as young 
as is feasible, and as productively as is possible” compelled the parents to make their 
children quit school at an early age, to the extent that in Austria and Bavaria, 
compulsory school attendance is only 12% or 13%. The small family farms competed 
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with the capitalist farms through “the dirtiest and most degrading misery”, turning 
themselves into “a class of barbarians standing half outside the society.” 298 
Besides, “family” also proves to be the most tenacious and elastic form of 
economic organization that suits well with the flexible and fluctuating conditions of 
post-Fordist capitalism. Because of “love”, a peasant worker may be “laid off” by the 
factory, but he cannot be “laid off” by his family. When a peasant migrant is laid off 
by the factory and discharged back to the rural sector, he will nevertheless be 
supported by his family, who, through the ceaseless intensification of labor input onto 
the small plot of land, will keep him alive. Hence, the “household contract 
responsibility system” generates a huge army of cheap, flexible, and disposable 
migrant labor force. Not only factories in the city need not undertake the responsibility 
for workers’ livelihood, but also, the wage of the worker need not cover the expenses 
of the entire family as such cost is outsourced to the countryside. This is why the 
phenomena of left-behind children, empty-nest elderly, and separated couples were so 
prevalent. With the small plot of land at home, the peasant worker turn into what 
David Harvey terms as “disposable workers” in the city, which do not rely on the 
social welfare or job security provided by the capitalist sector in the city, and can be 
discharged at will back to the countryside, suiting the need of the precarious and 
highly flexible post-Fordist economy. For example, when financial crisis struck China 
in 2008 and shut down masses of manufacturing factories, the migrant workers can 
return to their home in the countryside, stay there, and “wait out” the crisis, until the 
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improved economic conditions allow them to go out to work in the city again. 299 That 
was the secret of how China can still remain politically and economically stable, 
because peasants have land to return to. For this reason, some Chinese scholars oppose 
to “capitalizing” the land, and insist that the small holdership be preserved, because it 
would serve as the “reservoir” and “buffer” for the flexible and fluctuating post-
Fordist capitalism in China. 300 
For all these reasons, the small holder family is both “indispensable” and 
“impossible.” It is necessary to maintain the integrity of the family as an economic 
unit, because the reproduction of the family is predicated upon the combining both the 
agricultural income from the land and the wage income from the city together. At the 
same time, family is “impossible” because it straddles across the divided between the 
urban and the rural area, between the industrial sector and agricultural sector. The 
integrity of the family is founded on the long-term separation of family members 
(reunited only once a year) and the immense labor input of the migrant on running 
back and forth between the countryside and the city. The family is inherently and 
structurally divided; in essence, it is precarious and unstable.  
Besides, the integrity of family labor is based on the assumption that laborers are 
always “healthy” and “functional”; it requires ceaseless input of labor power, that 
young migrant workers never get ill in the city, and that old people in the countryside 
are physically capable of fulfilling their assigned tasks of doing agricultural labor and 
raising grandchildren, contributing economically to the house. Such economic 
structure never takes into consideration that the bearer of the labor power, the 
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laborer’s bodies might get sick or lose their capacity to work due to old age. When 
laborers fall ill, the economic structure of the half-migrant, half-small-holder family 
will lose balance, and the precarious unit of family will fall apart. As a result, family, 
as an institution that carries out labor reproduction for capitalism, is now facing the 
crisis of disintegration, to the point that family may lose its its most basic function – 
the production and reproduction of labor power. What follows, naturally, is the 
termination of labor power itself.  
The logic of capital inherently demands the instrumentalization of migrant 
workers, whose reproduction lay outside the capitalist sector, undertaken by the rural 
community and family in the non-capitalist countryside, so as to relieve capital of the 
cost of reproduction. However, “living labor” suggests something irreducible to mere 
instrument and which exceeds the control of capital. Laborer possesses his subjectivity, 
even though the capital tends to instrumentalize the labor. Hence, when the viewpoint 
is placed within the laboring subject, when literature speaks from the alienated body of 
the migrant laborer positioned and structured in the post-Fordist configuration of 
political economy, such literature ineluctably testifies to the process of a laboring body 
being destroyed. On one hand, it testifies to the cruelty of primitive accumulation, on 
the other hand, it witnesses the process of dying of the living body, and translates its 
anxiety, uneasiness, and irrationality aroused in such process. Because the living body 
of the subject cannot completely conform to the instrumental logic of global 
capitalism, it inevitably questions the post-Fordist configuration that fractures the 
living body. Once the living body, the bearer of labor power, acquires subjectivity and 
becomes conscious of its position in the urban-rural configuration, it will bring threat 
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to the entire system, manifesting itself in the ominous scenes of bloodshed, poison, 
breakdown, and violence of the living body. This is exactly what we can read from the 
“Underclass Literature.”        
 
Precarious Life and Crisis of Labor Power in “Underclass Literature”  
“Underclass Literature,” or, diceng wenxue (©Ì), became an outstanding 
phenomenon in 2004. Underclass literature features the downtrodden class at the 
bottom of Chinese society, or, to be more exact, the people who were formerly the 
masters of the socialist state but now are marginalized by China’s rapid economic 
development and its joining of the dominant order of global capital: peasants, laid-off 
workers during the privatization, migrant workers. Like Xueping Zhong points out, the 
significance of “diceng wenxue” lies in its documentation of the “subalternization” of 
the working class, that is, their pauperization and the loss of dignity,301 which came 
along with the drastic social and economic transformation that took place in China 
after 1990s – privatization of state-owned enterprises and the resultant mass lay-offs 
of factory workers, marketization of public welfare system, the polarization of social 
classes, the enlarging income gap between rural and urban citizens, pauperization of 
peasants and workers, corruption. By the time of 2004, China had completed two 
major changes – it had completed the privatization of state-owned property through 
the “restructuring” of state-owned enterprises, and it had officially made entry to the 
order of global capitalism by joining the World Trade Organization. Underclass 
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literature, emerging under such circumstance, positions itself in a critical relationship 
to the unequal relations in social reality, and raise question the logic of capitalist 
modernization.  
According to Chinese literary critic Li Yunlei, “underclass literature” draws its 
resources from the left-wing literary tradition established around May Fourth period, 
using realism as its primary method. It holds a critical and reflective attitude towards 
the socio-economic reality of the Chinese society, and has a strong concern and 
sympathetic attitude for the underprivileged class. It aims to speak for the underclass, 
and tell the untold stories of underclass, whose voices have been suppressed or 
overshadowed by the dominant discourse of modernization by elite intellectuals or 
upper class.302    
An outstanding characteristic of “underclass literature” is its straightforward 
description of violence, death, and bloodshed. The two representative works that 
marked the phenomenal emergence of “underclass literature” in 2004 were Cao 
Zhenglu’s (Üµƈ) There (Na’er, ƚ3), and Chen Yingsong’s (Ʃ¨å) Bloodshed 
in Masiling Moutain (Masiling xue’an, ƹrŨï), published in 2004. Cao’s fiction 
depicts how a labor union leader of a state-owned factory, after several failed attempts 
to stop the factory from being privatized and workers’ rights being sold, in desperation, 
committed suicide by placing himself under the hammering machine and letting 
himself be crushed. The story ends with a horrible scene: the leader’s headless body, 
the iron axes and grass hooks (symbols of the Communist Party) he made scattered 
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around on the ground, and empty wine bottles. The second fiction, Bloodshed in 
Masiling Mountain, tells the story about how two local villagers working as porters for 
a research team in deep mountains, due to a series of chafes and misunderstandings 
resulted from the drastic economic gap between the two parties (urban intellectuals 
and peasants), ended up killing the entire team. The ending scene of the story is an 
astonishing anesthetized rendering of the deaths at the crime scene: several corpses 
lying on the mountain like transparent rubies, glittering in the sunset.  
The theme of “death” that frequently appears in “underclass literature” captures 
the condition of the living bodies of the downtrodden classes in the age of global 
capitalism. Especially, as we discussed above, when the rural migrants are treated by 
capital as “disposable” labor force that can be summoned and discharged by 
whimsical need of capital, the body of the laborer, as the bearer of labor power, 
inevitably perishes. The lack of care for the well being of peasants in the countryside 
due to poor infrastructures, the intense input of “unpaid labor” within the small 
peasant family, the overworking of the migrant’s body under poor working conditions, 
the exhausting travel back and forth between country and city, all cause damage to the 
laborer’s body, resulting in its premature death.  
Below, I choose Fang Fang’s “Tu Ziqiang’s Personal Sorrow” (Tu Ziqiang de 
geren beishang, ćŘ±Ĥ!¾+) (2013) and Chen Yingsong’s “Mother” (Muqin, 
ù ) (2012) and “Wild Cat Lake” (Yemaohu, ƠĘČ) (2012) as my subject of 
literary analyses. They have touched upon different situations of the families of 
migrating peasants and reveal the impossibility of family and the “death” that hovers 
above the vulnerable bodies of rural laborers like a shadow.  
  159 
 
(1) Fang Fang’s “Tu Ziqiang’s Personal Sorrow” 
First, I would like to discuss Fang Fang’s (ÐÐ) award-winning novella Tu 
Ziqiang’s Personal Sorrow (Tu Ziqiang de geren beishang, ćŘ±Ĥ!¾+) 
(2013). 303  It metaphorically illustrates the “impossibility” of family and the total 
destruction of the laborer’s migrating body in the most thorough sense, revealing the 
“broken” and “fractured” nature of a migrant’s body under the logic of post-Fordist 
capitalist China. Generating a sensation and heated discussion in 2013, this novella 
has been regarded the representative work of “underclass literature.” Many critics and 
scholars have paid attention to Tu Ziqiang’s vain “individual struggle” that tries to 
overcome the structured inequality of urban and rural sectors. The protagonist Tu 
Ziqiang becomes a “type” that typifies the failure of peasants’ descendants to change 
their fate of being a migrant manual laborer through personal struggle, rendered 
impossible by the increasing gap between the city and the countryside. While back in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, getting a college degree and a descent job through one’s 
intelligence and hard working was a reliable way of getting rid of the “peasant” 
identity and becoming an urban citizen, 304  nowadays, with the extremely uneven 
distribution of resources in the countryside and the city, it is no longer possible for a 
peasant’s child to work their up the social ladder through individual struggle. Their 
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fate is structurally determined, hence the irony conveyed by the title “personal 
sorrow,” and by the protagonist’s name “Tu Ziqiang” (“ćŘ±” sounds like “¶Ř±”, 
which means “self-reliance in vain”). However, I want to focus on the aspect of the 
“impossibility” of family, and hence the impossibility for the reproduction of labor 
power in this novel. What makes this novel special is that Tu Ziqiang is not an 
ordinary rural migrant, but a college student, who, theoretically, is able to earn himself 
a descent living and can settle down in the city as an urban citizen. However, not only 
the extreme poverty of his family – a necessary effect of agriculture being the “non-
capitalist” sector - precludes him from having equal chance in competing with others 
in job-seeking, but also his struggle to maintain the integrity of his family substantially 
weighs down his life.  
Living in a small isolated village deep in the mountains, Tu’s family is a typical 
case of the structural “impossibility” of family rendered by the long-distance 
separation of the family and their children. At the beginning, the novel presents us a 
bleak picture of dwindling population of the Tu family, with three of their children 
dead or missing. Tu Ziqiang is the fourth child of his family. His elder sister went to 
the city at sixteen and lost contact ever since, even villagers who work in the city have 
no clue about where she had gone. Unable to afford the journey to the faraway city, Tu 
family gave up the hope of looking for her. One of Tu’s brothers was born with brain 
illness and died a premature death at age seven. Another brother of Tu left the village 
with other peasants to work as coal miners in the faraway province Shan Xi, and 
maintained intermittent contact with his family only through mails. In the first few 
years, he sent money to his family, and even sent a letter saying he has found himself a 
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wife; but later no message came from him any more, and words came out that he died 
under the mines, with no precise information about at which mine he was working, or 
where exactly he lives.   
It is not surprising that “death” and “missing” often fall upon the population of 
rural migrants. Separated by the long distance between the workplace and the rural 
home, and unable to afford the expensive travel fares for the journey home, the 
migrant rarely reunites with his/her family, and only keep contact with the family 
through phone or letter. Deeply involved in the informal economy of post-Fordism, 
the migrants are in a highly unstable status of employment, frequently changing from 
jobs to jobs, and moving from one place to another place, and because they are not 
integrated into the urban social welfare system, it is hard for the government to trace 
and govern their residence. In other words, rural migrants constitute the huge 
population of flux and anonymous being.  
The same situation happens to Tu Ziqiang, who goes to college in Wu Han City, 
which is far away from home. In order to go to Wu Han, the capital of Hubei Province, 
Tu Ziqiang needs first to walk over two mountains to get to the nearby town, and take 
a bus there to a small county called Xiang Fan, and take a bus to the capital Wu Han. 
Like his missing sister and brother, Tu finds it either difficult or extremely expensive 
to keep the integrity of the family over a long distance. At first, to save money, he 
chooses to stay in school for three years without ever paying a visit to his family, and 
only connects his family through phone. The long distance has kept him from knowing 
what is going on with his family; the first time he ever returns home since he enters 
college is when he hears the news of his father’s death due to the family’s fight over a 
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plot of land. Now that Tu’s mother is left living alone in the village, Tu finds it 
impossible to properly take care of his mother over such a long distance. After an 
accident happened to his mother – she was buried under the collapsed roof caused by 
heavy snow (and the more fundamental reason for this accident was that there was no 
male laborer in the family to undertake the heavy manual labor of fixing the roof) and 
got her leg broken – Tu decides to get his mother to live with him in the city.  
The act of making his mother live with him in the city instantly immediately 
disrupts the equilibrium of the “small holding family” analyzed above, whose 
economic stability is founded on the division of labor between agricultural work in the 
countryside and wage work in the city. While Tu’s family could lead a relative “self-
sufficient” life by feeding pigs and growing vegetables for their own consumption, 
after Tu’s mother comes to live with him in the city, the cost of living instantly soars. 
His salary each month is only enough for the daily expenses of him and his mother. 
Renting the cheapest place in the city somewhat like slums or shanty town in the big 
city, he still tries to provide the comfortable living condition for his mother by renting 
a unit with independent kitchen and bath, and instead of sharing the apartment with 
other people, he pays for the entire unit, which takes up half of his monthly wages. 
Similar expenses are many. In order to cope with the coldness of the unheated 
apartment in the winter, he bought an electric heater for mother. He also rented 
internet service so that his mother can spend her idle time while he was working. As 
such, his salary is spent every month and couldn’t put up any extra savings. 
All of these stem from Tu’s aspiration to provide “a normal life” for his mother 
in the city. “He is determined to settle down in the city. He is determined to let his 
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mother walk freely on street, like the aunts he often sees around the corner, carrying a 
basket and revealing satisfied smile on their faces.”305 He dreams of the things that a 
“normal” persons should have: a descent job, a house, and a family; it never occurs to 
him what he sees as the “normal life” enjoyed by most “ordinary people” are only 
entitled to a limited group of “privileged” people, the Wu Han citizens, and never 
belongs to him. Even though Tu has a college degree, he cannot compete with 
graduates from famous universities. And for young people like Tu who have “no 
background, no good look, no good brand university and no competitive degree”, most 
jobs they can get are some informal jobs of some small companies, which give them 
meagre wages, provide no social insurance, and easily go broke. “Everyday, they run 
in and run out with a nervous look on their face. When this company shuts down, they 
shift to another company; when this boss is bad, they change to another boss; when 
this job has no prospect, they shift to another job.”306 Tu shifts frequently between 
different “informal jobs” of telephone salesman, planner of ad company, salesman of 
insurance company, clerk of real estate company, delivery man for a computer store, 
and salesman of conditioner company.  
The economic difficulty of Tu is exacerbated by the need to feed an extra mouth 
of his mother, who is incapable of working in the city. Coming from a remote village, 
Tu’s mother speaks a dialect which no Wu Han citizen could understand, likewise she 
cannot understand others. Lacking the ability to communicate with others, she cannot 
make of her way around the city on her own. Though she had tried working as 
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waitress in the restaurant and as housemaid, her strong self-dignity (characteristic of 
independent small producers) is incompatible with the submissive attitude required of 
her by these jobs, hence she was often fired. Even the relative stable job of street 
cleaner which lasts for half a year is only a temporary contract-based job. Besides, she 
is often involved in accidents while Tu is at work, causing Tu to quit the job at hand to 
run back to check upon her. Once, while Tu was on a sales trip to another city, he 
received the word that she was missing; Tu had to terminate his visit in the mid way 
and runs back to find her. It turns out she was cheated by some swindlers and lost her 
way while chasing them; unable to communicate with the people, she cannot find the 
way home. Tu’s frequent absence and distraction from work infuriates his boss, who 
threatens to fire him. When Tu pleads for his forgiveness and asks him to sympathize 
his situation of having an aged dependent, his boss replies: “Such things would never 
happen to my mother.” This is not only because the manager’s mother and Tu’s 
mother have different social statuses, but also because Tu is now living in an age 
which makes family impossible. Unlike the welfare state which take care of the 
worker’s family and provide subsidies for the worker’s dependents, the post-Fordist 
age requires “disposable workers” and “migrants,” who are expected not to be 
burdened with family and are responsible only for themselves. Hence, facing the gap 
between urban citizens and rural migrants, between the stable and fully integrated 
local citizens and instable and precarious migrant outsiders, Tu not only stands “on 
uneven ground” with others, but the drastic height can even be described as “steep 
cliff.” 
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Aware of the “steep” gap between him and others, Tu Ziqiang nevertheless 
thinks he can overcome these difficulties through his “individual struggle.” “My 
predetermined condition is already inferior compared to others. I can do nothing else 
to make up for this but by working hard, making more effort, and struggling with my 
life. This is my life. If I cannot expect to compete with others, I can at least compete 
with myself.”307 Interestingly, Tu’s unwavering faith in “self-reliance” and “personal 
struggle” comes from his small peasant family, which leads an independent and an 
almost self-sufficient life. Being a small name that has no power in the village, “We 
have nothing but self-reliance” has become a motto of the Tu Family. Just like 
Kautsky remarks, small farmers tend to overwork themselves to the point of self-
exploitation in their competition with the large capitalist farms, we also see Tu tries to 
overwork himself, by exhausting his biggest asset, labor power. Therefore, he liberally 
expends his “labor,” which is “free” and does not “cost” him anything. In the same 
way that small farmers exclude the labor cost from the calculation of “wage,” Tu 
exerts the physical capacity of his body in such a way as if it were “free of cost” and 
can be expended at will. He barely rests on holidays or weekends; to save money, he 
runs from place to place on foot instead of taking bus; he cuts the expense on food to 
the minimum extent; and he did not buy any health insurance. When he catches cold 
and coughs, he refuses to go to hospital but drinks a lot of water instead, for he cannot 
afford the extra expenses on medicine. Even when he coughs blood, he hangs on with 
his will power. He tried so hard to “internalize” all the obstacles and external 
difficulties into his “personal struggle” by over-expending his “labor power” that his 
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body couldn’t bear the high intensity and often “felt tired.” Finally, it collapses: he 
was diagnosed with late-stage lung cancer. He couldn’t afford the expensive medical 
treatment, for he was not integrated into the social welfare system and did not buy 
commercial health insurance, and he ended up dying. As a matter of fact, Tu Ziqiang 
falls into the situation which Marx describes for proletariat: he has nothing to sell but 
his labor power. Tu’s tragic fate of exchanging his labor for cash, over-expending his 
physical capacity to make up for his extreme shortage of cash, spells the common fate 
of all migrant workers venturing into the city in the hope of “earning money.” Not 
integrated into the city’s welfare system to properly take care of their life, earning 
little money that is barely enough to build a home in the city, and having no family 
around to take care of them, their labor power quickly diminishes and dies out.  
 
He had pictured himself wearing a suit, driving a car, living on a high-rise 
and looking down upon the street, strolling in the park with his wife and 
holding his child in his arms. He had also pictured himself sitting in a 
spacious office with a large desk, signing his name on a document, having 
his photograph taken and his interview published on newspaper. He had 
even pictured himself attending a conference in the Great Hall of the People 
and shaking hands with state leaders. He had thought a lot about his life and 
he has been struggling for this perfect life he pictured. It never occurred to 
him that he has no life at all. The diagnosis of the doctor deleted his life 
from this beautiful world, to which he would no longer have any 
relevance.308        
  
Having no relevance to the world is not only a metaphor for his departing from 
this world, but profoundly reveals the positions for all rural migrants: anonymous 
beings that cannot be recognized by the order. Keeping the news of his imminent 
death from mother, Tu tries to find a way for his mother to settle in the city. However, 
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for a lonely old rural woman who has no husband or son, and has neither income nor 
capability to work, there is no way for her to live in the city, as no institution would 
accommodate her. Tu’s money could barely afford her stay in the rest home through 
three months, and the city’s bureau of civil affairs wouldn’t take responsibility for her 
since she is not an urban citizen. Women’s Federation and welfare house wouldn’t 
take her in either, since she is neither disabled nor ill; and as she is not too old, she is 
expected to support herself through her own labor. Finally, a temple kindly took her in.  
In the end, Tu’s disappearance from the world is also anonymous: he walks into 
the mountains from which he came out: “This man, this man called Tu Ziqiang, walks 
out of the sight of the world step by step. From then on, no one ever sees Tu Ziqiang. 
His disappearance does not even get noticed. How lonely is this man! The world in 
which he lives doesn’t even know if he exists or not. Or, he is too small to be 
remembered.”309  
Tu’s individual demise is the tragic termination of the whole Tu Family, because 
he does not have any descendants; and the reason he remains unmarried is that no girl 
in the city wants to date an economically unstable migrant living with a dependent in a 
rented place. As is well known, it is impossible for rural migrants to establish a family 
in the city. The neoliberal economy requires that migrants are single and only 
responsible for themselves. They can, at best, maintain a “divided family between 
urban and rural sector”, having the parents or wife live in the countryside and take 
care of his offspring. The doom of Tu Ziqiang - his exhaustion of his laboring body 
through overwork - stems from none other than his attempt to fulfill the impossible 
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desire of letting his family “settle down in the city” like “normal people.” Tu’s failure 
to break this pattern of “divided family” to keep his family in the city in essence 
illustrates the impossibility for migrant’s reproduction of labor power in the city.  
 
(2)  Logic of Love: Chen Yingsong’s “Mother” and “Wild Cat Lake” 
 
If Fang Fang’s novella illustrates the exhaustion of migrant labor in the city, 
then Chen Yingsong’s (Ʃ¨å) novella Mother (Muqin, ù ) (2012) illustrates the 
exhaustion of old people’s labor power in the countryside, which, as analyzed above, 
is indispensable for the reproduction of small holder family. It offers a glimpse into 
how a small holder’s family in the countryside collapses when they lose the most 
precious “auxiliary labor” of old people. In the story, the independent and capable 
mother, who had raised up her four kids on her own, suddenly had a cerebral 
thrombosis at the age of 76 and paralyzed ever since, which completely disrupted 
everybody’s life in the family. 
The story shows us how the precarious “balance” and “self-sufficient” state of 
small holder family is built on the consistent input of old people’s auxiliary and 
unwaged labor. Living in her elder son’s house, Mother not only takes good care of 
herself, but feeds two pigs for the consumption of the whole family, washes clothes 
and cooks for the family, takes care of her grandchildren, and often walks over 
mountains to bring lunch to her daughter working as teacher in the primary school in 
another village. Her “auxiliary labor” is so indispensable for the whole family that 
when she fell ill, the family instantly shows signs of decay. “There are no more grains 
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in the pot, no more vegetables in the yard,” and “without her collecting grass to feed 
the pigs, the pigs now starve to bones.”310 
The first problem for the family is the expensive cost for medical treatment. A 
mere few days in hospital has cost them 1000 yuan, which was a bit amount for a 
small peasant’s family. Since the family cannot afford the expensive CT 
(Computerized Tomography) scan, which costs 250 yuan per scan, the hospital can 
neither locate the exact spot of the illness nor diagnose the cause of the pain; having 
no idea where the pain comes from, the doctor can at best prescribe some medicines 
for her stomachaches or give her pain-reliever injection. Besides, as they are not 
within the urban medical welfare system, even the most ordinary procedure of 
temperature measuring and blood pressure measuring, means substantial cost to the 
family. “Each time the nurse walked in with a plate in her hand, their sweated and 
their heartbeat hastened, as if they saw robbers come in, as if they saw their money 
being thrown into the river.”311 As the medical treatment soon exhausted their savings, 
they had to take Mother out of the hospital and sustained her life by using the cheap 
and native methods.   
The second problem is the extra labor the have to put into taking care of the 
paralyzed mother - washing her body, changing her bed, feeding her, massaging her 
body, helping her with the toilet, while enduring her upsetting moaning and howling 
caused by the constant pain. Taking care of the mother disrupts their life and 
discontinues even the simplest reproduction of daily life. The family, full of the weak 
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and the old, now reveals its truly broken and fragile nature. The eldest son’s family, 
suffering the high blood pressure, anemia, and hereditary heart disease, simply lack 
the capability to take care of the paralyzed mother. The second son, who lives in 
another village and runs back and forth to look after mother, suffers the economic loss 
as his sheep go missing or die of plague due to the lack of attention. The youngest son, 
suffering from minor brain damage, is a temporary worker who could barely feed 
himself and does not even own his place. The eldest daughter, being a grandmother 
herself, has to contribute her own auxiliary labor to her own household, looking after 
three grandchildren. The youngest daughter, occupied by her full-time job as a 
primary school teacher, almost gets fired for the accidents caused during her leave 
from the school to look after mother. The demand of continual input of labor into 
looking after the patient has fundamentally disrupted the equilibrium of their life and 
production, that even the simple reproduction and daily life cannot continue. Finally, 
the sons and daughters decided, “If she doesn’t die, then we will all have to die.”312 
They chose to poison the mother, who, for the sake of her sons and daughters, 
willingly drank up the poison.   
What we see here is how the logic of love is exploited by capital to the extreme. 
Love does not ask for price, and hence constitutes a “free gift” out of which capital 
ceaselessly draws its profits of labor power. The “love” and the “unremunerated labor” 
relieves capital or the state of its responsibility to take care of the laborer in old age. 
Hence, in the story, the 76-year-old mother willingly devoted all of her labor into the 
big family without asking for return, and continued to work for the family until her 
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body collapses. However, her love for the children falls victim of the logic of 
capitalism. When she has lost her capacity to work and needs children’s love and care 
in return, what dominates her children’s thoughts is the pure economic calculation – 
the limted resources should be devoted to the younger generation who have a future 
ahead, instead of wasting on the “useless” old people who are about to die.  
In Hubei Province, the hometown of Cheng Yingsong, sociologist He Xuefeng 
find a cruel fact that the suicide rate of the old people in Jingshan County is 
exceedingly high. The old people are expected to work as long as they can still move, 
and once they are too weak or too old to be useful to children, they tend to commit 
suicide, quietly and secretly, in order not to cause any more trouble to their children.313 
In other words, once the “labor value” of the aged parent is exploited to the very last 
bit, the parent can be disposed of. Inherent in such utilitarian calculation of the 
elderly’s “use value” is exactly the logic of “disposable worker” under neo-liberalism, 
which absolves the state and capitalist of the obligation of taking care of laborers’ 
bodies. Finally, we witness in the mother the similar destination of Tu Ziqiang: the 
ultimate exhaustion of labor power, or, to be more accurate, the termination of labor 
force itself, death.  
Precisely because “love” is the key to sustaining the integrity of peasant family, 
in recent years, many scholars and policy-makers have emphasized the importance of 
upholding the values of family in the countryside.314 However, can we take “love” for 
granted? We may ask, what if “love” is missing? Chen Yingsong’s fiction “Wild Cat 
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Lake” shows, when the non-capitalist sphere of “love” is exploited by the logic of 
capital to the very last bit, it causes the disintegration of family and even the total 
collapse of social order in the countryside.  
The beginning of novella shows a dreary picture of a village where most of the 
men have gone to the city to earn money, leaving only women and the elderly behind.  
With nearly all the men gone, women who live alone in the village are exposed to the 
frequent assaults by thieves and robbers, as well as thefts and robbery targeting their 
property. With her husband working the city, Xiang’er, the most beautiful woman in 
the village, finds herself in a position that is physically defenseless and economically 
vulnerable. On one hand, she definitely needs man’s help in money as well as in labor, 
when her field is drowned by a rainstorm, when she needs extra hands to help her 
harvest the rapeseeds from the field during busy season, when the field is infested with 
pests, or when the cattle gets sick. On the other hand, she has to shun away from the 
“help” of the village head, who covets her beauty and often “helps” women in 
exchange for their bodies. She also finds herself physically incapable of defending 
herself or her property. Working alone in the field constantly exposes her to the danger 
of being raped by rogues wandering in the fields, and living alone in the house invites 
the thieves who once stole away the cow and knocked her out when she was trying to 
chase them. 
It is at this time that the middle-aged widow, Sister Zhuang, stepped into her life 
and replaced the role of her husband. Losing her husband three years ago and living 
alone with her son, Sister Zhuang has turned into a spiritually and physically strong 
person; even her physicality has picked up some characteristics of man: her voice is 
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coarse, and her fat body is full of strength. Missing sexual life for many years, she 
even teases that she has “turned into a man.” She helped Xiang’er with work in the 
field, checked upon her safety regularly, looked after her house while she was away, 
and accompanied her through the horrifying nights, and even rescued Xiang’er from 
being raped by the rogues.  
Receiving her care, protection, and love, Xiang’er not only became emotionally 
attached to her, but also grew physically intimate with her. She thinks, “Who ever 
cares for me like this?” After all, “Sister Zhuang is the one who tucks the quilt for her. 
Her hand feels like a mother and a father. Her eyes are kind and full of love.”315 
Meanwhile, “there is no news from San You, her husband. The other end of phone is 
always a female voice saying the number is out of service. And she never receives a 
phone call from him.” 316  When they sleep together and Zhuang’s hand tenderly 
caresses over her body, Xiang’er suddenly realizes that “San You doesn’t love me 
anymore; without the participation of the hand there is no love.”317  
Eventually, “she forgets there is still a San You”, until “at a dusty dusk, a man 
showed up in front of her, his head and face covered in dust.” “San You walked in the 
house like a stranger and a beggar, which astonished her.” 318 While San You chatted 
with her like he had never left, Xiang’er tried in vain to update him with all the things 
happened while he was away, that sister-in-law died, that cattle was once stolen and 
then retrieved. She was surprised by his ignorance of the change in this house - the 
new rice she grew with Zhuang: “Why does he not ask about the fresh rice? Why does 
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he not ask where the rice came from?” “After all this chatting, he still did not ask 
where the rice came from, who planted it, who harvested it. The rice smelling so nice 
is definitely not old rice. Does he no longer care?” Obviously, San You took her life in 
the countryside for granted, assuming she had always maintained this peaceful and 
affluent life without him. Hence, she reached the conclusion, “he doesn’t care us at 
all.”319 Unwilling to have her current peaceful life with Sister Zhuang disturbed by 
San You’s return, she withheld from telling him that the dog meat he bought from the 
bazaar was poisoned, and did not stop him from eating the poisonous meat. Finally, 
when San You died, that Xiang’er finally called Zhuang by the name that Zhuang had 
always wanted her to call, “husband.”   
While love is supposed to sustain the integrity of family, in the form of self-
sacrifice – the wife Xiang’er is supposed to endure all the harsh difficulties and cares 
for the family while waiting for her husband to return, however, in the story, “love” 
itself is problematized. Without the medium of care, protection, and intimacy offerd 
by the corporeal body, “love” easily falls apart - “without the participation of hand, 
there is no love.” It reveals the inner paradox and the unsustainability of the “divided 
family” between the city and the countryside. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I conceptualize how, the small peasant family, grounded in the 
“household contract responsibility system” after the dissolution of the cooperative, 
emerged as a peculiar mechanism in post-Fordist age to create a huge reservoir of 
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rural migrant workers that suited the need of neoliberal capitalism for cheap, flexible, 
and disposable labor force. On one hand, the peasant family must remain intact as an 
economic unit in order to reproduce itself, combining together wage from the migrant 
member in the city and agricultural income from the countryside. On the other hand, 
such family is inherently and structurally fractured and split between country and the 
city. Such precarious and unstable family is sustained by the logic of “love,” which 
generates unremunerated labor input without asking for price. Such instrumental use 
of labor finally results in the total erasure of the body of laborer, the termination of 
labor power itself. The traces of the dying process of the laborer’s bodies have been 
recorded in the underclass literature. Fang Fang’s “Tu Ziqiang’s Personal Sorrow” 
presents us a process of how the body of a migrating young man is exhausted to death 
while trying to have his family settle in the city, Chen Yingsong’s novella “Mother” 
and “Wild Cat Lake,” on the other hand, shows how “love” within the family is 
exploited by capital to such extent that love itself gets questioned and loses its ground. 
As a result, family, as an institution that carries out labor reproduction for capitalism, 
is now facing the crisis of disintegration to the point that family may lose its 
designated function of reproducing labor. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“EXODUS” OF LABOR AND “NEW COMMON” TOWARD THE FUTURE 
 
Last chapter, I have shown how the dissolution of the commune and the 
individualized production under the “household contract responsibility system” 
created an “outside,” a non-capitalist sector of small holdership, onto which capital 
“externalizes” the cost of reproduction of labor, and which generates a huge army of 
cheap migrant labor force that suits the needs of the flexible economy of post-Fordist 
China. However, like any “outside” that capital tries to incorporate into its metabolic 
cycle for the purpose of extracting surplus value and tries every means to tame its 
heterogeneity, such agricultural “outside” also poses threat to capital by introducing 
radical “otherness” into capital and subverts its logic. Harry Harootunian points out in 
his analysis of “formal subsumption,” while the structure of contemporaneous 
configuration of different temporalities is essential for capital’s self-reproduction, it at 
the same time generates within itself “the force of temporal interruption, unevenness, 
fracturing, and heterogeneity.”320 In reproducing the old elements for the purpose of 
creating surplus value, it also brings in the radical otherness (or historicity) of a 
different temporality of pre-capitalist society, which capitalism tries every means to 
bury or “naturalize.” Once the suppressed historicity and heterogeneous elements have 
been discovered, excavated, and activated, the possibilities for an alternative future 
could be opened. 
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In this sense, the role of “outside” of the countryside for China’s capitalism 
would not just mean the source for raw material and cheap labor like the “colony,” or 
as a dumping ground to which global capital “externalizes” its costs and emits its 
waste (both “material wastes” and the “human waste” such as the weak, the aged, the 
disabled that have bee exploited and disposed by the city). Because the countryside 
undertakes the job of producing labor force for the capitalist economy in the city, and 
because labor power is the most important factor that sustains the production circuit of 
capital, countryside may end up a source of instability for the capitalist system, as it 
always contains the possibility of terminating the supply of labor power.   
According to Gavin Walker, even within capitalist system, labor power 
commodity itself constitutes the “outside” of the capitalist mode of production. His 
study of Japanese Marxist Uno Kozo shows that, labor power, as the source and origin 
of surplus value, creates an opening that disrupts the smooth operation of capitalism, a 
“threshold” or “limit” of capital which capitalism itself cannot overcome. “Labor 
power haunts the circuit M-C-M, incapable of serving as a stable element.”321 On one 
hand, “Capitalism, in essence, is a systemic and total force, a closed cycle without 
limits, but this cycle’s very existence and operation are enabled only by a fundamental 
outside, that is, the existence of sufficient inputs of labor power as well as the 
existence of excess labor power that can be employed in future rising levels of 
production.”322 The continuing cycle of capitalist (re)production is predicated upon the 
ceaseless input of labor power into the production process. Thus, the continuation of 
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capital must always presume that labor power is given and available at hand. On the 
other hand, “labor power is something that cannot be produced in the production 
process as a commodity,” 323  but “must always-already be intersected by another 
surface or entire phase of capital’s circuit, the consumption process.”324 That is, the 
process in which the laborer consumes food and clothing to replenish his physical 
power and reproduces himself lies “outside” the capitalist production process and “can 
never be strictly presupposed in capital’s interior.”325 
Therefore, capital delegates its most important task, the reproduction of labor 
power, to the state, which undertakes the responsibility to “care for and shelter life in 
order to ensure the consistent and constant supply of labor power that can be 
commodified.”326 “Without the nation, the malleable elements of labor power cannot 
be recirculated as if they were directly graspable, by means of the reproduction of the 
worker’s body on the outside.”327 Through instituting laws to protect property (capital), 
enforcing borders to govern the migration of population, and setting up welfare system 
to take care of people’s lives, the state provides for capital the stable supply of labor 
power. However, Walker points out, there is always a “torsion” or “rupture” in the 
production of labor power that cannot be mended, because labor power can only be 
“substantialized” and “actualized” during the production process. Since the laborer is 
deprived of the means of production, only in factory can his labor power be 
“actualized” and combine with the means of production to create use value. When the 
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capitalist spends the money to purchase labor power as commodity, what he purchases 
is only the appearance of commodity. “Labor power comes to exist or is called into 
life only when it is utilized in the process of production. Prior to its use it is nothing 
more than a potentiality that is materially absent.” Hence, labor power “does not exist 
as something substantial”; “rather, it is retrospectively made to have existed only 
during the process of production itself.”328 Therefore, labor power “lacks a stable 
presence, a ‘commodity body.’”329 The impossibility of “commodification” of labor 
power constitutes an inherent and structural defect of capitalism. Because labor power 
is never a stable element, the circuit of capital hence remains forever a “defective 
circle,” “a circuit process that never quite reaches its cyclical starting point.”330  
If, as Walker shows, the separation of (re)production of labor power (in the 
realm of life) from usage of labor power (within the factory) generates an inherent 
“fracture” or “split” in the labor commodity (and hence the opening within capitalism), 
then, in China, the gap between (re)production of labor power and usage of labor 
power is enlarged to an even greater extent, to the gap between the countryside and the 
city. In China, laborer is produced in the countryside, but has to travel a long distance 
from the inland agricultural provinces to the coastal cities to actualize his labor power; 
this implies that the supply of labor power is even more unstable and more out of 
control by capital. Such instability is further reinforced by the still valid “collective 
land ownership,” which suggests there exists the possibility of reactivating a kind of 
collective economy capable of producing enough surplus value to keep the peasants on 
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the land instead of let them flow into the city for employment. As such, it may indicate 
an alternative mode of life, a common life.  
 
Seeking the “Common” from within Capitalism  
In the West, there have been various efforts to re-conceptualize the “common” 
and reverse the “primitive accumulation.” One potential way of re-building the 
“common” is the biopolitical production of alternative subjectivity proposed by 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt.  
Hardt and Negri seek for resistance from within modernity itself. According to 
them, while labor power derives from life, life always exceeds the control of capital. 
Though there is “power over life” exerted by disciplinary regimes of capitalism and 
state that try to produce subjects and provide labor power for capital, there is always 
“the power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity.”331 
Such “power of life,” immanent to the living body itself, comes with and even before 
the imposition of the modern regime, and constitutes the necessary condition for the 
exercise of power. “At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly 
provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.”332 
Therefore, anti-modernity co-exist with modernity: “Antimodernity is prior in the 
sense that the power relation of modernity can be exercised only over free subjects 
who express that freedom through resistance to hierarchy and domination. Modernity 
has to react to contain those forces of liberation.”333 For this reason, the way to resist 
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capitalism is to stay right inside capitalism; and the way to reconstruct a new common 
come from the “common” conditions prepared by contemporary capitalism. For them, 
today’s capitalism has erased “the differences of kind that used to divide labor” and 
has created “the condition for various types of labor to communicate, collaborate, and 
become common.”334  
Assuming that all material means of production have already been “enclosed” 
and “expropriated” by capital, Hardt and Negri look to the “immaterial” means of 
production which is yet to be privatized by capital, such as “information flows, 
communication networks, social codes, linguistic innovations, and practices of affects 
and passions.”335 Accordingly, they propose, the way to rebuild the new “common” is 
through organizing and engaging the different singular subjects in the cooperative 
production of immaterial knowledge, such as values, codes, images, languages, music, 
which they hope would escape the capturing of capital and transcend the boundaries 
posed by the regime of “private property.” 
Hardt and Negri’s theory of “common” is based on two important concepts of 
Baruch Spinoza, “singular” and “multitude.” The subject of production of commons, 
the “multitude,” historically refers to the victims who have been deprived of their 
means of production by the enclosure and excluded from the political body in 17th 
England. They were “the remainder left by the violent appropriation conducted by 
nascent powers of capital” and “prisoners of the new conditions of the production and 
reproduction.”336 According to Hardt and Negri, in 17th century England “comes to 
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connote the lowest rank of society and the propertyless, since they are the most visibly 
excluded from the dominant political bodies,” which consisted of “shoemaker, Farrier, 
Weaver, Tanner, Mercer, Brewer, Butcher, Barber,”337 and even vagrants and beggars. 
In a word, they are the plurality of proletarians. Hence, “multitude” is “the name of the 
poor” which stands opposite to the political identity based on property. It stands for “a 
political body without distinction of property, a mixed body that is unbounded.”338  
It must be noted that “multitude” denotes a kind of existence prior to the 
emergence of modern “proletariat.” Hardt and Negri choose to re-activate the word 
“multitude” in order to avoid the “homogenization” involved in the organized form of 
“proletariat,” and to stress that “singularity” is the basis of “multitude.” These 
singularities are free and autonomous subjects who have their own determinates. 
Based on Spinoza’s philosophy, Hardt and Negri redefine multitude as “an open and 
inclusive political body,” 339  “an inclusive body in the sense that it is open to 
encounters with all other bodies, and its political life depends on the qualities of these 
encounters.”340 It consists of the multiplicity of social singularities “whose difference 
cannot be reduced to sameness.”341  Acting as free and autonomous subjects, they 
freely associate with each in struggle and “seek to coordinate their common actions 
and maintain their equality in horizontal organizational structures.” 342  Their 
organizational structure is “horizontal,” characterized by equality and openness to 
otherness, rather than “vertical,” characterized by subordination, hierarchy, and 
                                                
337 Ibid., 40. 
338 Ibid., 41. 
339 Ibid., 41. 
340 Ibid., 43. 
341 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 99. 
342 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 110. 
  183 
exclusiveness. And the space for such “common,” they propose, is the “metropolis,” 
which provides conditions for “the unpredictable encounters among singularities, with 
not only those you do not know but also those who come from elsewhere, with 
different cultures, languages, knowledges, mentalities.”343 “The metropolis is to the 
multitude what the factory was to the industrial working class”;344 it is “a site not only 
of encounters but also of organization and politics.”345 We can see that the political 
theory of Negri and Hardt is especially suited to the conditions of post-Fordist 
conditions of capitalism in which the highly fluid, highly fragmented, heterogeneous 
population (especially the multi-ethnic migrants) continually crisscross and destabilize 
predetermined borders of various kinds, rendering the old forms of organization (labor 
union, nation-state) ineffective, hence their proposed organizing principles, such as 
“openness,” “autonomy,” and “freedom” of subjects, resist any predetermined form of 
union or unity, such as the state, the labor unions, etc.    
It is worth noting that Hardt and Negri focus primarily on the politico-cultural 
reinvention of the social relations without, however, challenging the the economic 
base of the means of production. In other words, it is “subjectivity” or “values” that 
they concern, rather than the actual distribution of wealth. For example, the term 
“multitude” does not carry any class connotation; it does not designate a specific 
social standing or economic status, but rather points to a kind of subjectivity 
“regardless of social order or property.”346 Although “multitude” is “the name of the 
poor” and “is characterized by poverty,” however, “the poverty of the multitude … 
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does not refer to its misery or deprivation or even its lack, but instead names a 
production of social subjectivity that results in a radically plural and open body politic, 
opposed to both the individualism and the exclusive, unified social body of property. 
The poor … refers not to those who have nothing but to the wide multiplicity of all 
those who are inserted in the mechanisms of social production regardless of social 
order or property.”347 Hence, people of any class can be part of this multitude so long 
as they promote the right subjectivity.      
Accordingly, the “exodus” they propose, the “process of subtraction from the 
relationship with capital” by “actualizing the potential autonomy of labor-power,”348 
does not mean to sever the relation with capital, or to stop providing their labor to 
capital and disrupt the production process like class struggles in the past, but means 
“staying right here” (right within the capitalist system), and “transforming the 
relations of production and mode of social organization under which we live.”349 In 
other words, they do not seek to change the conditions of production, the ownership of 
means of production, but to utilize the given/assigned material conditions of the 
capitalist mode of production to forge new social relations. Their rebellion is “within 
and against” the capitalism,350 which means the reproduction of capital may continue 
to carry on without disruption. In this light, to what extent is such “exodus” from 
capital effective remains a question. Besides, the “immaterial labor” which they count 
on as a new form of “common” may very well depend on capital itself. What they 
presume, as the premise of their theory, is a “finished” state of capitalism, which had 
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already completed primitive accumultion, established capitalist mode of produciton, 
and had enclosed every “outside” into its omnipotent rule. 
Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of “the common” is inspiring for us in 
understanding the post-Fordist capitalism, however, it does not suit to the conditions 
of “common” and “commune” as we have seen in China’s history and literature. In 
fact, Hardt and Negri have been criticized for their Western-centrism. Massimo De 
Angelis criticizes Hardt and Negri for focusing only on “the world of ‘immaterial 
labor’ and ‘post-Fordism,’ of high-tech and instant communication” while neglecting 
areas outside the advanced capitalist countries, where many “non-capitalist” elements 
are still retained. For example, he points out, “the post-Fordist flexibilization of 
production was accompanied by a dramatic increase in production in sweatshops and 
factories around the world, many of which retain typical Fordist features.”351 And in 
the global loops of capitalism, “modern slavery … trickles up in the global production 
chain by allowing cheaper food and cheaper general conditions of reproduction, thus 
lowering the value of labor power … for skilled Indian programmers connected by 
instant communications to their American clients.”352 Hence, De Angelis suggests, 
instead of looking to “the ‘creative’, ‘immaterial’ workers … as the ‘vanguard’ of the 
revolution” for the frontline of resistance of capital, we should look to “the Central 
American indigenous … struggling against the enclosure of their lands through Plan 
Puebla-Panama,” 353  “the Zapatistas and other similar commoners, especially the 
indigenous, the peasants, the just-in-time factory workers in the ‘free trade zones’ of 
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the third world, the peasant mothers, the slum communities struggling in a variety of 
contexts for livelihoods and dignity.”354 In his view, alterity should be sought in the 
ongoing struggles against capital in the areas “outside” the advanced capitalist states. 
Hence, different from Hardt and Negri’s notion of “common” that is based on 
the shared network of information and knowledge, the “common” for De Angelis 
refers to the linkage and integration of different communities around the world in their 
common struggle against the global loops of capitalist production. Because “capital 
has always been global,” 355  it is in essence a “global articulation of different 
conditions and activities of production and reproduction, different socio-economic 
compositions of labour, different class compositions, different cultural languages of 
struggles, different subjectivities,”356 hence, communities across the globe suffer from 
the common fate of enclosure, the forceful separation from non-market conditions for 
reproducing their livelihoods:  
 
At the peak of the salve trade, coinciding with the English industrial 
revolution, the men, women and children entering Manchester’s sweatshops 
and working daily for 14 or 16 hours in exchange for a pittance were the 
result of the proletarianization of the preceding three centuries of enclosure 
of lands, state repression of the struggles for commons and criminalization 
of ‘indigence’ and ‘vagrancy,’ all means that increased dependency on the 
market (this time the ‘labour market’) as a means for the reproduction of 
livelihood. Also the mines, plantations and other ‘business operations’ in the 
‘new world’ were put in place on lands and along rivers expropriated from 
the local populations, while the slave-bodies shipped to work in them were 
themselves ‘enclosed’, forcefully separated from their communities.357 
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Because capital always works through “global articulation of a multitude of 
techniques and strategies, from slavery to wage labour, from unwaged work of 
reproduction to post-Fordist temporary work, from unwaged third world petty 
commodity producers on the breadline to the highly skilled ‘systems analysts’ of high-
tech capitalism, from Fordist sweatshops to cognitive precarious labour,”358 hence, 
accordingly, the “exodus” from capital would be the common struggle of the planetary 
social body to dissociate from capital, the “overcoming of this articulation dividing the 
global social body and pitting co-producing communities against each other.”359 
Compared to Hardt and Negri, De Angelis has paid more attention to the 
rebelling power of the “outside” which is articulated in the uneven structure of global 
capitalism. Nevertheless, De Angelis agrees with Hardt and Negri that resistance can 
be found within the social body of a capitalist society, which is “the spheres of 
relations, value practices, affects as well as forms of power relations, conflict and 
mutual aid that we constitute beyond capitalist relations of production.”360 For De 
Angelis, the “value practice” that operates on a different logic than the market, money, 
and accumulation is the fundamental way of labor’s “exodus” from capital, because 
capital, as “a social force,” always tries to interlace and articulate “the practices of a 
multiplicity of social subjects,” to make sure that “the mental and manual activities of 
these singularities, their doing, constituted in a web of social relations, are coupled to 
these value practices so as to reproduce capital itself in its endless drive for self-
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expansion.”361 Hence, the way of “exodus” from capital lies in the breaking away from 
such articulation, the “de-coupling” from the value practices of capital by creating 
alternative value practices. 
Besides seeking “the common” from inside capitalism, there are also attempts in 
historical studies that try to recuperate the historically lost “common” occurred at the 
historical moment of 17th century, when the multiethnic and interracial “multitude” 
tried to “de-link” from the domination of capital by taking possession of the means of 
production from capitalist through cooperative labor. In Peter Linebaugh and Marcus 
Rediker’s study of the transatlantic economy of 17th and 18th century, the 
“multitudes” refer specifically to the multi-ethnic lower-class who were involved in 
the trans-atlantic trade as sailors. Many crew members of these transatlantic vessels 
during the first half of the seventeenth century were “dispossessed commoners, 
transported felons, indentured servants, religious radicals, pirates, urban laborers, 
soldiers, sailors, and African slaves.”362 Among them were former little proprietors 
and tenants who used to maintain themselves and families on the commonland before 
the Enclosure drove them out, hence they retained a living memory of open-field 
agriculture and communing in England and Ireland, and sought to restore the common 
way of life whenever there was a chance.363 It was in this context that a historical 
moment of rebuilding “the common” by the motley crew emerged in the transatlantic 
trade.   
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Linebaugh and Rediker show, when the transatlantic vessel of Virginia 
Company, Sea-Venture, wrecked on Bermuda, sailors on the vessel decided to settle in 
Bermuda Island and refused to go to Virginia. The “motley crew” on vessel consisted 
of “sailors, laborers, craftsmen, and commoners of several sorts, including two Native 
Americans, Namuntack and Matchumps.”364 Knowing that “the ease, pleasure, and 
freedom of the commons” is better than “the wretchedness, labor, and slavery awaiting 
them in Virginia,”365  these former commoners conspired and rebelled against the 
Virginia Company officials, hoping to stay on the Bermuda island to start a egalitarian 
common life through cooperative labor. Their cooperative labor existed not only on 
the ship when they “steered the vessel, struck sails, cleared the decks, and pumped out 
the water that was seeping into the hull,” but also extended to the shore, when they 
were “building huts out of palmetto fronds for shelter and communing of subsistence – 
hunting and gathering, fishing and scavenging.”366 Taking “the classless, stateless, 
egalitarian societies of America” as their model,367  they decided to “retire to the 
woods and live like savages,”368  hoping to build “a world without work, private 
property, law, felony, treason, or magistrate.”369  
Such multiethnic struggles, Linebaugh and Rediker point out, existed 
everywhere during the 17th century, because the “expropriation occurred not only in 
England but also in Ireland, Africa, the Caribbean, and North America.”370 In Virginia, 
“colonists refused to work, mutinied, and often deserted to the Powhatan Indians,” and 
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“soldiers, sailors, and Indians conspired to smuggle guns and tools from the Virgina 
Company’s stores and held ‘night marts’ to sell the appropriated goods.”371 In Ireland, 
“English soldiers and settlers … deserted the plantations to join the Irish,” hoping “to 
live idle among the savages.”372 With the rise of the transatlantic trade, there emerged 
around the globe an “amorphous laboring class,”373 like “a many-headed hydra.” To 
quote Linebaugh and Rediker’s description of this class: 
 
This class was anonymous, nameless. … It was landless, expropriated. It lost 
the integument of the commons to cover and protect its needs. It was poor, 
lacking property, money, or material riches of any kind. … Its origins were 
often traumatic: enclosure, capture, and imprisonment left lasting marks. It 
was female and male, of all ages. … It included everyone from youth to old 
folks, from ship’s boys to old salts, from apprentices to savvy old masters, 
from young prostitutes to old ‘witches.’ It was multitudinous, numerous, and 
growing. … It was cooperative and laboring. The collective power of the 
many rather than the skilled labor of the one produced its most forceful 
energy. … It was motley, both dressed in rags and multiethnic in appearance. 
Like Caliban, it originated in Europe, Africa, and America. It included clowns, 
or cloons (i.e., country people). … It was vulgar. It spoke its own speech, with 
a distinctive pronunciation, lexicon, and grammar made up of slang, cant, 
jargon, and pidgin - talk from work, the street, the prison, the gang, and the 
dock. It was planetary, in its origins, its motions, and its consciousness. 
Finally, the proletarian was self-active, creative; it was - and is - alive; it is 
onamove.374 
 
We can see, there did exist a historical moment of utopian struggles for a 
egalitarian and common life based on common propriety and common labor in 17th 
century; it was a transitional stage full of contradictions and paradoxes when the 
Enclosures were just launched and capitalist production had not firmly established its 
rule all over the world. Is such common life still possible at the stage of late capitalism? 
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If world capitalism, or capitalism within one nation, is an uneven structure that 
articulates both capitalist and non-capitalist components, is it possible to seek for the 
new common within a mature capitalist society?     
If, like Walker says, the impossibility or uncertainty of folding the labor power 
from “outside” into the “inside” of capitalism indicates the potential shortage of labor 
power and leads to the ominous scenario of the termination of production circuit of 
capital, then, in China, the fact that production of labor power is “outsourced” or 
“externalized” to the countryside indicates greater obstacles for labor power’s re-
entering into the production. In fact, the ominous possibility that this labor force 
produced in the rural “outside” may refuse to “enter” the production circuit of capital 
is further supported by the “collective land ownership”, which, as part of the 
“collectivization movement,” has remained to this day. Although, after the dissolution 
of the agricultural cooperative in 1980s, the village community ceased to be a 
functional economic body and has been reduced to mere shell, mainly functioning to 
bind peasant’s permanent residence to the countryside, locking them in the state of 
“migrant”; however, the land is still collectively-owned, at least in law, it is subject to 
the governance of all the villagers as a collective (whether it would lead to democracy 
or corruption depends on the actual practice). Hence, there exists a possibility that the 
land could be used collectively and productively to generate enough surplus to enable 
laborers to live self-sufficiently and “delink” from the logic of capital. That is to say, it 
is possible to rebuild a collective economy to facilitate labor’s “exodus” from capital, 
which amount to an “undoing” of primitive accumulation, and a return to the 
“common.” 
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In the post-Fordist stage of contemporary China, there are two strains of cultural 
imaginaries and practices of the “commons” in contemporary China. The first strain of 
“common,” similar to Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of “the multitude” in the 
post-Fordist conditions, refers to an open and inclusive political body, formed through 
chance encounters of multiplicity of singular subjects which reside “within and 
against” the system. This “multitude” appears in Wang Anyi’s novel Anonymous (Ni 
Ming, Th) (2016). However, different from the “multitude” which are produced in 
the setting of metropolis and enabled by the network of language, knowledge, and 
information primarily powered by capital-intensive technology, Wang Anyi’s 
“multitude” are found in the deep mountains, in the remote and underdeveloped small 
towns that are “de-linked” from the capitalist city and market economy. Wang’s novel 
probes into the invisible and marginal “worlds” of the anonymous “multitude,” the 
“useless” people “discarded” or neglected by the mainstream world, and shows us how 
the various singular subjects, located at different nodes of the network, come into the 
chance encounter with each other and generate amazing social power that change the 
course of events.  
The second strain of “common,” based on the existing collective land ownership 
and the past socialist legacy of agricultural cooperatives, tries to imagine an egalitarian 
and self-sufficient community through cooperative labor. The reality basis for such 
attempts is the ongoing experiments of “New Co-operative Movement” in the 
countryside, promoted by the state and participated by intellectuals, college students 
and peasants. Such literary imagination for “socialist common” consciously inherits 
and develops upon the socialist canons on collectivization such as Liu Qing’s The 
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Builders. Rather than falling “outside” the capital, small peasants seek to combine and 
organize together, to use the means of production collectively and productively, so as 
to compete with urban capital and partake the surplus value. For this I will use Liu 
Jiming’s novel Human World (Ren Jing, !) (2016) for illustration and the practice 
of Zhou Village Commune as example.  
 
Anonymous Multitude and the World of Common in Wang Anyi’s Novel 
Wang Anyi is known for her series of Shanghai-themed novels, the most famous 
of which is The Song of Everlasting Sorrow (Changhenge, Ʀ½ö). Her nostalgia for 
pre-1949 old Shanghai has often been labelled as one of the many praises of 
Shanghai’s glamorous bourgeois modernity. However, many scholars have noted that 
Wang Anyi is far from an embracer of the dazzling metropolis of post-revolutionary 
Shanghai in the age of global capitalism; rather, Wang tends to question the grand 
narrative of “modernization” (be that of “socialist revolutionary modernity” or 
“bourgeois modernity”) and challenge it with the concrete materiality of mundane 
everyday life;375  her nostalgia in fact aims to unearth the “substrata of unofficial 
histories, intimate life-worlds, and memories of long-duration beneath a mechanical, 
homogeneous history.”376 In recent years, Wang has turned her gaze to the everyday 
life of the underclass people that have been excluded or marginalized by the 
“mainstream” of “modernization,” such as small producers, vendors, nurse-maids, 
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peasant workers, cobblers, the scrap-collectors, the boatman on Suzhou River, the new 
immigrants from the countryside of Shanghai. In her novella Fu Ping (š), written 
in 2000, she writes about a girl named Fu Ping from the countryside who works as 
maid in Shanghai. In her name, “Ping” means floating duckweed, while “Fu” means 
“richness,” hence the name indicates the inner richness of the individual being (a 
mature subjectivity), even if she is merely a domestic servant. Sensing the alienation 
while working in the city, this girl finally chose to marry a crippled man in shanty 
town called Meijia Bridge in the outskirt of Shanghai, as she was touched by the love, 
dignity, and meaningful human connection among the people in the neighborshood. In 
2001, Wang’s novel Grow Trapa Natans Here and Lotus Root There (ıŃŠ	ı
ŧ) depicts the experience of a little girl in the small town called Huashe near the big 
city of Hangzhou. Critic Wang Xiaoming points out, the community of Meijia Bridge 
and the Huashe Town form a constellation which indicates the dignity and industrious 
life of ordinary people, and which contests the levelling force of globalization, 
urbanization, and modernization.377 In these novels written at the beginning of 21st 
century, we could already see Wang’s imagination for a “singular individual,” 
“multitude,” and “common life” among the underclass people.  
This time, in the novel Anonymous, Wang Anyi further moves this space of 
“common life” into the remote mountains far away from the modern city. This novel 
has a beginning that corresponds to the ending of Fang Fang’s story of Tu Ziqiang, the 
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becoming “anonymous” of the protagonist. In Fang Fang’s story, the sick and 
propertyless young man Tu Ziqiang walks into the mountains and disappears from 
people’s sight, with no one knowing where he has gone, and no one ever seeing him 
again. Wang Anyi’s novel begins with the protagonist, “he,” a Shanghai citizen, who 
was kidnapped and “disappeared” from the city, from people’s sight. While in Fang 
Fang’s story Tu Ziqiang’s disappearing into the mountains indicates his death, in 
Wang Anyi’s story, the protagonist’s “death” in the city is his “rebirth” in the 
mountains as a “new human” (hence his name “Old New”), his “becoming 
anonymous” in one world is his “becoming visible” in another world. As such, 
Wang’s two-volume novel presents us two worlds. The first world, represented by the 
international metropolis of Shanghai where “he” used to work and live, is a world of 
“names” based on labour value and property rights. The second world, hidden in the 
forests, mountains, the remote villages, and small towns, is the world of the 
“anonymous multitude.” 
What constitutes the “multitude” in Wang Anyi’s novel are the abandoned, the 
handicapped, the retarded, the gangsters, the sick, the old, who could not produce 
economic value and hence are “useless” to the capitalist economy. If in modern 
society one’s “name” is linked with one’s “property rights” (including the rights of 
labor power), then these people, having no property, are “anonymous” and “outside” 
the modern order of society which is organized around “property” and the capitalist 
normality. To this extent, this “motley crowd” fits with the original meaning of 
“multitude” in 17th century England, which refers to “the lowest rank of society and 
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the propertyless.” 378  The protagonist, especially, is a typical figure of “the 
anonymous.” In the novel his real proper name remains unknown. In the first world of 
metropolis, “he” is mistaken as “Wu Baobao,” the boss of the company which “he” 
worked for; after “he” is “reborn” in the world of the anonymous, he is given the 
nickname “Old New” (lao xin, ŕÏ).   
However, Wang Anyi shows, it is in the modern world of Shanghai, the world of 
“names” (based on one’s property rights) that the “real being” of a person gets 
concealed. “He” is kidnapped by the gangs of a debt-collecting company because he is 
mistaken for as “Wu Baobao,” the real owner of the trading company he works for. 
And he is recognized as “Wu Baobao” because he leaves his information when he 
works for the company, using Wu Baobao’s name in receiving and sending packages, 
signing documents, sending out emails, making phone calls, filling forms; therefore, 
the information he has left - the address, phone, email – has become his identity 
(“name”), and fixed him in the order of society as the representative/boss of the 
company. As such, he is recognized by “name” rather than by person. He is just a 
“name” in the system; what defines him is a combination of floating markers of 
numbers and accounts organized around property and his assigned position in the 
order - his job, his phone number, his name card, his social welfare account, his 
residence address. Hence, when his wife tries to trace “him” through such identity 
markers that used to fix him in the system, she finds only “void,” because all of these 
have now been seperated from his corporeal body after he is missing. Figuring out 
what he had done in the company for the past few months does not help a bit in 
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finding him. “Zimbabwe, the bamboo of Siming mountain, the debt-collecting 
company, is there really a ‘him’ amid this opened space? How shall she seek him out, 
from the void he disappears into? …. The void into which he disappears now gets a 
name, but the name cannot turn the void into substantiality; to the contrary, name is 
eaten out and turns into void. The power of void is bigger than substantiality.”379  
Wang shows, such dissociation of “name” and “being” is prevalent in the 
modern world, rendering everyone “anonymous” and “hidden” under the “names” and 
fake identities. When the wife searches for Ms. Xiao, the vice general manager of the 
company, she finds that the phone number listed on Xiao’s name card is an empty 
number; and the address of her registered residence is also an empty address, a rented 
apartment where she does not live. The small trading company “he” works for turns 
out to be only a “shell” which, along with many other branch companies owned by 
Wu Baobao, functions as a sham to cover Wu’s huge deficit and to trick more loans 
from the bank. The owner of the company, Wu Baobao, is a mysterious figure that 
rarely shows himself, giving instructions only through the vice general manager of the 
company, Ms. Xiao. When “he” got kidnapped, Wu and Xiao both disappeared, and 
the company soon terminated the lease and moved out. The “friend” (who is a friend 
of his friend) who had introduced “him” to this job also lost contact and turned his 
phone off. The novel tell us, the boss’s runaway and the close-down of the company is 
cause by the failure of speculative investment due to the financial crisis in 2008. 
Clearly, Wang Anyi has touched upon the highly precarious and flexible 
conditions of post-Fordist capitalism characterized by the rapid circulation of migrants 
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and money. In such a world, every individual being is instrumentally integrated into 
the order of money, becoming “anonymous,” lost in the numerous titles, hence losing 
his distinctiveness as a a human being. People get to know each only by their “titles” 
and “names” (name cards, telephone contact, address), instead of by the concrete 
contact with the real persons. The author tells us, “the missing population in this city 
(of Shanghai) is so huge. On average, every minute there is someone disappearing.”380 
And “every minute, how many companies are cancelling their registration and 
disappearing, just like the disappearing population every minute.” 381  The “fake” 
company that “he” works for rented an office in a residential building, in which the 
short-lived small companies kept move in and out all the time. The management staff 
of the building watch the inhabitants coming and going before their eyes everyday, 
receiving and sending packages for them without the slightest idea about who they are 
and what they are doing.382 Ms. Xiao’s residential address on her name card, too, is a 
rented apartment, located in a subaltern shanty-town packed with self-built houses, 
where migrant tenants “come today and go tomorrow, highly mobile, with nobody 
knowing anybody.” “Many of the houses are subleased to the tenants through double 
and triple rounds, without knowing who is the real owner.”383  
However, Wang seems to suggest, the fundamental reason for the person’s 
missing, derives not just from the post-Fordist economy in specific, but lies in the 
“stranger society” (“Gesellschaft”) in general, in which the relation between individual 
human beings is organized and formed around market relations. Such relation 
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grounded in “names” and “titles,” Wang seems to suggest, is highly unstable and 
unreliable, just like the flickering economic conditions. In other words, people’s 
anonymous state of being derive from their identity of “disposable worker,” which can 
be easily replaced by others. In the first world, all these “identity markers” in the order 
are “empty” and do not point to the real person, and the social relation founded on 
these “names” is also “empty” relation without substantial meaning. The real 
meaningful social relation, rather, comes from the “informal” relation that is concealed 
beneath the “titles” on the name card, not registered by the official institutional 
naming system, and not defined in terms of titles and property. For example, when the 
wife searches for Ms. Xiao according to the contact on her name card – the officially 
and institutionally registered personal information, the “name” that “fixes” Ms. Xiao 
in the system – what she found is only “void” - empty phone, empty address. It is only 
through the face-to-face personal association with the subaltern immigrants living in 
the shanty town that she gets to connect with Xiao as a real person. And these social 
connections are often generated by random encounters. Through the help of Coach Liu, 
a stranger who she accidentally bumped into when he was helping the “fake” company 
move out, the wife managed to get the contact of Xiao from the rental agency; through 
a chance chat with the Henan shop-owner living in the shanty town, she got to know 
Old Ge, who governed the all the rented houses in this area; finally, it was Old Ge who 
brought Ms. Xiao to her. Hence, these strangers of different backgrounds constitute 
the “multitude”; they are connected to each other not through their occupations, not 
through their assigned position in the capitalist system determined by their utilitarian 
function, but through the non-utilitarian associations as “friends,” formed in their face-
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to-face encounters. In this sense, they are indeed “an open, inclusive social body, 
characterized by its boundlessness and its originary state of mixture among social 
ranks and groups.” 384  The relation between these singularities, through chance 
encounters and not registered by the institution of “property,” is the real social relation.  
In the second world, Wang pictures several worlds that are “hidden” “in the 
cracks between civilizations,” “at the back” of the normal world, worlds that are “de-
linked” from the world dominated by the logic of market and the state. Already in her 
novel Outlaws Everywhere (Ɨzèƫ) in 2005, Wang Anyi has touched upon the 
nonymous and hidden world of outlaws and gangsters, telling the story of how a 
young taxi driver who was kidnapped by three gangsters ended up liking their way of 
life and running with them, which, albeit vagrant, is full of friendship and mutual-aid. 
In Anonymous, Wang Anyi further characterizes numerous “anonymous worlds” 
inhabited by “nameless outlaws,” delinked from the mainstream world. Among them 
is the deserted village hidden in deep forest, called “Forest Cave,” where “he” (Old 
New) was dumped by the kidnappers to starve to death after they found out he was the 
wrong hostage. Located in the intersection of three provinces with primitive 
conditions of production, this village used to thrive with illegal bazaars outside the 
governance of the government. After the market economy drove the inhabitants out for 
employment, this deserted village “disappeared from map and administrative 
division.”385 Another “hidden” world is the under-developed tiny town called “Nine 
Feet,” which accommodated only the weak and the old, as well as outsiders and 
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immigrants from various places, while deserted by the capable poeple going out for 
employment. The vitality of this little town exudes from its “half-deserted, half-
utilized” status; it thrived through informal economy, including illegal trades and 
pirated goods: the hair salon are doing the business of the brothel; at the back of the 
clothing store are the chemically-processed garments recycled from who-knows-where; 
the dentists in the private clinics act like butchers stained with blood all over the robe, 
pulling the bad teeth from the patient’s mouth. “Car stores are filled with stolen cars, 
what fill in the Nike sneakers are coarse paper and plastic, the famous star appearing 
on the banner are fake, and god knows whether he/she will appear or not! Drainage oil, 
meat from dead pigs, and big white buns steamed with brimstone, that is what 
constitutes the storefront of the old street. Its prosperity grows out from the decadence, 
thrives on the deviation, providing a more self-sufficient livelihood than those 
institutionally endorsed by the government.”386  
The inhabitants of this “anonymous” world are gangsters, the dumb, the retarded, 
villagers, widow, the old, the paralyzed, the abandoned child born with a congenital 
heart disease, the handicapped. These are subjects that are “singular,” “abnormal,” 
unproductive, excluded from the mainstream of the society, and hence have no 
identity based on property rights. They “do not have names, and only call each other 
by nicknames,” because, born in the wild or abandoned by their family, they come 
from “nowhere,” and “are not properly born and raised by father or mother.”387 The 
two places that accommodate Old New, are a temporary rest home in the small town 
of “Nine Feet,” and a welfare house in the small county, which accommodate all the 
                                                
386 Ibid., 227. 
387 Ibid., 229. 
  202 
“useless” people that are unable to produce any economic value and abandoned by the 
society. The welfare house are full of people who are inflicted with all kinds of rare 
diseases and physical defects, such as palatoschisis, brain paralysis, retarded, senium 
praecox, while the rest home accommodates a widow, a vagrant old man found on the 
street, a paralyzed person in bed, a sick child found abandoned with congenital heart 
disease, and Old New who has lost all “memory of his name, age, birthplace, 
occupation, and family.”388 Since the temporary rest home lies outside the state’s 
welfare system, this motley group with no laboring capability scrape by by leasing out 
a small plot of land to immigrants, raising some poultry, and at times receiving some 
donations and aid from the neighborhood. The clothes they wear are donated by the 
clothes factory; they get some free food from time to time from vendors while walking 
on the street; the mill grounds their grains for free, and at times give them some 
vegetables; at times the neighbor would give them some hawthorn, which they would 
make into sugared hawthorn and exchange for some money on the street. In a word, 
the livelihood of this small group “lies outside the economic body of the small town 
and in the heart and morality of the neighborhood.”389  
The connection between these singular subjects in the second world, is not 
predetermined and arranged according to the logic of capital and institution of the state; 
rather, it is formed through the seemingly irrelevant and non-utilitarian encounters, 
and sustained by the desire to help each other. The dumb was found starving and 
abandoned on the street by the gang master Pock Monk; the child with heart disease 
was picked up by the hospital after he was abandoned by his parents and was then sent 
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to the rest home; Old New, who had passed out on the field after escaping from a 
forest fire, was taken in by a village family, and through the brother of the retarded Er 
Dian whom he accidentally bumped into in the forest, was transferred to the town 
Nine Feet. Interesting, it was in the process of helping the sick child to receive heart 
surgery in Shanghai that Old New, long lost in the mountains and forests, came into 
contact again with his family in Shanghai and returned to the modern world. The 
cooperative effort of “sending the sick child for heart surgery” hence has connected 
together a multiplicity of subjects of different walks: the retarded Er Dian, gangster 
Pock Monk, his assistant Dumb, the police chief of a tiny police station in Nine Feet, 
gangster Dun Mu, the Albino boy in the welfare house, a volunteer in Shanghai, and 
the young policeman in the county’s police station. If Hardt and Negri’s network of 
“common” is based on the capitalist mode of production and facilitated by capital, 
then Wang Anyi’s “multitude” and “common” is found in the remote countryside and 
small towns that are “de-linked” from the modern society; they are “the hidden small 
worlds that cannot be integrated into the common sense.”390 It is precisely in these 
remote, backward, and under-developed areas “in the cracks between civilizations” 
and “delinked” from the modern society that a real social relation between singular 
human beings become possible. This anonymous world is exactly the wrold of 
“common” imagined by Wang Anyi. 
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Reconstructing a Human World: Imagining New Cooperative in the 21st Century  
If Wang Anyi places her imagination for “the common” on the anonymous 
“multitudes” of ordinary people in the “hidden” worlds “delinked” from the 
mainstream modern society, then Liu Jiming’s novel Human World (Ren Jing, !) 
(2016) tries to reactivate the socialist legacy of collectivization, and to develop a 
common way of life on the basis of the new agrarian co-operative in the countryside.  
The novel must be understood against the background of the “New Co-
operative” Movement promoted by Chinese government and the state’s huge financial 
investment in the countryside for “Construction of New Countryside” (Ï@ã­Ų) 
in recent years. With the continuing outflow of rural population into the city, the decay 
of rural economy, and the fundamental collapse of ethical and cultural order in the 
countryside, the central government has paid increasing attention to the “three rural 
issues” (i.e. issues of peasants, rural areas, as well as literature). The state cancelled 
agricultural taxes in January 2006, forbidding local township and county government 
to extract any more fees and taxes from peasantry; instead, the financial budget of 
local township government would be provided by the state. The state also started to 
provide subsidies for peasants who grew food on the land, as a way to encourage 
agricultural production. Besides, the state has been investing billions of dollars to 
improve the basic infrastructure in the rural areas, building roads and installing 
electricity, running water, and telecommunication networks in each natural village. 
From 2003 to 2007, the financial investment of Central Government on “three rural 
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issues” have totaled 1.56 trillion yuan, increasing at the rate of 17% per year.391 The 
state has also made various efforts to foster the cooperative economy in rural areas. In 
2006, the “Law of the People's Republic of China on Farmers’ Professional 
Cooperatives” was passed, encouraging individual peasants to ally together into 
economic organization. 
On one hand, as Walker suggests, we can understand these measures as the 
state’s attempt to fulfill its function as a “biopower” to “care for” the well-being of 
population and sustain their life so as to secure for capital a stable supply of labor 
power. To some extent, this can be understood as what Kalyan Sanyal calls as 
“developmental governance.” According to Sanyal, “developmental governance” 
prioritizes “need, entitlement, and capability” of population over economic 
development.392 For Sanyal, the example of “developmental governance” is India’ 
anti-poverty programs in the 1970s, which “aimed at improving the condition of small 
and marginal farmers on the one hand, and creating employment opportunities for the 
landless agricultural laborers and artisans, on the other.” The measures included 
providing for peasants “sources of irrigation, implements for farming in the small and 
marginal farms, animals for dairy and animal husbandry as non-farm activities and 
tools and training for artisans in cottage industries and handicrafts,” as well as 
lauching nutritious programs for vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, nursing 
mothers and children. 393  Sanyal point sout, to some extent, such measures of 
developmental governance amounts to a reversal of the logic of capitalist primitive 
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accumulation, as it redistributes a part of the surplus generated in the capitalist sector 
to the poor.  
On the other hand, the state’s financial investment in rural areas can also be seen 
as a means to solve the problem of “over-accumulation.” According to David Harvey, 
each capitalist state would ultimately face the crisis of overaccumulation, “a condition 
where surpluses of capital (perhaps accompanied by surpluses of labor) lie idle with 
no profitable outlets in sight.”394 When over-accumulation occurs, capital needs to find 
an outlet elsewhere for productive and profitable investment in order to avoid 
devaluation, otherwise the “overaccumulated capital stands to be devalued directly 
through the onset of deflationary recession or depression.”395 According to Harveym, 
the over-accumulated surplus capital can be absorbed internally either through 
geographical adjustment or social expenditures (such as education, medication) which 
requires long-term investment,396 and “the internal role of class relations and of class 
struggle, and the particular pattern of class alliances that is constructed within the 
state” play a crucial role in determining which method is to be used to solve 
overaccumulation.397 While in some capitalist states, the reactionary bourgeoisie are 
reluctant to give up its privileges and tend to resort to imperialist expansion to solve 
overaccumulation, some other states, where progressive class forces are stronger, may 
prefer to use the surplus capital to “improve social and physical infrastructures for 
production and consumption at home.”398 For Harvey, China has now reached the 
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stage of overaccumulation, and its huge expenditure on building basic infrastructures 
such as roads, bridges, and airports served exactly to “absorb their vast labor surpluses 
(and to curb the threat of social unrest).”399  
Under the stress of the overaccumulation of capital, China’s rural area, as the 
“non-capitalist” sector where private capital has thus far been unable to penetrate, now 
has become the target of various kinds of surplus capital (private capital, transnational 
capital, and state capital), which seek to invest in the rural area and make profit. If, as 
Harvey says, “the internal role of class relations and of class struggle, and the 
particular pattern of class alliances that is constructed within the state” determines the 
method for solving the overaccumulation,400 then, as a state that has the socialist 
tradition, the Chinese state is playing a complex role in arbitrating between different 
class forces. On one hand, there are increasing demands on the part of bourgeois 
capitalists to abolish the collective land ownership and turn land into private property, 
allowing land to be bought and sold on the market, so that capitalists can buy land 
from peasants for investment in land and agriculture. On the other hand, some leftist 
intellectuals who are concerned about the conditions of peasants have been arguing 
against this option, pointing out that a huge rural proletariat without land would be a 
source of instability for the Chinese society.401  
Wen Tiejun proposes that the central government should invest the surplus 
capital in the construction of social and physical infrastructure of the countryside, to 
improve the overall welfare of of the rural population in the fields of medical care, 
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education, and pension system, as a way to absorb the overaccumulated capital.402 He 
points out, China’s remaining collective ownership (as remainder of the socialist 
collectivization) constitutes the peculiar form of “small holders community economy,” 
a closed community within which the property (land and natural resources) can be 
retained and shared by all members, instead of flowing out and being traded on the 
market as commodity.403  This, according to Wen, could be utilized as a favorite 
condition to develop cooperative economy in the rural areas. Wen suggests the urban 
private capital should be precluded from entering the rural community; rather, all 
productive funds should come from community members themselves and retained 
within the community. If the peasants do not have enough money, the state should 
provide the start-up funds (capital investment) for the community economy, and retain 
the returns of investment inside the cooperative economy, to be used as the next round 
of investment. 404  Also, Wen proposes the state to open lucrative occupations to 
peasants cooperatives instead of monopolizing them with the state or private enterprise, 
such as the supply of raw materials, storage and transportation of agricultural products, 
processing industry, agricultural finance, insurance, etc..405 Wen’s proposal of “small 
holders’ community economy” amounts to the construction of a semi-autonomous 
economic organization “delinked” from the urban capital, an economic body that is 
not only self-sufficient but also capable of producing surplus.   
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Some other scholars, such as Pun Ngai, looks back to the socialist legacy of 
collective land ownership for useful resources, in the hope of rebuilding a functional 
collective economy to keep labor force on the land. Pun’s study of Zhoujiazhuang 
Commune, which has retained the basic form of agrarian co-operative even after the 
mass abolishment of People’s Communes after Cultural Revolution, shows that 
socialist cooperative is still capable of producing surplus value and providing for the 
welfare of its members. As of 2009, the Zhoujiazhuang Commune had 21046 mou 
(about 3507 acres) of land, 4495 households, 13029 residents. As a comprehensive 
economic unit that integrates both agricultural department and industrial department, 
its production activities include traditional crop planting such as wheat, corn, grains, 
and beans, while running a commercial orchard, a valve factory and a printing plant. 
As such, the commune has managed to keep nearly all its population on the land, with 
very few laborers drifting into the city. Despite the disparity of revenues generated by 
different departments, the commune has stuck to a relatively egalitarian way of re-
distribution of income between different departments. The surplus value has been 
basically retained within the community and divided among all members, rather than 
flow into the urban sector. After taking out 7% to be used for “public accumulative 
fund” and 3% for “public welfare fund,” about up to 86% of surplus would be 
distributed among cooperative members. Hence, cooperative members live a relatively 
well-off life. The aged members earn as much as 25000-28000 yuan per year, while 
young people working in collective enterprise earn 30000 to 35000 yuan per year. 
With its independent collective funds, the commune set up its own welfare system. It 
provides free education from elementary schools to junior middle school. The 
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commune provides subsistence for aged people over 65 years old, and send staff to 
look after them, covering their fees of medication, and giving them monthly allowance. 
For those who suffer great illness and need medical treatment in the city, the commune 
will provide subsidies depending on their economic conditions. Besides, the commune 
undertook its own infrastructure construction, installoing running water for the entire 
area, and building residence house in a unified manner.406 At any rate, Pun’s study of 
Zhoujiazhuang Commune has demonstrated the vibrancy of a socialist co-operative in 
the contemporary age, a collective and productive way of produciotn that benefits the 
rural community, with all its members entitled to the collective surplus, instead of 
decentralizing into migrants drifting into the city. 
Human World must be placed within this context of the efforts of left-leaning 
intellectual to revive the socialist tradition of collectivization. In fact, the writer Liu 
Jiming (IŋÓ) is one of the New Left intellectuals who hold a critical attitude 
towards the marketization and developmentalism after 1990s, and one of the main 
advocators of “Underclass Literature” around its emergence in 2004. Having majored 
in Chinese literature and graduated from the Department of Chinese Language and 
Literature at Wuhan University, Liu is familiar with the socialist literary canons and is 
well-informed about the intellectual trends in contemporary China, including the 
debate between liberalists and New Leftists in 1990s. Reading widely in political 
economics, history, and sociology, he is well-informed about the socio-economic 
issues of Chinese society. Compared to other writers, Liu has not produced many 
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fictional works; before Human World, he mainly publishes social criticisms and 
reportage literature that concerns about contemporary Chinese society. Hence, Liu is a 
scholar, a critic, and a writer. Like most New Left intellectuals, Liu is critical of the 
dramatic political and economic changes taken place in China throughout the 1990s, 
including the waves of marketization and privatization in 1990s, mass lay-off of state-
owned factory workers, commercialization and marginalization of literature, the 
prevalent corruption of government officials who allied with capital, and the 
pauperization of peasants and migrant workers. Especially, with his peasant 
background, Liu has paid consistent attention to the “three rural issues,” writing 
intermittently about the change in his hometown village.  
In literature, Liu is a firm supporter and main proponent of the trend of 
“underclass literature.” He participated in the discussion of “underclass literature” on 
the magazine of Frontier in 2005, right around the time when “underclass literature” 
began to appear. In his article “How Do We Narrate Underclass,” he appreciates the 
“underclass literature” not only for its exposing of the social contradictions and its 
straightforward representation of the cruel reality, but also for its willingness to speak 
for the interest of underclass.407 Liu criticizes, due to the stigmatization of socialism 
and realist literature after 1990s, writers have refrained from describing the reality in a 
realist manner and have become increasingly obsessed with the experiment of pure 
aesthetic forms or immersed in trivial personal feelings. Literature since 1990s has 
turned “inward” to the description of trivial personal desires and has lost the ability to 
capture or conceptualize the major changes in Chinese society, which has resulted in 
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the marginalization of literature. He calls people to look back on the realist tradition of 
socialit literature for supporting resources to reconstruct a “New Left Literature.”408  
Human World can thus be seen as an attempt to actualize Liu’s ideal for a “New 
Left Literature.” The novel was published in 2016, but the writing of this novel started 
as early as 1995, and Liu’s thoughts for this novel have been fundamentally shaped by 
the series changes taken place in Chinese society during the past two decades.409 In 
terms of content and aesthetic style, this consciously models itself after the socialist 
realist novels, including Liu Qing’s The Builders. It tells a story of how the intellectual 
Ma La, after suffering setbacks in the city, returns to the countryside and rebulids a 
community life together with other peasants by founding and running professional 
agricultural cooperative.  
To some extent, this novel is basically a literary illustration of the theoretical 
framework of New Leftist intellectuals about how to reconstruct the countryside 
through the founding of “New Co-operative,” a romanticized projection of New 
Leftist intellectuals’ utopian ideals about the “new common life”. Characters in the 
novel represent different class identities, and their contradictions and interactions are 
codified in such a way as to serve as metaphors of the struggles of different social 
forces in contemporary Chinese society. Ma La stands for the generation of 
intellectuals who swing between the socialist tradition of 1950s-1970s and the post-
1980s developmentalism, and who, now disillusioned with the cruelty of capitalism, 
start seeking for a “third road” in cooperation. The two different roads of “socialism” 
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and “capitalism” are symbolized by Ma La’s two spiritual leaders in his childhood and 
youthhood. One is his brother Ma Ke, who stands for the pure and passionate socialist 
ideals of collectivism, a bygone socialist tradition which has been buried together with 
Cultural Revolution; and the other spiritual leader is Lu Yongjia, his instructor in 
college and a liberal intellectual who threw himself into business and gained huge 
success, but finally ended up broke and died of AIDS due to his collusion with 
corrupted officials and his indulgence in the hedonist life-style. On the other hand, 
former commune leader Ding Changshui stands for the living tradition of socialist 
collectivization and which is a support force of “New Cooperative Movement,” while 
his son Ding Youpeng, the current mayor of the Yanhe County, stands for regional 
bureaucrats who prioritize economic growth and cater to capital investment in 
disregard of social costs. Gu Chaoyang, son of a retired high-ranked party cadre, 
works for the transnational biological corporation, represents the most vicious 
collaboration of the priviledge bureaucratic class and transnational capital. As such, 
the novel set up a series of binaries: socialist assets vs. transnational capital, corrupted 
bureacrats vs. old revolutionaries, liberal intellectuals vs. left-leaning intellectuals.  
Through such binaries, Liu presents us two “worlds” in the novel, the “human’s 
world” and the “capital’s world.” The “human’s world,” in contrast to “capital’s 
world,” has several meanings. In terms of agriculture, it is to develop eco-agriculture 
free of toxic pesticides and chemical fertilizers, instead of developing capitalist-
intensive modern agriculture and growing the genetically modified crops developed by 
transnational agribusiness. In terms of culture, it is to form an egalitarian and 
cooperative community among small peasants to help each other through difficulty, 
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instead of being crushed under the force of market as vulnerable individuals. In terms 
of academic research, it is to stress the value of “human” and to concern for the social, 
cultural, political values instead of focusing solely on the economic value and serving 
the utilitarian purpose of economic growth.  
The novel is suffused with nostalgic sentiments of for the collective economy in 
socialist period. The two volumes of the novel respectively focuses on two 
protagonists, the intellectual-turned-peasant Ma La and sociologist Murong Qiu, who 
are both connected to Ma Ke, Ma La’s brother and Murong’s lover, who lost his life 
while trying to salvage seeds of the commune from the fire of the storehouse in 1970s. 
The 1970s, the period of socialist collectivization and People’s Commune, stands for 
Ma La the innocent childhood filled with heroic dreams, and stands for Murong the 
passionate youthhood of romantic love and socialist idealism. When Ma La drives the 
tractor along the river, he feels like “he is lingering between the past and the present,” 
“as if his body was turning small bit by bit, turning into a boy of two or three years 
old.”410 And Murong, who buried her ideals and passion deep inside her heart after Ma 
Ke died, when visiting the vllage again, saw the image of the girl “wearing a green 
student uniform, with two braids, running and jumping on the grass on the 
riverside.”411 Their nostalgia for the youth and childhood in the 1970s, along with its 
passion and idealism, is in essence the nostalgia for a bygone socialist tradition. 
Such nostalgia is not only seen on the two protagonists who are related to the 
martyr Ma Ke, but is also seen in the old cadres who used to work for the People’s 
Commune in the socialist period, who retained a vivid memory of the socialist 
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collectivization, and is the embodiment of the socialist legacy of collectivization that 
survived to this day and could be reactivated as supporting resources to transform the 
capitalist reality. The former leader of People’s Commune Ding Changshui feels “hot 
blooded” whenever he recalls the period when “the countryside was full of young 
people,” and “girls and boys were singing while having a labor contest,” and “the field 
was filled with the bustling noises of people and the neighing of horses.”412 On the 
other hand, in the memory of the former co-operative chief Guo Dawan, the 
construction site was filled with large crowds of laboring people, “flags were flying,” 
and “singing and speech on loud speakers” were all over the construction site; tractors 
were competing each other in contest. Thinking of the lively scene of collective labor, 
the seventy-year old Guo Dawan feels his aged heart starts to beat strongly as if he 
were young again.413  
In contrast to the lively scene of collective labor of People’s Commune during 
Cultural Revolution, the countryside now is characterized by a desolate and dreary 
view: the rugged and muddy road resulted from the lack of maintenance (due to the 
shortage of funds after the dissolution of collective economy), the dried-up aqueducts, 
the deserted fields overgrown with weeds abandoned by peasants who migrated into 
the city as wage-laborer, the stinking river; there were only a few skinny trees, and not 
a bird in the sky. No youth in the village, only old people and children.414 Now, 
standing at the beginning of the 21 century, thirty years after the Cultural Revolution 
ended and the People’s Commune disintegrated, their personal nostalgia points to the 
                                                
412 Ibid., 77. 
413 Ibid., 182. 
414 Ibid., 29.  
  216 
intention and effort of recovering and reactivating the legacy of socialist 
collectivization. To be more specific, they hope to rebuild a community and found a 
new cooperative.  
When depicting the activities and characters of the cooperative, Liu Jiming 
clearly and deliberately echoes Liu Qing’s canonical novel on collectivization The 
Builders in many respects, showing the clear attempt of re-activating living tradition 
of socialist collectivization of the 1950s and 1960s. For example, like Liang 
Shengbao’s socialist co-operative, the founding members of Ma La’s co-operative 
were impoverished peasants who could not even pool enough money to form the 
starting funds for the co-operative, and just like Sheng-pao who advanced his money 
to buy seeds for the poor members of the mutual-aid team, Ma La donated 10000 yuan 
into the co-operative to be used as founding funds. And just like Sheng-pao’s 
travelling to the neighboring county to buy the high-quality rice seeds, Ma La and his 
loyal follower Gu Yu travelled to another province to buy the experimental seeds from 
an institute of agricultural science. And just as the poor peasant Gao Zengfu is a loyal 
follower of Liang Shengbao, the handicapped Gu Yu also becomes the most loyal 
student of Ma La and acts as a deputy of the cooperative, running from household to 
household to organize peasants.  
The most essential character the new cooperative inherits from the socialist 
commune is the ethics of egalitarianism and mutual aid. Not unlike Liang Shengbao’s 
socialist cooperative, this cooperative in its founding stage consisted of the “weakest” 
members in the village: a former criminal Ma La (who had been put to prison for his 
involuntary involvement in an economic crime), the handicapped Gu Yu (who had 
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three fingers cut off in an accident while working as a migrant worker in the city), a 
middle-aged widow Aunt Hu (whose husband died from a fall from high rise while 
working as a construction worker in the city), and a fifty-year-old man Cao Guangjin 
(who is left with his wife to plow the land alone while his son works in the city). In 
other words, they are like a motley bunch of “multitude”, in the sense that they are a 
mixed body of underprivileged people.   
However, it is from this motley group that the lonely and lost intellectual Ma La 
regains the sense of “family” and “community”:  
 
He no longer considers himself as a cynical, self-pitied, melancholic, and 
solitary person who lacks a sense of belonging. He is like a person who had 
once left home and now is back in the crowd. This crowd is no longer the 
crowd [in the collectivization period]; but precisely because of this, he has the 
feeling of rebirth, especially when he discusses about the co-operative with 
Gu Yu couple, Uncle Dawan, Aunt Hu, Cao Guangjin. In the past, these 
people were polite and distanced from him, treating him as an ‘outsider’; now 
they have taken him as one of them, treating him as family, which he could 
tell from their unrestrained and amiable manner of talking to him. This is the 
feeling of home. He likes this feeling. It is warming, amiable, and intoxicating, 
and arouses certain sense of responsibility that has been buried deep in his 
heart. He feels, living is no longer the issue of individual himself, but has 
unknown relation to the people around him and the village he grew up with.415  
 
However, we must not think that such connection to the village is an “organic” 
and “unreflective” relation to the environment, like the undivided relation to the clan 
community in premodern societies. Rather, Ma La and his family, in essence, were 
immigrants and “outsiders” to the village. Losing his fisherman father in a flood, Ma 
La and his family fled from the flooded town and lived a vagrant life until they settled 
down in this village. As “outsiders,” they were taken in by the People’s Commune as 
its members and integrated into its productive activities, living in the warehouse that 
                                                
415 Ibid., 193. 
  218 
the cooperative emptied for them. In other words, Ma La’s (as well as his brother Ma 
Ke’s) relation to the village is not a pre-given, pre-determined relation determined by 
one’s blood, but is a truly social relation, a relation which welcomes and accepts 
“others,” formed through the co-operative and People’s Commune. After his mother 
died in an accident and his brother sacrificed himself in the fire, the orphan Ma La was 
taken care of by the chief of the co-operative, Uncle Dawan; and from middle school 
to college, Ma La’s living expenses and tuition were provided by the collective funds 
of the commune. Hence, in essence, Ma La’s emotional attachment to the village is not 
an “organic” and “unreflective,” but is mediated by the real social relation forged 
under People’s Commune and infused with the socialist ethics of mutual aid.  
It is worth noting that in the socialist literature of rural collectivization, the 
protagonist who led the peasants and founded the co-operative, tend to be immigrants 
that are not born in this village, such as Liang Sheng-pao in The Builders and Xiao 
Changchun in Sunny Days. In other words, it is a tradition of novels of socialist 
collectivization to tone down the one’s predetermined “organic” blood relation to 
one’s residential village, and to highlight the social relation based subjectivity and 
class consciousness. Liu’s novel also repeats this theme - the social relation formed 
between unrelated strangers transcends blood relation of family. Whereas in Mao’s 
period, such “social relation” indicates “class relation,” in this novel such social 
relation points to a more open and more diverse association between singular subjects. 
Just as Ma La’s relation to the village was not founded on blood, the “family” 
that Ma La set up after he came back and settled down in the village was also a 
“motley” bunch of singular individuals that had no blood relations to each other. As a 
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forty-year-old bachelor, Ma La lives with an orphan boy and a girl drug addict. These 
three persons, who have no blood relations, live like a family. The fifteen-year orphan, 
Little Limpy, after losing his father in an coal mine accident and abandoned by his 
mother at the age of seven, has been living an unstable life through leasing his land he 
leased to his rich uncle, and has owed large sum of debts due to his involvement in 
gambling. While his uncle, the rich farmer Zhao Guangfu, refused to give the nephew 
any help, Ma La took him in after he found this boy beaten almost to death by debt-
collectors, and looked after him for weeks. Meanwhile, knowing nothing about 
cooking, Ma La received assistance from the members of the cooperative: the couple 
of Gu Yu killed a hen and prepared chicken soup; Uncle Dawan sent in pork feet; 
Aunt Hu brought him a basket of red dates; even the most stingy person, Cao 
Guangjin, gave a small bag of sticky rice; the barefoot doctor in the village dropped by 
from time to time to check his body and give him injections. When Little Limpy got 
better, he stayed with Ma La, who was surprised to find that Little Limpy was a good 
cook. As such, they started living together. Another member of the “family,” the 
seventeen-year-old girl Tang Cao’er, was the daughter of Ma La’s deceased teacher 
Lu Yongjia. Lacking care from her mother and her stepfather, Tang got into various 
bad habits in the city, and was drugged and raped while she was performing for a 
disco hall, and ended up a drug-addict. After Ma La bailed her out from the prison, 
and treated her drug addition, Tang treated him as her father. As such, the three 
persons of heterogeneous backgrounds – a bachelor, an orphan, and a drug-addict – 
started to live together like a “family.” What we see here is the forming of a real social 
relation of the “common.”  
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The new co-operative not only symbolizes the restoration of the bygone socialist 
tradition of mutual-aid and egalitarianism, but also stands for a type of “eco-
agriculture” in which human beings live in harmony with nature. Ma La’s new co-
operative grows organic rice without using fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides. 
Instead of using pesticide, they use the new technology of insect repellent lanterns, 
and use little animals in the garden to eliminate the pests rather than pesticides. They 
grow their own vegetables in the yard, eating the strawberries and kiwi fruit picked 
directly from their gardens. They raise their own pigs and use its manure to fertilize 
the crops and produce gas to power the electricity for the house. This ecological 
agriculture relies on the updated scientific knowledge and information of the market, 
gained from newspapers and the internet, thanks to the state’s financial investment in 
infrastructures in rural areas. Clearly, the novel places itself in the background of the 
state’s projects of “New Co-operative Movement” and “Construction of New 
Countryside,” and stresses the importance of the state’s policy support.   
In contrast to this ecological mode of agriculture, Liu criticizes the highly 
commercialized and capital-intensive mode of agriculture that heavily relies on 
fertilizers, pesticides, and genetically-modified seeds, backed by the transnational 
corporation “Duke Company,” which metaphorically stands for the infamous 
Monsanto Company in reality. Having sold genetic-modified beans, cotton, and corns 
to Latin America, Southeast Asia, and India, this huge corporation has established its 
leading status on the global seed market, making huge profit out of the seeds, 
pesticides and fertilizers it sells to these countries. Now, turning to the not-yet-
capitalized rural area of China, the vacuum zone of capital, it tries to sell the seeds 
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which have been genetically modified to Chinese peasants at cheaper price. At the 
same time, it tries to purchase the devalued assets of state-owned enterprises when 
they were undergoing massive bankruptcy, and runs a chemical plant that produces 
fertilizers and pesticides and cause hazards to the neighborhood’s health, to the extent 
that it caused protests and riots outside the government.    
Hence in the novel we see the struggle between the agricultural cooperative and 
the transnational Company, between the eco-agriculture and the capitalist-intensive 
agriculture; the former stands for “human’s world”, while the latter stands for 
“capital’s world.” The business representative of Duke Company, Gu Chaoyang, is a 
descendant of a prestigious cadre, and despite his father being an old revolutionary 
loyal to Mao’s socialism, the son uses the political power and political resources of his 
father to manipulate the policy of local government to serve the interest of his 
transnational corporation. Colluding with him are other descendants of the cadres and 
the local government official who, for the sake of more revenues, try to attract capital 
investment and provides favorable conditions for big enterprises, to the extent that 
they even organize police to suppress the protesting crowd against the poisonous 
chemical emissions. On the other hand, the academic sphere is also driven by the 
anxiety to search for more funding to support academic activities, and even seek to 
cooperate with large corporation and government. What we see here is the penetration 
of money relations in every corner, as well as the collaboration of government, 
enterprise, and even academic circle. The novel has a tragic ending: the polluting 
chemical plant is going to relocate to the village where Ma La lives. Under the 
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pressure of capital and the local government, the entire village had to abandon the land 
and and relocated to another town, leading to the disintegration of the co-operative.    
At any rate, the story is more of New Left’s theoretical conceptualization of the 
Chinese society rather than a realist depiction of what is happening in Chinese society. 
Since it sticks to the “New Left” position that praises the socialism and criticizes 
bureaucrats and global capitalism, it somewhat simplifies the complex historical 
reality. For example, it romanticizes the period of Cultural Revolution by its nostalgic 
depiction of the lively scene of collective labor during this period, whereas in actual 
reality, by the time of 1970s, due to the decades-long extraction of surplus products 
and the resultant poverty of peasants, collectivization has already lost its vitality and 
shown the signs of decay, let alone the military conflicts and factional struggles taken 
place during Cultural Revolution. Although the rosy picture that Liu depicts for the 
socialist history undermines its intellectual power, nevertheless, it can be seen as an 
attempt of New Left intellectuals to construct an utopian narrative about the 
alternative path of China, a political statement of the “new common” in the form of 
literature.   
 
Conclusion 
While the non-capitalist sector of small holdership created an “outside,” onto 
which capital “externalizes” the cost of reproduction of labor, the structural separation 
of production of labor power and the usage of labor power by the rural-urban divide 
increases the danger of labor power’s “exodus” from the capitalist sector. While 
Marxists in the West seek the re-construction of the “common” from within capitalism, 
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in China, the not-fully-capitalized countryside, along with the remaning socialist 
legacy of collective land ownership, provides the theoretical possiblity for 
reconstructing a common life.  
 Not surprisingly, Wang Anyi’s Anonymous and Liu Jiming’s Human World, 
though presenting two different ways of imagining the “common,” both set their story 
in the countryside or remote mountains, far away from the city, demonstrating the idea 
of a “delinking world” from capitalism. While Wang Anyi imagines the “common 
connection” between singular individuals of drastically different backgounds formed 
through their non-utilitarian chance encounters, the New Left intellectual Liu Jiming 
consciously connects the ideal of “common” life with the socialist tradition of 
collectivization and agricultural co-operative. On the other hand, the reality base for 
the reconstruction of the “common” is the “New Co-operative Movement” and the 
“Construction of New Countryside” undertaken by the Central Government, which is 
making huge investment onto the construction of infrastructures and welfare system in 
the countryside, to improve the livelihood of rural population, as well as to relieve the 
pressure of overaccumulation of capital. As such˜, with New Left intellectuals’ 
pushing the state towards a more progressive policy towards te countryside, the 
“common” seems to find its actualization in both cultural imagination and practice.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 “Commune,” the premodern social formation characterized by the 
indistinctiveness of individual from the community, has been regarded by Marx as an 
alternative to the capitalist modernity and modern state in his late years. Marx’s 
attempt of turning the archaic form of “commune” into a modern political practice can 
be seen in his passionate praise of Paris Commune and his political vision for the 
Russian village commune; it was imagined as the way of democratic and egalitarian 
self-governance of the people. Following Marx’s advice for developing agrarian 
commune, socialist states (most of them underdeveloped, rural countries) adopted the 
road of collectivization, though they neglected Marx’s intention of overcoming the 
modern state.    
Like most socialist states, Chinese Marxists did not get rid of the obsession with 
the goal of modernizing itself and founding a modern nation-state; nevertheless, due to 
the influence of Mao Zedong, China’s socialism has taken on a distinct color of “anti-
modernity” and “anti-statism.” On one hand, “agrarian co-operative” was used as a 
means for China’s “internal primitive accumulation,” and there was even attempts to 
turn “agricultural co-operative” into an organ of the state, as seen in the People’s 
Commune, where the administration of township government and the agricultural 
production were merged into one. However, on the other hand, the effective and 
functioning agricultural co-operatives tended to be those who coincided with the 
natural village, below the level of township government and beyond the direct control 
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of state officials. Therefore, agricultural co-operative at the level of village was free of 
the direct control of the state and became a semi-autonomous political-economic body. 
In this light, the Marxist sense of “commune” can be found at the agricultural co-
operative. Chapter One shows that the traces of such a democratic and egalitarian 
commune that did not conform to the logic of state or capital are preserved in Zhao 
Shuli’s novel Sanliwan Village, which depicts agricultural co-operative from the 
perspective of peasants, and embeds the “co-operative” in the life-world local rural 
society rather than as part of the modern state; the thought of “delinking” the 
“commune” from the state became more manifest in his unfinished novel Lingquan 
Cave, written in 1958 when the agricultural co-operative was suffering from the state’s 
intense exploitation. Another writer Liu Qing, an ardent believer of “modernization” 
and a loyal follower of Communist Party, though appreciating co-operative mainly for 
its significance to China’s industrialization and modernization, nevertheless affirmed 
the legitimacy of the co-operative for its ethics of “mutual-aid” and “helping the 
weak.”  
This internal complexity and heterogeneity of China’s socialism was preserved 
in and extended to the Reform period in 1980s. Chapter Two deals with the changed 
form of agricultural co-operative, the “household contract responsibility system,” in 
which land was still collectively owned but was divided and contracted to each 
household, while peasants were entitled to the usage of land as members of the village. 
Under the increasing commercialized conditions, “commune” has lost its substantial 
economic function of organizing production activities and distributing products, but 
has ended up a supplement of capitalism, generating a huge army of migrating labor 
  226 
force for the city, which suited with the flexible economy of post-Fordist capitalism. 
Drawing on Marxist theory on small peasant economy, I analyze how the small 
peasant family plays a crucial role in keeping this migrating force from permanent 
settling down in the city and lowers the cost of labor power, and how such fractured 
family threatens its designated function of reproduction of labor power. The “death” of 
labor power hidden in the capitalist logic is captured and exposed in “underclass 
literature” that emerged around 2004, which aimed to challenge the modernization and 
developmentalism of Chinese society. As I show in Fang Fang’s Tu Ziqiang’s 
Personal Sorrow, Chen Yingsong’s Mother and Wild Cat Lake, the equilibrium of 
small peasant family which integrates small peasants and migrant workers in a single 
economic unit is extremely vulnerable and precarious, and any disruption of this 
equilibrium will cause the unsustainability of the reproduction of labor power. 
Entering into 2000s, China witnessed the resurging effort of restoring the 
cooperative organization in the countryside, as the state promoted the “New Co-
operative Movement” and put huge financial investment in “New Countryside 
Construction.” The background was the overaccumulation of capital at an advanced 
stage. How to deal with the non-capitalist rural area has become the center of struggles 
of various social forces. Is the countryside to be opened up as a new frontier for the 
surplus capital to make profit, or is it to be guarded as the last guarantee of peasants’ 
livelihood? It is at this critical moment that the Chinese state displays its rich 
complexity and its indebtedness to the socialist past. New Left intellectuals and left-
leaning economists look back at the socialist tradition of agricultural co-operative and 
hope to rebuild the village community into a functional economic co-operative, and 
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have been urging the state to divert the surplus funds to the long-term projects of 
infrastructure construction and welfare benefits of the rural population. Liu Jiming’s 
novel Human World can be seen as a statement of New Left intellectuals regarding the 
rural issues, whose imaginary solution is full of utopian color. On the other hand, 
Wang Anyi’s novel Anonymous, while displaying the philosophy of a “common” life 
formed between singular individuals through their “chance encounters” different from 
Liu Jiming, also places “common life” in the geographical space of countryside, a 
“delinked world” from the urban order based on property rights.  
Land relations in China’s rural area have been through major changes since 
1940s, such as land reform, collectivization, and 1980s’ economic reform, but the rule 
that peasants have the rights to their land has never changed. China did not have a pure 
and fully functional “commune” in Marx’s sense, but elements of “commune” as a 
self-governing economic body existed here and there throughout the socialist period in 
the agricultural co-operative based on natural village, and China has witnessed the 
revival of the effort of “re-organizing” and “re-collectivizing” in recent years.    
At any rate, China’s rural area has been the source of inspiration for the 
intellectual debates and literary imagination of “other worlds” and a center of 
intellectual debates to this day. As a critical component of China’s modernity, China’s 
rural area was not only the center of revolutionary struggles of Communist Party since 
modern times, but continues to define the nature of Chinese state to this day. At the 
moment, how to deal with the land in the countryside is still under debate, but the still 
remaining collective landownership that has thus far resisted capital’s infiltration 
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suggests undefined nature of Chinese society and the open possibility for China’s 
future direction.   
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